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Daily Report
East Europe

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Balkans: Uncertainty Over Success of Arms Control Talks

LD0506141896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1342 GMT 5 Jun 96

[By Goran Bradic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, June 5 (TANJUG)—A day ahead of the scheduled end of the conference on arms control in the Balkans under the provisions of the Dayton agreement it is still uncertain whether the talks will be successful and will end on time.

Negotiations are being conducted round the clock in the Vienna seat of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the organisers limit themselves to expressing the hope they will be completed on time.

Sources close to delegations participating in the conference are also reluctant to give any more specific information on the outcome of the conference.

Head of the Yugoslav delegation at the talks Ambassador Dragomir Djokic said that very intense talks were under way but that for now significant progress had not been made.

Despite all the difficulties a solution could be reached if all the sides are ready for compromise, the head of the Yugoslav delegation said.

Conference Chairman Norwegian Ambassador to the OSCE Eide Vigleik said cautiosly before the beginning of the last and decisive round of the talks that the talks would end on time if the participants so wished.

The failure of arms control talks, important for the Bosnia peace process and the military-political stability in the Balkans, would be a blow to the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

The arms control agreement is scheduled to be initialed on June 6 and signed at ministerial level on June 11 in Oslo.

It would be followed by a stage of counting of military holdings of the participants of the conference, further talks and real disarmament, organisers of the talks said.

The conference, which started on January 5 this year behind closed doors in Vienna's Hofburg Palace, groups representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska [Serb Republic], Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Albania: Serreqi, Austrian FM View CEI Cooperation

AU0306200496 Tirana ATA in English 0844 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 2 (ATA)—During the conference of foreign ministers of the Central Europe held in Austria recently, Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Austria Wolfgang Schuessel had a separate meeting in the royal headquarters of Hofburg with Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi yesterday.

The two ministers discussed the Central Europe Initiative [CEI] and the possibilities created for a more qualitative cooperation between the CEI countries and Albania.

Mr. Schuessel voiced his belief that the second round of elections in Albania will be marked by correctness and tranquillity. In this context he congratulated Serreqi on the landslide victory of the democratic forces in the first round of elections in Albania and assured of Austria's further and full support.

They dwelt on questions of the situation in the region and the extreme tense situation in Kosova.

During the conference Minister Serreqi also met and had separate talks with the foreign ministers of Italy, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and with representatives of the European Union and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Albania: Zhulali Thanks NATO for Accepting IFOR Request

AU0506153296 Tirana ATA in English 0940 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 4 (ATA)—Another NATO delegation with representatives of the Supreme Staff of the Allied European Forces is paying a visit to Albania, spokesman of Defence Ministry said.

Colonel Bianchi heads this visit which is realised in the context of the visits NATO delegations are paying to Albania. They will meet officials in the Albanian Defence Ministry to prepare the visit of the deputy commander of NATO Forces in Europe, General Mackenzie.

Albanian Defence Minister Safet Zhulali received the delegation in a special meeting, where they got acquainted with the victory of the democratic forces in Albania and their determination to continue the work to a further reformation of the Albanian Army in its way to be up to the NATO standards.

Zhulali confirmed Albania's determination to continue the dialogue with NATO underlining the fact that President Berisha and the democratic government are intensifying their efforts to become a full right member of NATO.

Zhulali thanked NATO for accepting Albania's request to take part in the IFOR [Implementation Force] peace force in Bosnia and said that Albania will always be a serious partner continuously strengthening its cooperation with NATO.

He once more stressed the commitment of his country to contribute to the peace, security and stability in the region.

The delegation was also received by Sheme Kosova, chief of the Albanian Army General Staff.

The delegation will also visit the peace keeping company which is training in Albania to take part and carry out peace keeping duties in Bosnia.

Albania: Berisha Welcomes U.S. Office in Kosovo

AU0506192596 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 5 Jun 96

[Announcer-read statement by Albanian President Sali Berisha in Tirana on 5 June]

[FBIS Translated Text] I welcome the opening of the U.S. Information Office in Prishtina [Pristina] as testimony to the direct interest of the U.S. Administration and President Clinton in a solution to the Kosova issue, which remains essential to long-term stability in our region.

Albania: Center Pole Memorandum to European Parliament

AU0506204096 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 5 Jun 96 p 6

["Memorandum That the Center Pole Will Submit to the European Parliament Today," signed in Tirana on 1 June by Social-Democratic Party Chairman Skender Gjinushi and Democratic Alliance President Neritan Ceka]

[FBIS Translated Text]

On the Situation Created in Albania by the Elections-cum-Coup d'Etat on 26 May and a Solution to This Crisis

The Situation

The Social-Democratic Party of Albania [PSD], a member of the Socialist International, and the Democratic Alliance [AD], an observer member of the European

Christian-Democratic Union, express to you their alarm at the situation created by the brutal electoral farce of 26 May 1996 in Albania. In fact, no elections were held on this date, but votes were seized by force according to a scheme carried out with the direct support of the secret service, the police, and criminal gangs organized by the Democratic Party [PD]. The efforts by the members of electoral commissions to resist the open theft of the votes were met with violent attacks, and, in order to avoid conflicts, both the PSD and the AD withdrew from the elections about four hours before their conclusion. Despite formal guarantees from President Berisha that the votes would be honestly counted, the apparatus of violence ran out of control, and announced on the following day of 27 May a PD victory in 113 out of 115 constituencies on the first-past-the-post list. The subsequent corrections and haggling that are still continuing did nothing but further compromise this result, which is tantamount to a coup d'etat.

The Consequences

1. In fact, Albania provides the first example in former communist Europe of a reversion to an appointed parliament without an opposition (at least without a legal opposition). Such a precedent would have a deleterious influence on the prospects for the democratic development of such Balkan countries as Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, etc.

2. Any recognition by the EU of these elections and the bodies resulting from them would mark the end of the short period of democracy inaugurated with great sacrifice in December 1990. The mechanism of these elections would be repeated in local elections a few months later and in every subsequent legislature, thus establishing a dictatorship in the guise of formal political freedom.

3. One immediate and irreparable consequence would be the elimination of the political class created in recent years and distrust among the Albanians in the values of European democracy.

4. The center represented by the Social-Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance suffered the most savage blow from this coup d'etat, and was in fact expelled from parliament and sent underground.

The situation that has arisen is doubtless a result of the weakness of the state and its democratic institutions, which were not strong enough to administer the free and secret votes of the people. The coup d'etat of 26 May was moreover only the final point reached by an authoritarian spiral that was begun four years ago by a corrupt party and state clique under the direction of President Berisha, which often met with the indifference or even the encouragement of European institutions and officials.

We must candidly say that both our parties have denounced this spiral of violence but have not received a proper response from the relevant organizations of the EU. The naive conception among some European politicians of the opposition's struggle to establish democracy in the Albanian Parliament and all our political life as a battle between a European-style right-wing and a former-communist left has had a harmful influence. Without dwelling on the fact that Berisha himself was a communist of the nomenklatura, and that Prime Minister Meksi, PD General Secretary Gjongecaj, and Albanian Television Director Sakajeva were all communists, we stress that this concept has artificially exacerbated the political struggle in Albania and has intentionally reduced the scope available to the center as represented by our two parties.

It was in fact the liberal-democrat and social-liberal center which represented the European and anticommunist alternative in the movement of December 1990. Ten of the 14 leaders of the PD at that time are now in the AD. Both our parties were the only ones to denounce in parliament Albania's membership of the Islamic Conference, and have consistently pointed Albanian politics toward the EU and NATO. Propaganda apart, the main target of the state's deadly blows was the center, which possessed about 10 percent of the seats in the previous parliament and, according to polls conducted by Eurobarometer and the International Republican Institute [IRI], was set not only to maintain but to increase its share of the vote. Meanwhile, there can be no justification for Berisha's anticommunist crusade against the Socialist left, when Eurobarometer and IRI polls suggested that its share of the vote would not be more than 23 percent. The aim of this campaign was doubtless, under an anticommunist blanket judgment, to obliterate the alternative of the center, which was the most credible alternative for Europe and the Albanian electorate. This explains why the leaders of the center, Arben Imami (AD), Gramoz Pashko (AD), Skender Gjinushi (PSD), Blendi Gonxhe (AD), Gaqo Apostoli (PSD), and Shahin Kadare (AD) were struck and severely ill-treated during the brutal intervention of the police and the secret service during the opposition demonstration on 28 May.

Solutions

The situation that has been created demands urgent repair through the intervention of the EU and the United States.

1. The proposal for partial elections in a number of constituencies, which would no doubt fail to dent the PD's

ridiculous majority, would be both counterproductive and not feasible in practice, for the following reasons:

a) The gross manipulation in the majority of constituencies would be excused and the principle of a free and secret ballot would be seriously compromised.

b) It would be impossible to achieve a consensus among the political parties in the constituencies where the elections would be repeated (at the moment, the Republican Party is proposing 40 constituencies, and the Christian-Democratic Party 15 completely different ones!)

c) Partial elections would favor the Socialist Party [PS], as a large party benefiting from the first-past-the-post character of the law.

d) At best, the result would lead to the imposition of a minority government that would lead to demands for elections again within a few months.

2. The only solution lies in free, secret, and general elections under international monitoring within a period of three months on the basis of a law that will correct the constitutional and procedural shortcomings noted by the OSCE observers in their report.

a) Immediately after President Berisha's acceptance of this solution, dialogue must be established among the political forces that participated in the 26 May elections.

b) These parties must sign a pact for social peace, rejecting political revenge and the persecution of the opposition, and preserving and respecting the functions, organs, and elected institutions of the present parliament, within constitutional deadlines.

c) In accordance with the law, the parliament elected on 22 March 1992 will remain in office until the start of the parliament resulting from the new elections, in order to prevent a constitutional vacuum.

d) By a consensus among the political forces, a four-party government (including the PD, the PS, the Center Pole, and the right) should be created, in order to carry the country toward new elections, according to the precedent of the Stability Government of June-December 1991.

We think that this solution will rebuild the fragile Albanian democracy and will balance the relationships among political forces in favor of the center and forces of a European and Atlantic tendency.

Regardless of the difficulties, this is a less costly solution in both time and money. A dictatorship in Albania would be the most costly system for the Albanians and for Europe and the United States.

We preserve a belief that the organs of the EU will make a decision corresponding to the principles and values which have inspired on their road toward democracy the people who sacrificed most under the communist dictatorship.

Albania: PS Calls for Protests Despite Ministry Warning

AU0406133596

[FBIS Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 4 June carries on page 1 a call for protests against the alleged rigging of the 26 May People's Assembly elections. Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 4 June carries on page 1 an Interior Ministry statement under the headline "Red Terrorists Prepare Acts of Violence."

ZERI I POPULLIT's unattributed item under the headline "Day of Mass Popular Protest" reads:

"The opposition parties invite Albanian voters to join peaceful rallies that will take place in all the towns of Albania today at 1800 [1600 GMT] to denounce the conduct of the election, which was neither free, democratic, nor honest, and to condemn the state violence used in Skenderbeg Square on 28 May."

This item is followed by an "Announcement" issued by the Socialist Party (PS) in Tirana on 4 June, which states:

"The PS and the opposition have insistently asked permission from the Interior Ministry to organize a rally on Skenderbeg Square at 1800 [1600 GMT] on 4 June to protest:

—The manipulation of the elections;

—The violence used against the demonstration of 28 May.

"Because the police did not give permission for this legitimate and peaceful demonstration, and accurate reports from within Democratic Party [PD] headquarters report that groups of thugs and bandits have been organized to provoke police violence that will compromise the peaceful character of our protest, we call on all members and supporters to gather on the premises of the PS headquarters, both indoors and outdoors, to demonstrate peacefully.

"In this way we will thwart Berisha's barbaric scenario whose aim is to compromise our fair and democratic struggle against the establishment of a dictatorship on the basis of rigged elections."

An Interior Ministry statement of 3 June published by RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE under the headline "Red Terrorists Prepare Acts of Violence" reads:

"The Interior Ministry spokesman reports that the ministry possesses incontestable information that former Deputy Musa Ulqini together with Bujar Hazizi and Razip Leli, former senior officers of the State Security Service, met certain groups of people in Tirana yesterday to organize and issue instructions for illegal acts of violence in Skenderbeg Square tomorrow.

"The Interior Ministry calls on citizens not to fall victim to these elements, against whom the responsible authorities will act according to law. The police is determined to secure order and the public peace in accordance with the law. The police will act according to their responsibilities against anyone who violates order and the public peace."

In evident response to this statement, Musa Ulqini issues a "Denial" on ZERI I POPULLIT's front page, which reads: "The Interior Ministry, through the criminal slanders of its own spokesman, is attempting to make excuses for the fatal and barbaric scenario that the PD staff have prepared to repeat a 2 April in Skenderbeg Square today [reference to deaths of demonstrators in Shkoder on 2 April 1991].

"My activities as a deputy, chairman of the PS in Tirana, and member of the PS Presidium, and as a citizen are legal and in accordance with the constitutional law on human rights and freedoms.

"The card of 'terrorist groups and the secret police' can no longer be played to stage incidents like that of the car bomb of 26 February to blame Musa Ulqini and the PS.

"Members and supporters of the PS!

"Be alert and avoid confrontations with plainclothes special troops who, according to reports from within the PD headquarters, will appear in Skenderbeg Square today and will clash with the police, describing themselves as Socialist militants."

Albania: PS Hunger Strikers Hold News Conference

AU0506191296 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 5 Jun 96 pp 4-5

[Unattributed report on news conference given by Socialist Party parliamentary candidates in Tirana on 4 June: "Seventy-Six Socialist Candidates for Deputy End Political Hunger Strike—We Will Use All Democratic Means To Prevent the Establishment of Dictatorship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kastriot Islami] We were not prepared to hold a news conference today. We were prepared to hold a peaceful demonstration. We therefore do not have a special statement to make. Our statement is a simple one. "The Socialist Party [PS] headquarters is besieged. Tirana is besieged. Albania is besieged. There are policemen and National Intelligence Service operatives everywhere. There are bands of armed thugs, whose aim is to retain our stolen votes by force." I will give the floor first to the candidate for deputy Pandeli Majko, who is also chairman of the hunger strike of the PS parliamentary candidates. He will read out his message, which is against provocations and in total conformity with the statements of the EU and the U.S. State Department.

[Namik Dokle] Excuse me for a short interruption. As my colleague said, this news conference is not following the normal pattern with a communique. It is an impromptu news conference, because circumstances in Tirana oblige us to work under strain. Skenderbeg Square in our capital of Tirana acquired a new name today. It might be called Pinochet Square, Marcos Square, Somoza Square, or Berisha Square, because if it were a democratic square it would indeed bear the name of our national hero Gjergj Kastriot Skenderbeg and it would be free for everybody to speak out in the place where they wish, in their own country, without bothering anybody. However, Berisha's regime and the Democratic Party [PD] have devised all kinds of farces, which have led to this siege that you can see for themselves. Albanians have only ever seen such scenes in films. It is ridiculous that Albanian Television today, immediately after its report on the hunger strike of the PS parliamentary deputies, should broadcast a report on "measures being taken to fight against ants." That is what they called the people who were fighting for democracy. That is what they call Pandeli Majko, Blendi Gonxhe, Ilir Meta, and dozens of young people whom you yourselves saw being dragged across Skenderbeg Square and being struck in the most barbarous fashion. We had intended once again to avoid confrontation, as we did on 26 May when we withdrew our members and observers from the electoral commissions in order to save Albania from bloodshed and confrontation. We therefore decided today too that our members and supporters should meet on the premises of the PS to meet with the strikers, to talk to them, and to discuss together Albania's woes. However, not even this was permitted and Sali Berisha has in practice done nothing but to impose an undeclared state of siege. We denounce this siege as not only antidemocratic, but illegal and unconstitutional.

[AFP] You mentioned other forms of democratic struggle. What do you think these forms are?

[Dokle] We said that we will use all democratic means, and you know very well what they are because you do not write for the official press. Only Albanian Radio-Television and the newspapers RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE, ALBANIA, and LAJMI I DITES do not recognize democratic methods. We will use all the means a truly democratic society possesses, step by step, and now in one way and now in another. Above all we are determined to defend democracy against the establishment of a new Berisha dictatorship.

[Pandeli Majko] Since the police struck the people of the opposition, it is clear that the opposition's struggle has moved into a new phase. The hunger strike is part of this phase. We do not at present possess any democratic medium to unfold our political position. They do not give us the squares, our activities are forbidden, the television censors us. Under these circumstances, we thought that a hunger strike was the best way of conveying our message. I also think that the end of the hunger strike is in political continuity with the departure of the delegation of the opposition parties to Brussels at the special invitation of the EU. This invitation is part and parcel of the statements of the EU and the U.S. State Department, which clearly suggest that the Albanian parties should call for the assistance of foreign monitors. This appeal looks very reasonable and timely. This is the firm position of the international community after the 26 May elections. On behalf of the participants in the hunger strike, I wish to say that we respond with a resounding "yes" to foreign monitors. At the same time, the illegitimate regime has preserved a deep silence.

[Tele Norba] You mentioned the support of the EU. What are you thinking of specifically, apart from the European envoys that are currently visiting the Presidency and the PD headquarters?

[Dokle] The clearest signal is the one given by the EU and the U.S. State Department. In order to understand this signal properly, you must listen to Mr. Tritan Shehu and Mr. Berisha, who, each in his own way, have most shamelessly made the most thoroughly antidemocratic, anti-American, and anti-European statements. According to the U.S. and British press, Berisha, when asked about the events in Albania, replied, "We might remind the Americans that candidates are even killed during their campaigns." This statement by Mr. Berisha has two subtexts. First, Berisha wants to pretend to be more democratic than the Americans, and second, he is directly attacking U.S. democracy. This attack has come at a time when U.S. democracy has become aware of the events in Albania, when the entire U.S. press has written against Berisha, and at the moment when the U.S. State Department has clearly stated that the elections of 26 May were a step backward in comparison with those of 1992. Meanwhile, Tritan Shehu, in his own way, said to the BBC at a news conference that the declaration of the U.S. State Department concerns technical matters and must be discussed in its technical aspects by the Central Electoral Commission. I do not think that any other politician can ever have been so idiotic as to give the name of a technical department to the most political department of the world's greatest and most democratic country. I do not think it can ever have occurred to the U.S. State Department at any time in the history of U.S. political life to make technical statements. The U.S. State Department and the EU are calling for elections in those constituencies where irregularities have been observed, and are asking for these elections to be supervised not by the PS and the other opposition parties, and not by Sali Berisha, the PD, or the Central Electoral Commission, but by [illegible]eign monitors. This is a key issue for us. We bel[illegible] that foreign monitors will accurately observe the situation of the elections and will clearly see that violations have taken place in all the constituencies according to a single plan acted on throughout Albania. On this basis, we think that new elections will be achieved in Albania.

[Unnamed journalist] Do you have information about the number of supporters that have set off toward the PS headquarters and information about the situation in other districts of the country?

[Dokle] Thousands of people have been impeded at all the crossroads leading to the PS building. There are four police cordons between the Court of Cassation and our building. IFA trucks full of policemen are at the bank. The same cars are driving in circles round Skenderbeg Square: These are National Intelligence Service [ShIK] cars filled with plainclothes officers who are to provoke incidents. The entire area is surrounded by policemen. It is a typical state of siege. According to our reports, thousands of people have set off for the PS headquarters. Nobody has set off from the districts because demonstrations are being held throughout Albania today against police violence and election rigging.

[Majko] Since 28 May, Albania has been under the shadow of the police. One of the messages of the hunger strike is the need for political dialogue and for all the Albanian parties to sit at the discussion table. Today the Albanian state and its government gave a clear and curt reply that we would not be dealing with government politicians at a discussion table but with policemen in bullet-proof vests.

[Islami] The scenario goes further. According to our information, the scenario was that a policeman would be killed and the PS would be accused of organizing this "massacre," so that special forces could later seize the

PS headquarters and make arrests and possibly commit murders. Our aim has been to avoid a scenario similar to that of 2 April.

[REUTERS] How will foreign monitors determine which constituencies will hold elections again? Will this intervention solve the crisis?

[Dokle] This much will solve the crisis of the elections. We have now gone beyond the phase of the elections, and have come to a dangerous moment, the threshold of a dictatorship. The German press wrote of "The first day of the dictatorship in Skenderbeg Square..." One can now talk about the second day, the third and fourth, and so on. When we talk of a political solution, we are therefore thinking of not allowing a new dictatorship to be established in Albania.

[Majko] It seems ironic to talk about constituencies where new elections will be held at a time when there are no monitors in Albania but only policemen.

[Deutsche Welle] Have you had contact with the president and the government in the last few days?

[Dokle] We have tried to make contact with the president, the government, Europe, the United States, and the moon but our telephones do not work. "Your telephone is temporarily out of order."

[Majko] I want to emphasize that our hunger strike was not for mercy from President Berisha and the present government, but was a protest strike. If Berisha had wanted dialogue with us, we would have responded.

[Deutsche Welle] Did you try any other way apart from the telephone?

[Dokle] No, we did not try any other way. We are here and Berisha knows perfectly well where we are because he sends the police. We are a channel through which we could convey to Berisha, if he wishes it, the declaration of the U.S. State Department.

[KOHA JONE] Do you think that one leader of the opposition could convey your protest over the election rigging to the chancelleries of Europe and the United States?

[Dokle] Several parties cannot be represented by one leader, because we have not created a link of this kind with other parties. Each party is independent and has its own program. The Albanian political spectrum is quite clear, but these parties are united in the defense of democracy and of the people's free vote. We are therefore talking about a political group in defense of a single cause, the struggle against dictatorship.

[KOHA JONE] You talked about the establishment of a dictatorship. Do you know of any case in which a dictatorship has been brought down by political dialogue?

[Dokle] Yes. For instance, the dictatorship of the colonels in Greece was brought down by democratic means.

Albania: PD's Shehu, EDU Observers on Elections

AU0406200196

[FBIS Report] Tirana ATA in English on 3 June carries several reports on a joint news conference held in Tirana on 3 June by Democratic Party Chairman Tritan Shehu and the following European Democratic Union observers who came to monitor the 26 May elections: Senator Nicando Marinaci, representative of the Italian Christian Democratic Union; EDU Secretary General Aleks Vintoriak; and Christine Branchou, representative of the Union for the Republic of France Party.

A 1737 GMT report by R. Floqi states: "Chairman of the Democratic Party (PD) Tritan Shehu and observers of EDU party delegations said the broad participation of the electorate, even after the Socialist Party (PS) and opposition parties boycotted the second round of the vote, is an indicator of a massive victory by the PD."

"The Albanian electorate massively and decisively ignored the absurd and destabilizing call of the Red Front to boycott the second round," said Shehu at the beginning of a news conference at the Palace of Congresses in Tirana on Monday (3 June).

"The Albanian electorate massively took part in the second round and with its free vote it expressed its aspirations and desires, its liking, which naturally are a basis for the democracy of the future in Albania," said Shehu, "announcing the outcome of the second round of parliamentary elections."

"The PD confirmed in the second round that it is capable of winning in any constituency and that the Albanian electorate is determined to support it everywhere, also in the so-called gray constituencies, which were more difficult for us. It is about the nine constituencies that competed in the second round.

"Last Sunday showed that the electorate not only took part in the voting but that the number of voters for the PD has increased. This complies with our concepts and ideas that man is in evolution," said Shehu, adding that "this proved the very negative effect of the red front act and its reaction."

The ATA report cites Shehu to have said that "60 per cent of the Albanian electorate took part in nine constituencies and in six of these constituencies the PD won some 78.5 per cent." "It is interesting that in these six constituencies the number of voters for the PD in relation to the first round has increased," said Shehu.

The report continues: "PD will always respect law and the opinions of our opponents, said Tritan Shehu in reply to a question. Asked how PD would respond to a call from OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], European Union, and U.S. Department of State for a partial rerun of elections, Mr. Shehu said: 'We do not want unfair votes. But we are not those who decide for the partial rerun. It depends on the extend of violations. Besides, there are authorized legal bodies that decide on this question, namely the Central Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court will fix it within a legal set deadline. We shall also win in the constituencies where elections will be repeated, said Shehu, because everybody wins with us.'"

"On May 26, the PD captured 44,931 votes, whereas on June 2, 53,910 votes, nearly 9,000 votes more than a week ago, some 1,500 votes more in each constituency," concludes the report.

Another report by R. Floqi at 1838 GMT covers the speech by Senator [illegible]cando Marinaci, representative of the Italian Christian Democratic Union, who "observed the development of the second round elections in Albania."

"The first day I came to Albania, I expected to find a nation in flames, but on the contrary I found people, children and women walking in a climate of absolute calmness," said the Italian senator.

"Marinaci said that the Albanian 'situation' had become an object of discussion in the Italian Parliament and that he had decided to come to Albania to see with his own eyes what the Italian left media were spreading in Italy," ATA reports.

"'I often refused to be accompanied. I walked alone along the streets so that I could ask people of the moment they were going through because I had only the information I could obtain in Italy from some Italian reporters,' Marinaci said at a news conference held by Democratic Party Chairman Tritan Shehu and EDU party delegation observers in Tirana on Monday," ATA notes.

"I could say here that many things have been instrumentalised. I asked to visit many villages of Albania, acting, perhaps, not with the delicacy of a parliamentarian. I avoided checks and joined people to ask if they had been threatened or had any clashes. They turned down all these charges," Marinaci said further on.

"I also met with the Human Rights Union Party leaders, who told me there had been some disorder, but I think every democratic country may have irregularities, but errors can be corrected," Marinaci said, adding that "Albania, despite some lack of perfection, is making ahead towards a democratic moment of life."

"Marinaci said that he also had visited the fortresses of the PS and of the former Communist Party, for instance the Krutje village, without introducing himself. And in all the polling stations he visited he was told that in the first round, two hours before the voting closed, the socialists had participated in the poll, but after the call from the PS Steering Committee, many of them had said regretfully that they had been ordered by the above to boycott the poll without any motive," ATA reports.

"I also asked to watch the signed written statements I was provided with without any hesitation. Later, I visited a farm near by and without introducing myself I asked people which party they had voted for and if they, their family or child had been threatened a day or an evening earlier. All were convinced of what they said, because the face tells when there is a lie. I realised that they were saying the truth," ATA cites the Italian senator to have stated at the conference. The report adds: "Also, in the former communist party polling stations I saw people happy because they had lands, Marinaci said."

Another ATA report at 2039 GMT adds: "Abandonment of polling station is also abandonment of the electorate who has believed you, said senator Nikando Marinaci. Marinaci said that on June 2 he had met Bashkim Zeneli and Ilir Meta in the Socialist Party headquarters in the presence of 200 people."

"In my opinion, the moment when polling station is abandoned is never a moment of evolution towards sound democracy. The role of the opposition in a genuine democracy is several times more important than the role of the one which governs," said Marinaci, who according to ATA added: "It is important that the opposition must control the position and the abandonment of polling is not the right way to follow."

"Information should have its both sides, as in a medal, he said addressing the reporters present. There has been much talk about the episode in the Scanderbeg Square where police maltreated one or two representatives of left wing political forces. This is a condemnable act," Marinaci is cited to have said, adding that "I am convinced that Albanian Government will not allow such episodes to happen again. I have also regretfully noted that the same press organs, a night before had not seen and did not point out that thousands and thousands of people in the square were celebrating the PD victory."

The report continues: "Later, Marinaci said that 'Just like mathematics is not an opinion but an exact science, the votes of the second round too as compared to those of May 26 first round showed that only voters of PS and some other party related to it had not participated in the ballot.' Mr. Marinaci also stressed in an interview with GAZETA SHQIPTARE that it was quite right the idea reached also after you have seen thousands of bunkers that one should believe more the one who has suffered for a longer time under dictatorship than the one who has persecuted others."

A 2002 GMT report notes: "EDU Secretary General Aleks Vintoriak said in a news conference held today by Democratic Party chairman Tritan Shehu and observers of EDU parties that both on May 26 election and in the second poll round in Albania, EDU had its monitors. Yesterday we visited six polling stations in nine constituencies where rerun of elections was held, said Vintoriak. He added that the participation by over 60 per cent of the voters in the ballot was in fact the most important result of yesterday's elections, because maths are maths. If a week ago when socialists, social-democrats and their allies boycotted elections, 85 per cent of electors participated in elections, their 60 per cent participation in the second round is a very significant proof."

ATA continues the EDU secretary's remarks: "We express our regret that socialists, social democrats, and their allies did not take part in yesterday's (2 June) rerun of elections. We are of the opinion that they should have participated in elections calmly and freely. This has also been urged several times by the president. I think that the boycott by socialists, social-democrats, and their allies of the first round and their non-participation in the second round runs counter to democratic processes. I also think they have not been advised well by their European socialist colleagues and in my judgment they should bear a sort of responsibility for this. We scrutinized with responsibility observations made by some monitors regarding technical irregularities during the first round of elections. We had altogether eight reports on the conduct of these elections and only two of them reported for troubles. I also want to add that none of these critical reports offered concrete and detailed facts. We as EDU insist that irregularities in the first round of elections must have had an evident impact on the result of elections in those constituencies in which a poll rerun is urged. This also is the position by European Union institutions. I am informed that Albanian authorities have expressed their readiness to do this, said Vintoriak. In a nutshell, judging from the results of the second round and on the basis of observations in the first round, we think that elections have been held correctly, thus voicing the political will of the Albanian electorate. This shows of the great support for the Democratic Party. We hope that democracy and the democratic processes should develop further in Albania, therefore we encourage opposition parties to join and take part in dialogue thus contributing to the development of democratic processes."

ATA further reports: "In reply to a question about his opinion if the PD victory in Albania would set an example to other eastern countries, Mr. Vintoriak said that it is better to put this question to socialist parties. As we have noted, there are three stages of free elections in Eastern Europe. During the first round conservative democratic parties won in many Eastern European countries in 90s, later communists came back to power in many countries and now in the third round, Albania may give a signal that people do not want to turn back to communism. In response to another question, Vintoriak said that the victory in May 26 elections marked a final destruction of communism in Albania, which lays the need for the creation of a moderate social-democratic movement."

A 2036 GMT ATA report notes that Christine Branchou, representative of the Union for the Republic of France Party, says "she was happy to respond to the invitation of the Albanian Democratic Party. 'The aim of our party is not to be involved in the Albanian political life but we think we are right to see how the Albanians voted last Sunday (26 May),' Branchou said at the joint news conference of Democratic leader Tritan Shehu and EDU party observers in Tirana on Monday. My friends and I visited several polling stations in Pogradec and Korce in southeastern Albania. The prevailing atmosphere, which was completely apparent, was that of peace, calmness and freedom," she said.

ATA continues Branchou's remarks: "We did not witness any propaganda by the democratic or any other parties. The polling stations were organised normally with representatives of the local government and political parties. But what struck our eyes was the Albanians' viewpoints, as they welcomed the visit. To be a democrat means to accept the other's supervision. This morning we can testify that Albania has won the freedom and all Albanians can breath freely."

"Branchou said they were concerned at the fact that they had not seen Socialist Party representatives in polling stations," ATA reports. "The opposition is duty bound to carry through to the end the fight for democracy. We hold that to be a democrat means to accept failure. To lose in democracy is unpleasant but not dishonourable," she said. "Just like the majority should respect all the rights of the opposition, and we consider this very important, so should the opposition respect the rules of the game to the end. We believe that the PD will maintain this democratic approach. Secondly we express concern over the people chairing the polling stations in the Korce area (Maliq, where the PS has the local government). On Saturday (1 June) evening and on Sunday morning PS militants threatened the electorate that they would deprive the people who voted from their social benefits."

"My last hope is that Albanian observers go to monitor various elections in European democracy countries," Branchou concluded, according to the ATA report.

Albania: Second Election Round Further 'Electoral Farce'

AU0406152096 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 4 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Mentor Gjini: "Electoral Farce Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The disgrace of 26 May, a blatant electoral farce that seriously spoiled Albania's image in the eyes of democratic Europe, was capped the day before yesterday with the second round of voting in nine constituencies. The voting on Sunday [2 June] was a further electoral farce, and one more argument in favor of the consistent stands taken by the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance, who considered the parliamentary elections of the previous week a coup d'etat accomplished by an unheard-of theft of the free votes of the people.

The second round took place under utterly ridiculous circumstances. On the pretext that they were "thinking of the small parties," the Democratic Party [PD] and Berisha withdrew their candidates in three constituencies, thus giving the green light to the triumph (i.e., the appointment by Berisha) of two Republican Party candidates and one of the National Front. The ruling party's scenario was transparent. Its withdrawal in these constituencies, following the earlier withdrawal of the opposition, thrust into the field of battle the parties of Godo [Republican Party], Ermenji [National Front], and Laco [Social-Democratic Union]. A bitter contest, and no joke! Parties that had gained minimal percentages in the first round contested against one another. We did not have to wait long for surprises. The candidate of the National Front, the party that flirted with fascism in World War II and has no electorate at all today, won in Vlore, that well-known anti-fascist city. Let anyone dare to say now that Berisha is counting his chickens before they hatch! Can the people of Vlore allow themselves to be represented in parliament by a National Front candidate with stolen votes?

Everything to do with Sunday's second round was artificial. No interesting developments could be expected in the constituencies of Permet and Gjirokaster, where the presidential advisers Pollo and Beja were running. Berisha had long ago promised them seats in the parliament. They are his trusties, and "deserve" a reward from their boss. On the basis of this logic, those in power appointed a further four PD deputies in the second round. The victory of these four was forecast in the bargain struck in the PD headquarters with the other mercenary parties.

The PD was especially concerned to create the impression that a large number of voters participated in the second round. The truth is entirely different from what PD leader Shehu said at his news conference yesterday. This second round, in which very few voters turned up to cast their ballots, and a fair proportion of them under the pressure of the ruling party, showed clearly once again that the PD is in a minority. Impartial Albanian and foreign observers watched the attendance throughout the day at several polling stations in Mirdite and Vlore, and saw a turnout of 10 percent. In one polling station in Rreshen, about 50 people voted. The voters turned out to be extremely indifferent to the second round even though the PD's television station broadcast incessantly throughout the day its famous spot about sensitizing the public to vote. The electorate responded to the opposition's call to boycott the second round in order not to become accomplices with Berisha and his party in further violating democracy.

The voting (it cannot be called an election) of 26 May and the second round of 2 June, with their fatal blows to the will of the people, have buried pluralism in Albania. They have further deepened the country's political crisis. The band of thieves who stole the people's free votes cannot in any way represent a legitimate state. This would not be just paradoxical, but unimaginable. The only solution is to repeat the elections in order to restore the people's hope and trust because the democratic world too wants a different image for Albania, the image of a genuinely democratic country, in which the temple of democracy, the parliament, will not belong to the police but will issue from the verdict and free vote of the people.

Albania: 'Unidentified People' Attack Polling Official

AU0506205496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The People's Assembly Press and Information Directorate announces that, during the late night hours in Constituency 5 in Shkoder district, which includes Lac, Vau i Dejes, Guri i Zi, Mjede, and

Vige Communes, unidentified people have attacked Mr. Albert Ndreca, chairman of the Polling Station No 12 in the Mjede village, with knives.

According to the testimony of Mr. Ndreca, he has received threats, both before and since the elections, from Socialist Party militants.

Pjeter Arbnori, a deputy in this constituency, has asked the authorities of the Public Order Department in Shkoder to investigate this bitter incident quickly in order to be able to discover the culprits expeditiously, the statement ends.

Czech Republic: Official Results of Parliamentary Elections

AU0406155896 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 3

["Official Results of the Elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Approved by the Central Electoral Commission in Prague on 3 June 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Voting Results (in Percent)

Party	Prague	Central Bohemia	Southern Bohemia	Western Bohemia	Northern Bohemia	Eastern Bohemia	Southern Moravia	Northern Moravia	Total
1 SD-LSNS	2.98	1.96	1.95	2.81	2.28	2.42	1.73	1.19	2.05
2 CSSD	18.68	25.40	24.95	25.71	28.74	24.78	24.96	34.21	26.44
3 ODS	43.85	31.24	29.28	29.91	26.48	29.67	24.14	27.52	29.62
4 PB	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 NEZ	0.32	0.60	0.53	0.68	0.54	0.55	0.44	0.45	0.50
6 MNS-HSMS	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.80	0.59	0.27
7 DEU	4.38	3.51	3.27	3.07	2.79	2.69	1.94	2.13	2.80
8 ODA	9.60	5.93	6.14	5.73	5.88	6.44	7.50	3.92	6.36
9 SCK	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10 KDU-CSL	5.39	5.40	9.01	5.09	3.39	10.79	12.96	7.82	8.08
11 DZJ	1.79	4.12	3.71	3.79	3.96	3.61	2.84	2.20	3.09
12 SDL	0.06	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.10	0.13
13 CMUS	0.11	0.33	0.46	0.40	0.22	0.46	0.87	0.43	0.45
14 CP	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05
15 KSCM	7.45	11.22	11.16	11.31	11.56	9.56	11.16	9.78	10.33
16 SZ	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17 SPR-RSC	3.72	8.05	7.82	9.86	12.65	7.47	7.77	7.87	8.01
18 LB	1.62	2.00	1.47	1.41	1.30	1.35	1.28	1.12	1.40
19 HSMSMNSJ	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.46	0.63	0.42
20 CAO	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Participation	69.73	78.35	77.67	74.56	72.79	80.44	79.26	76.80	76.41

Party	Prague	Central Bohemia	Southern Bohemia	Western Bohemia	Northern Bohemia	Eastern Bohemia	Southern Moravia	Northern Moravia	Total
Valid votes	99.52	99.34	99.39	99.32	99.35	99.42	99.41	99.35	99.39

NOTE: SD-LSNS = Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party; CSSD = Czech Social Democratic Party; ODS = Civic Democratic Party; PB = Right Bloc; NEZ = Independents; MNS-HSMS = Moravian National Party-Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia; DEU = Democratic Union; ODA = Civic Democratic Alliance; SCK = Party of Czechoslovak Communists; KDU-CSL = Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party; DZJ = Pensioners for a Secure Life; SDL = Party of the Democratic Left; CMUS = Bohemian and Moravian Center Union; CP = Czech Right; KSCM = Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; SZ = Greens Party; SPR-RSC = Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia; LB = Left Bloc; HSMSMNSJ = Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia and Silesian-Moravian National Unification; CAO = Nationwide Caucus of Citizens

Czech Republic: Talks To Break 'Postelection Stalemate' Viewed

AU0506135696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "(km, jik)": "Zeman Will Control the Chamber, the Cabinet Will Remain With Klaus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The postelection stalemate is approaching its first outcome: A right-wing government headed by Vaclav Klaus will be formed and carefully supervised by parliament, in which Zeman's Social Democrats will have an important say. This was the result of the series of political talks held yesterday.

The opposition Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] has made it clear that it will support the formation of a minority government made up of the current coalition. CSSD Deputy Chairman Karel Machovec has confirmed that this is a principle on which his party has agreed.

The governing parties—the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party—will, however, according to Machovec, have to agree to the Social Democrats assuming important functions in parliament and will also have to accede to Ministers Jindrich Vodicka, Karel Dyba, and Igor Nemec not holding posts in the new government.

The CSSD, on the other hand, conceded that ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus would form the government.

The possibility that Klaus will again be the new prime minister was not ruled out yesterday even by Zeman, who had originally resolutely disagreed with this. The Social Democrats apparently withdrew from their original demand that Vaclav Klaus not form the government after it became clear that this option is absolutely unworkable in the coalition. "The view that Klaus should not form the government was expressed, but I do not think this is a matter that needs to be discussed at the moment as a significant issue," said Machovec.

The CSSD deputy chairman also confirmed that personnel issues in forming the government will certainly be among the Social Democrats' demands. "We have made it clear that we do not agree with Messrs. Ruml, Dyba, and Vodicka being in the new government. They are not really experts, not the right people for the job," declared Machovec. These demands from the Social Democrats will, in all probability, be met. Namely, the ODS had reckoned with the departure of Dyba and Nemec even if the current coalition had not found itself in the minority after the elections.

"It is possible that Vodicka will also go, but it would not be right to explain this as a concession to the Social Democrats," said a member of the ODS leadership yesterday. Former Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Jindrich Vodicka himself claims that his fate is not in his own hands.

The Social Democrats will want to delegate two of their representatives to the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies. Machovec did not rule out that this would also involve the post of parliament chairman, to which the leader of the Social Democrats, Milos Zeman, would aspire.

"The historical success the Social Democrats achieved in the elections this year is, to a great extent, associated with the person of Milos Zeman," said Machovec.

CSSD Deputy Chairwoman Petra Buzkova had previously been recommended for the potential post of parliament deputy chairman.

Machovec did not specify the Social Democrats' other demands. "So far, we have not discussed whether we would like to hold this or that parliamentary committee. But we would like to have a representative occupancy in them," he added. Reliable sources from the CSSD, however, have indicated that the Social Democrats' interest is heading toward the Economy Committee and the commission that supervises the activities of the secret services.

The Social Democrats will, apparently, also ask the coalition not to promote individual accounts in health care and that it commits itself to decentralizing state administration and to introducing the obligation to declare property. However, the coalition will, evidently, not accede to these demands.

Czech Republic: Zeman, Lux Say Consensus Needed To Form Cabinet

AU0506170796 Prague PRAVO in Czech 5 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "(dla)": "Zeman and Lux: It Is Necessary To Form the Government Following a Broad Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Following the meeting yesterday afternoon—which lasted for more than an hour—between Milos Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], and Josef Lux, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, the affinity of the two parties' stances on the means for forming the new government was confirmed. However, a question mark still hangs over the person of the prime minister.

J. Lux stated that his desire is for the politicians responsible to be able to hold talks, to suppress their personal aversions or ambitions, and to seek a solution. He supported the idea of an agreement between the current coalition parties and the Social Democrats that would contain an understanding on the form of parliament, and a consensus for the programs in foreign policy and select domestic policy spheres. "I think the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] itself should weigh whether the potential vanity of one man is of greater value to it than reaching an agreement on sensible forms of cooperation," said Milos Zeman to journalists following his meeting with Josef Lux on Tuesday [4 June].

Zeman refused to comment on the possibility that Vaclav Klaus could chair a minority government made up of the current coalition. He said that "it would not be polite to rule out this matter definitively before our talks with the president." However, he called upon journalists to imagine Klaus, after a policy agreement is reached, "standing behind the rostrum in the Czech parliament and saying that he supports regional decentralization, the separation of the pension funds from the state budget, the institute of ombudsman, conceivably even the institute of referendum, and other specific measures."

"I do not think this would seem quite credible," said Zeman, who stated later that he would be willing to meet with Klaus. Zeman did not specify the conditions for the Social Democrats' support for the current coalition, but he is hinting that they comprise the points mentioned. According to Zeman, they will follow on from the talks with the president. The CSSD should, according to Zeman, have the opportunity to exercise very considerable parliamentary control to ensure that the government cannot break faith with the policy points agreed upon.

Such a document should have a written and binding form so that it is absolutely transparent. Zeman described the possibility of a grand CSSD-ODS coalition as "very, very unlikely," and commented on the "basic dissimilarity of the positions of the two parties."

CSSD First Deputy Chairman Karel Machovec said on a television news program that the CSSD would demand the posts of at least two deputy chairmen in the Chamber and the chairmanship of certain committees. So far the opposition has not held any of these posts. According to Zeman, the Social Democrats would want, for example, changes in social policy and health care.

The CSSD's support for a minority government under the leadership of Vaclav Klaus is, at the moment, beyond the bounds of the relatively broad course that the Social Democrats' Presidium set for the bargaining. This statement was made by Karel Machovec to PRAVO on Tuesday. He added that this support would only be possible as a matter for potential further talks.

Czech Republic: Klaus Rejects Zeman Role in Forming Cabinet

AU0506153096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "(rep)": "The Coalition Does Not Want To Talk About Concessions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Vaclav Klaus was yesterday the last of the coalition party leaders not to rule out the possibility that he will accede to some of the demands put forward by the Social Democrats in return for their parliamentary expression of confidence in a government made up of the current coalition.

At the same time, however, he again denied that Milos Zeman could have a say in the composition of the new coalition cabinet. "It is clear that there can be no such consideration. We are surprised that this issue has been raised at all," he said.

So, if some of the ministers are to be replaced, the governing parties are not admitting that this would be under pressure from the Social Democrats. "We do not want Zeman to make his demands public before he discusses them with us. If he continues to behave like this, he has to bear in mind that we will not discuss his other conditions with him at all," said one of the coalition's representatives.

"We cannot accept the perception, which Mr. Zeman is spreading, that he won the elections. I do not think that the elections ended 101:99 for Mr. Zeman. Rather, they ended 99:61," declared Klaus. Following the elections, the current governing coalition has 99 seats in the 200-member Chamber, while the strengthened Social Democrats have 61.

"The Social Democrats do not intend to issue conceited, premature, and—far less—hysterical statements," said Zeman a few hours later, in response to this.

Klaus had expected on Monday [3 June] that the president would ask him to form the government immediately; nevertheless, he accepted Havel's notion yesterday that the right wing reach an agreement with the Social Democrats before a decision is made on the prime minister. At the same time, Klaus expressed himself in favor of the talks involving all four parties and the president. "We have to talk first; we can call them the 4 + 1 talks. These talks are necessary. This is an attempt to give things a certain direction," he said.

Klaus did not hold a separate meeting with Zeman yesterday, but it is not out of the question that one will take place today. Zeman, Lux, Kalvoda, and Klaus will again hold talks one by one with President Havel all day today. The so-called 4 + 1 talks will take place at the Castle on Thursday [6 June], and a general agreement on the course of action in forming the cabinet could be announced after them. But the definitive agreement on the composition of the government will still be preceded by talks on the coalition agreement and the distribution of seats in the government and parliament and other senior functions.

Yesterday afternoon's appeal by Josef Lux and Jan Kalvoda that the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Social Democrats express themselves clearly on the possibility of a so-called grand coalition indicates that the two smaller parties were concerned that Klaus and Zeman could reach an agreement on a compromise without their knowledge. That is, according to a coalition representative, Klaus took the People's Party and the Alliance by surprise when he asked at his meeting with the president on Monday that he be entrusted with forming the government Immediately.

Kalvoda and Lux each also held separate meetings with Zeman yesterday to convince him that he cannot demand a replacement for Vaclav Klaus, and to discuss with him the conditions for his support for the coalition government.

A senior representative from one of the coalition parties stated that Lux and Kalvoda wanted to induce Zeman to help them promote some of their demands against the ODS—for example the establishment of regional self-administrations. ODS Deputy Chairman Jiri Vlach has already indicated that, after losing the coalition majority in parliament, his party is prepared to make greater compromises than previously.

Zeman is demanding that the CSSD have an opportunity in parliament to supervise the government effectively. "The Social Democrats should have the opportunity to exercise very considerable parliamentary control to ensure that the government cannot break faith with the points agreed upon in the program. The document should have a written and binding form so that it is absolutely transparent," he said. According to Lux, it was not clear from the debate with Zeman that the CSSD would want to participate in the government.

Czech Republic: Analysis of Options for Forming New Government

AU0506093296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 2

["Analysis" by Roman Gallo: "The Game Over the Shape of the Government Is Only Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The conundrum of what the new government will be like and whether it will be formed by Klaus, Lux, or Zeman will, in all probability, be without an answer for another couple of days or, more likely, weeks.

President Havel, from whom a solution had been expected, suggested yesterday that the government should be formed by the three current coalition parties, but, in the same breath, he immediately added that they should talk about this first with the Social Democrats.

The two main rivals, however, are going into the crucial talks on the future shape of the cabinet with irreconcilably different conditions. Zeman declares repeatedly that Klaus should not again hold the office of prime minister, while the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] counters logically that it goes without saying that it will never surrender the nomination of its leader for the post of prime minister.

On the part of Milos Zeman, of course, the issue may involve setting a high target that he will be willing to reduced gradually in return for concessions from the other side, such as a promise of the post of parliament chairman or the sacrificing of ministers unacceptable to the Social Democrats. At the moment, this option seems far more likely than the one whereby the ODS would replace Vaclav Klaus with someone else.

Furthermore, the two smaller governing parties, the Civic Democratic Alliance and the People's Party, which are endeavoring to cash in on the unclear situation and are attempting to acquire a substantially greater influence in the potential old-new government than previously, are also making a contribution to the whole game. The official and unofficial statements by Chairmen Lux and Kalvoda merely confirm this course of action.

Vaclav Klaus, however, also has another option, although it is a very risky one. He could persuade his colleagues, with whom he has been in the government for four years, to stick closely to him, not to give in to the pressure from the strong Social Democrats, and to attempt themselves to form a new cabinet. Then they could appear before parliament and bank on managing, before the vote of confidence in the government, to persuade at least two meandering opposition deputies to raise their hands in favor.

If this gamble were not—even at the second try—to come off, there could be a moment for Josef Lux, who theoretically could reach an agreement with the Social Democrats, even though he is now rejecting this solution. This just conceivable coalition, however, would be 20 votes short of a parliamentary majority, and they would have to be supplemented either by the—for Lux—unpalatable communists, or by the ODS, which is still sticking to the slogan: Klaus or nothing.

Moreover, it is certainly far more advantageous for the Social Democrats to fill important posts in parliament and to continue their sweeping bombardment of the governing coalition than to enter at any cost into an uncertain minority government with the People's Party. This strategy could bring them even greater success in the possible early parliamentary elections than the result with which they surprised perhaps everyone a couple of days ago.

Czech Republic: 'Hard Life' for Minority Government Predicted

AU0406094796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Jun 96 p 2

["Analysis" by Roman Gallo and Jan Lipold: "A Minority Government Would Have a Hard Life"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The new parliament will very soon change the targeted distribution of social allowances into across-the-board ones; will reject the law on the new Czech-Slovak border, which will complicate relations with Bratislava; and will abolish the pensions law that takes into consideration raising the age limit for retirement. This notion, which just a couple of days ago seemed unlikely, almost crazy, may now easily be fulfilled.

The Social Democrats, the communists, and Sladek's republicans will have 101 seats at their disposal, sufficient to outvote the current coalition parties. So, a situation completely different from any the Chamber has experienced to date will arise. It is also possible that the parties will not keep all of their promises to the electorate and will reach an expedient agreement on compromises.

The first test of parliament's behavior will be the vote of confidence in the new government. If all of the deputies respect party discipline, it is virtually impossible for a government to be formed that the majority would support. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS], bolstered by the seats of the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], will need two votes for parliament to express confidence in it. Zeman will also find himself in a similar stalemate situation if he reaches an agreement with the KDU-CSL and relies on the tacit support of the communists.

The politician that the president entrusts with forming a government will have no choice but to appear before the deputies with a proposal for a minority government or to draft a policy statement that would also be acceptable to part of the opposition.

The political experts are allowing for the possibility of a minority coalition government, but they agree that this would be an unstable solution because support for government proposals would depend on the attendance or momentary favor of a couple of opposition deputies. "It would be enough for five deputies to get sick, and the situation would change suddenly," said Petr Fiala, a political scientist from Masaryk University.

Milos Zeman may even go for a risky option. He lets the right wing form a government now and supports it in parliament. Then, with the great strength of his deputies, he will promote measures that bring him more points and enable him to win early elections.

No matter whether a cabinet led by the ODS or the Social Democrats is formed, it will have a harder life in parliament than its predecessor. It will introduce its proposals into a divided Chamber, where two equally strong blocs oppose one another. The smaller parties that, depending on the situation, inclined toward the government or the opposition have disappeared from parliament.

"The fact that neither of the strongest parties on the left and right of the political spectrum is capable of putting together a broader-coalition majority government means a really unstable situation," stated Petr Fiala.

Another possibility—and not an improbable one—is that the three attempts to form a government as specified by the Constitution will end in failure and new elections will be called. These, however, could only be held at the beginning of next year, after the Senate is elected in the fall. The Chamber cannot be dissolved until then. Either the current cabinet would then govern until the new elections or a caretaker government could be appointed.

According to some political scientists, the close election results will have one obvious outcome: The influence of President Havel, who will be an important figure in the search for a stable government and political compromises, will increase.

Czech Republic: PM Views Way Out of Postelection Situation

LD0506175596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the conclusion of today's separate talks with Czech President Vaclav Havel, Civic Democratic Party Chairman Vaclav Klaus took the floor:

[Begin Klaus recording] We discussed in great detail the individual variants of a way out of the postelection situation. We are truly building on the real political strength of the individual parties on our political scene. This is the first thing we would like to stress, and I believe that some of you know what we have in mind.

Second, the next step is tomorrow's meeting of the coalition party chairmen—the coalition three. That is the second piece of news we have for you.

The third step is as follows: A possible further meeting with the president should deal with three main points. We discussed this with the president in detail. The first point is to draw up a schedule of how to proceed from now until the time the policy statement of a future government is approved. The second point is to determine how the government will be set up. The third point is a fundamental agreement on the basic roles in the Czech parliament. [end recording]

Czech Republic: ODS Leader Objects to Havel Role in Forming Cabinet

AU0306194096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jun 96 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Miroslav Macek, member of the Civic Democratic Party Executive Council, by Jana Pankovcinova and Juraj Hrabko; place and date not given: "President Havel's Active Participation in Coalition Talks Would Be Above-Constitutional"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Miroslav Macek has voiced objections to Czech President Vaclav Havel's active involvement in postelection coalition talks on the formation of a new government.

[SME] What made you voice those objections?

[Macek] Being the strongest party in the elections and forming a functioning coalition are two different things. My concern was that the coalition partners, if they receive substantially fewer votes than the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], will try, with the participation of the president, to play a game aimed at minimizing the ODS's power position. I was worried that they would start playing their game not according to the number of votes gained in the elections, but according to the one-to-one-to-one ratio—that is, that they would insist, within the framework of the coalition treaty, on each party having one vote. At that moment, decisions cease being made by parliament because parliament would only be endorsing what had been previously approved by the party apparatuses, and decisions start being made by party apparatuses, which are not elected by the citizens. This is not good as a matter of principle.

[SME] Are you out to prevent the ODS's coalition partners from having the right of veto in the government?

[Macek] I am afraid our partners will be pushing the coalition talks precisely in this direction.

[SME] Are you convinced that the Christian Democratic Union [KDU] and Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] chairmen will proceed as you expect them to—with the active participation of the president?

[Macek] I am convinced they will. However, while the Constitution clearly defines the president's rights and duties, President Havel has the tendency to establish certain above-constitutional or extraconstitutional precedents: He wants to participate actively in the coalition talks. This means that not only would political parties be negotiating, but yet another element would be in the game, which is a very extensive interpretation of the Constitution. The president should do only that with which he is tasked by the Constitution—entrust a politician with forming the government, and, once he receives the list of ministers, appoint them or not appoint them. Everything else is above-constitutional [nadustavne], in my opinion.

[SME] Why do you think Havel would enter the coalition talks to the detriment of the ODS?

[Macek] I do not claim that this would always be to the detriment of the ODS. I dislike the idea in principle. The Constitution does not say anywhere that the president should participate in coalition talks and talk in them.

[SME] Would it not be better if the new composition of the government were discussed with him in advance?

[Macek] Consultation and active participation in talks are two different things. I proceed from the president's words. He said that he wants to participate actively in the talks. I have nothing against the political parties' consultations with the president at a certain moment.

Czech Republic: Commentary Criticizes Havel's 'Vaccilation'

AU0406161496 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "The President's Needless Vaccilation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the Republic is to send abroad a message that stability is not in fatal danger, the election winner, Vaclav Klaus, must expeditiously attempt to form a minority right-wing government, one that could, under precisely set conditions, reckon with the support of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD]. It is therefore incomprehensible why President Vaclav Havel did not, already yesterday, entrust Vaclav Klaus with initiating talks with his coalition partners and with the opposition on forming a cabinet.

It would be immensely irresponsible to dither over the government formation for additional days and weeks and to wait for the Chamber of Deputies to meet and elect its bodies, as proposed by the president. There is not a single reason for this, and we would only be needlessly irritating the sensitive nerves of foreign stock market and other investors.

Vaclav Havel is right in that the talks on the new cabinet will be difficult and will require maximum readiness for consensus. But let this be the worry of the one to whom the president assigns this task.

The CSSD's electoral success surely entitles Milos Zeman to set specific conditions, and one can even imagine the strongest opposition party gaining the seat of chairman of the Chamber of Deputies. If, however, Zeman claims that he will support any cabinet with the exception of a government headed by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, without knowing its further composition and policy statement, he is engaged in irresponsible blackmail.

The elections condemned Klaus and Zeman to cooperating in some way and to seeking a way out of the stalemate. Klaus is ready, in the interest of the stability of the country, to offer to the CSSD chairman the highest parliamentary post. If Milos Zeman is incapable of shedding his old hatred [zast] of Vaclav Klaus even at this moment, he is behaving not like a responsible politician but like an obstinate child.

If Zeman wants at all costs to try to form a government, there is nothing simpler than that. The CSSD just has to deny support to the cabinet proposed by Klaus and, on the basis of the election results, it will then be Zeman's turn. For this to happen, however, it is necessary that the whole process be set in motion quickly and exactly according to the Constitution. The president should not put off the starting shot any longer.

Czech Republic: ODA Official Denies Possibility of ODS Merger

AU0506173896 Prague PRAVO in Czech 5 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "(ryc)": "ODA Is Not Considering a Merger With the ODS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The idea of a merger between the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] and the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], which was expressed unofficially on Monday [3 June] by a representative of Klaus's party, was rejected on Tuesday by ODA Deputy Chairman Libor Kudlacek in a conversation with PRAVO. According to him, the Alliance should have no reason to doubt that it will hover on the verge of 5 percent in the future. He was referring to the fact that ODA won greater support in these elections than it did in 1992—this year, it won 6.36 percent of the vote, while it won 5.93 percent in the 1992 elections to the Czech National Council.

Czech Republic: Klaus To Sue Daily PRACE for Libel

AU0406163996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "(km)" and CTK: "Klaus Intends To Go To Court Over Libel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Civic Democratic Party Chairman Vaclav Klaus, who so far has not been upset by the majority of the attacks against him and has deflected them with a smile on his face, is preparing to submit a complaint against the daily PRACE. The newspaper, which is owned by Poldi Kladno chief Vladimir Stehlik, published just before the elections an alleged form in which, according to it, Klaus was applying for membership in the KSC [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia].

"This is another of the dirty tricks that were played before the elections," declared Klaus on Czech Radio. PRACE published a copy of the alleged form last Friday [31 May]—that is, on the first day of the elections. Klaus's name is written on the form in an identifiable script, and the whole document is inscribed by hand like a questionnaire. "This is a normal employment application form to which has been appended, in a completely different script, that it is a request to join the KSC," said Klaus. "I have hesitated about entering into court actions many times, but this time I will do so," he declared.

Slovakia: Government Paper Views Outcome of Czech Elections

AU0406073896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by Stanislav Tomanek: "Czech Voters Held Up A Mirror to Their Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic held up a mirror to the state's economy. The picture that can be seen in this mirror is far more realistic than the one being permanently offered to us by media at home and abroad. It seems that the "Czech economic miracle" is more the work of propaganda than the product of actual results. The most obedient student among the postcommunist countries was doing his homework in an exemplary way, which earned him plenty of praise. Realistic observers have, however, been warning, above all, against the abysmal foreign trade deficit and the mass influx of speculative capital, which, as we know, profits from the artificial stability of the Czech koruna and exceptionally advantageous interest rates.

It is also in this context that one must see the Czech government coalition's self-congratulation regarding the influx of foreign capital. Foreign capital is rarely a good servant but very often an evil master. It is welcome, in particular, when invested in modern technologies and promising projects. Even before the elections, voices demanding the Czech koruna's devaluation, that is, the setting of its average exchange rate, were to be heard. But as Vaclav Klaus perhaps unwittingly said, the most important thing for his party was to win the elections. Judging from their results, however, he did not live up to expectations. If he now tries to form a government with his present coalition partners, there will be a minority government in Prague, which definitely is not an ideal situation, especially in a period of transformation when new proprietary relations are taking shape.

It seems that, despite the government coalition being the media's favorite, the Czech voters lent greater credence to their own perception of the reality. Even the country's speedy admission into the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], supposedly the rich countries' club, did not convince the Czech voter that he lives in a land of milk and honey. People's everyday problems were wind in the sails of Zeman's Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD]. The present government coalition will have 99 seats compared to 101 seats held by opposition deputies.

Whatever the composition of the future Czech government will be—a cabinet headed by Vaclav Klaus, one headed by Josef Lux, or a caretaker government—it is certain that the economic reality will require logical steps.

The promise of doubled salaries by the year 2000 probably will not be delivered. More likely to take place are price growth and devaluation. The consequences for citizens will not be pleasant. This could result in government instability and a change in the balance of power. We do not wish our closest neighbor such a development. It is in the interest of both partners that their economies should advance and mutual trade grow, also because we remain each other's very important economic and trading partners. Perhaps, even the hotheads from the Vltava river will now realize that their immense efforts to be admitted into the promised [European] Union or NATO will not automatically solve basic economic problems. The Slovak prime minister's idea appears to be far more realistic—he proposes that the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement] states admit additional members to test on a smaller scale their future joint activities within united Europe.

Slovakia: Politicians Comment on Czech Election Results

AU0306194596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "kw": "Elections in the Czech Republic Through the Eyes of Slovak Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The distribution of seats following the announcement of the results of the first count in the Czech parliamentary elections is perceived by representatives of the political scene in Slovakia as foreboding difficult talks on the formation of a stable government. Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Chairman Jan Carnogursky expressed the view that stability in the Czech Republic was in the interest of the entire region. "It seems that before the 1992 elections Slovak irrationality had an auspicious influence on Czech voters and they managed to rally around a meaningful coalition. This time the Czechs were not too successful in this," Jan Carnogursky said. Frantisek Sebej from the Democratic Party [DS] said that the election results spell bad news for the Czech public because instability is looming, but also for the DS, because until now the Czech political scene was a symbol of a successful right-wing policy for the DS. "If Mr. Zeman, who represents, within the framework of the present opposition, the only force that is not opposed to the political system as such, rejects a grand coalition, I dare say that they will not succeed in forming a functional cabinet in Prague," Sebej added. Democratic Union [DU] Chairman Jozef Moravcik believes that, based on the election results, Czech policy will not be as stable as heretofore, "which cannot please us." In his opinion, the Czech right and left will have to start cooperating. Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Deputy Chairman Peter Weiss expressed pleasure at the success of the Czech left. "Following the disappointment in Israel, the left needs success," he said, and noted that a stalemate situation could come to pass on the Czech political scene. "I can scarcely imagine a minority government, and complicated talks will therefore have to take place. We would like to see Social Democrats in the government," Peter Weiss said.

Slovakia: Meciar Comments on Health, Coalition Tensions

AU0506145696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 5 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Chief Editor Jan Smolec from the "Italics From the Government" column: "Vladimir Meciar: Tension in Coalition Is Not Heading Toward Its Breakup"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister came to yesterday's cabinet session. He announced in a weakened and hoarse voice: "Sergej Kozlik [deputy prime minister] asked me to show up at least symbolically. Here I am symbolically."

He informed the government about the state of his health. What brought him down was, to use medical terminology, a protracted viral infection of the respiratory organs complicated by inflammation of the outer ear. Reacting to untrue reports being spread by certain politicians and journalists that the prime minister had suffered a loss of memory, was undergoing psychiatric treatment, and was past praying for, he said: "The reality is such that at times I do not hear and from time to time I lose my voice. It is dragging on. The neglected viral disease has produced other illnesses. Four physicians were examining me yesterday. I am supposed to undergo treatment for another fortnight."

He sent his political adversaries, also those in the direction of the Castle [seat of the president], the message that they should not rejoice, as he is not dying yet. This evidently satisfied the ministers. And they also laughed when he supplemented the report on his state of health by saying: "And I do not have AIDS either."

The prime minister then touched upon the tension in the coalition: "There is no need to conceal it, there is movement in the coalition. However, the coalition is not heading toward its breakup. The government is a constitutional body. Certain views or confusions in parties cannot influence the government's activity. Until now we have been working honestly as one entity. We must not allow the tension to be carried into constitutional institutions."

He lashed out critically against, and expressed dissatisfaction with, greedy people who in an attempt to obtain property up to 5 million korunas [not requiring government approval] are splitting large companies into miniature firms. He also commented on the Czech Republic elections. The voters took it amiss that Klaus's government did nothing regarding decentralization. It is an objective process. If a government does not decentralize, it is punished in the elections. The elections in the Czech Republic have confirmed that Europe is shaky. It is necessary to take note of the exchange rate movement on the other side of the Morava River. The Slovak path indicates success. It is therefore necessary to maintain peace in our country.

Only two points on the agenda were discussed in the prime minister's presence. After a discussion on the jurisdiction law, when the concept of social policy started to be discussed, his voice grew weaker. The hard work of many years in his struggle for Slovakia is leaving its negative traces on him. He is reducing the time needed for recovery to a minimum. Already on Friday and Saturday he wants to participate in solving social policy issues.

During a break, I wished the prime minister an early recovery in the name of our readers.

Slovakia: Meciar Says Slovak Jews Need Not 'Feel Uneasy'

AU0606120096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Jun 96 p 20

[Report by TASR: "According to Prime Minister Meciar, Slovaks Are Not Anti-Semites"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—In an interview carried in the latest issue of ILLUSTRIERTE NEUE WELT [monthly published by the Jewish community in Vienna], Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar replies to a number of questions concerning above all the Jewish issue in Slovakia.

"I do not believe that Slovak citizens of Jewish denomination have any reason to feel uneasy," Meciar said in the interview. According to him the Slovak Government is implementing a policy of tolerance and is trying to set right the wrongs inflicted upon the Jews in the past. Today's Slovak Republic is not identical with the state of the years 1939-45 either in terms of territory or in terms of policy.

At the same time the Slovak prime minister stressed that there exist laws in the Slovak Republic to protect every citizen, laws that also apply to transgressions against members of the Jewish religious community. In addition, the Slovak Government has taken steps that should eliminate any vestiges of anti-Semitism. The Slovak Republic is not a racist or anti-Semitic state. Quite the contrary, it is the only country in the eastern part of Central Europe that has returned to the Jewish community property confiscated after the year 1939.

He added that Jewish representatives are represented on the government's advisory bodies and enjoy in our society all the respect they deserve.

"Bratislava, in particular, was a significant Jewish center in the past. A large number of great rabbis lived here, whose graves we protect. There also exist a great many monuments that remind us of the victims of fascism. Besides, we are negotiating on the return of gold that was confiscated from Slovak Jews at the time of fascism and that is now deposited in the safes of the Czech National Bank," Meciar replied to a question about steps being taken by the Slovak Government to prevent the important role played by the Jews in Slovakia in the past from falling into oblivion. The Slovak prime minister described the Slovak Republic's cooperation with Israel as very good. Slovakia has its ambassador in Israel, and an agreement on free trade is currently being prepared. At the same time the government is engaged in talks on the abolition of the visa duty, which should improve contacts among people, Vladimir Meciar said at the close of the interview.

Slovakia: Meciar Reportedly Living With Wife, Daughter Again

AU0606102896 Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Ivan Cernansky: "Has Anyone Threatened Vladimir Meciar's Family? After Some Time, the House Where the Prime Minister's Family Lives Is Being Guarded Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As is known, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's wife refused, after some time, to use the security guard services to which she is entitled as the prime minister's spouse. After several months, however, armed young men with two-way radios are again standing in front of the house where she lives with daughter Magda. Yesterday NOVY CAS reporters even observed in front of the house, in addition to a plainclothes security guards, two policemen in uniform. They claimed, however, that they were there by chance. By sheer coincidence, however, we found them there also a few hours later.

We learned from the residents of Frano Krala Street that the security guards have been guarding the house around the clock ever since reports about Vladimir Meciar's illness appeared in the media. We therefore assume that the prime minister, who was not living there for a fairly long period, is staying during his sick leave in the apartment on Frano Krala Street. As we were told by the young security guard standing in front of the house, however, the apartment was empty at the time of our visit. Magda Pospisilova, Vladimir Meciar's spokeswoman, was unable to tell us yesterday exactly when the apartment at Frano Krala Street began to be guarded again, but she admitted that this could have been since approximately the day when "Vladimir Meciar came down with a neglected flu." Asked why the guarding of the house where his family is staying has been resumed after a long time, she replied that there was a reason for that. In our opinion, there could be several reasons: Either the prime minister is really spending his sick leave in the apartment on Frano Krala Street or something serious must have happened recently that forced the young bodyguards to again watch around the clock the apartment block in which the prime minister's wife and daughter above all are living.

Slovakia: Kovac Interviewed on Domestic Political Scene

AU0506182396 Prague TYDEN in Czech 3 Jun 96 No 23, pp 28-32

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Marek Wollner; place and date not given: "Democracy Could Be Jeopardized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "One person, even in the post of president, cannot prevent undesirable developments if that is the decision of a government or a government coalition anywhere in the world," Michal Kovac says in response to the question of whether he could meet the expectations of the opposition, which claims that the head of the state is the main guarantee for Slovakia not being usurped by a dictator.

[Wollner] Are your powers really so limited?

[Kovac] A president in the constitutional position of the Czech or Slovak type has only the power to openly criticize the situation, if it contradicts the consolidation of the constitutionally democratic regime. The protection of democracy is also a part of the presidential oath. I am trying to use my powers to their full extent. These endeavors certainly bring about tensions between the representatives of the government coalition and myself but, at the same time, it may be helping in deterring some negative phenomena.

[Wollner] The head of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] accused you in the report to the parliament of abusing the office of president in order to solve family problems. When listing the enemies of Slovakia, he brought together the former StB [State Security] agents with the former agents of the Federal Security and Information Service, and he did not forget even journalists and representatives of the Catholic Church. Can this be understood as a warning against a frontal attack?

[Kovac] The appearance of the SIS director in the parliament is an excellent example of how the secret service can be returned to the old track in which it operated under the totalitarian regime. Mr. Lexa could not have brought a better proof that the secret service violates the law and the Constitution. Lexa appears as a representative of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] because that is the only way one can consider an enemy everyone who has ever criticized the HZDS or the government coalition. My concern of old—because of which I refused to appoint Lexa to this post—is being confirmed. Unfortunately, the parliament deprived me of the power to decide on the director of the secret service by an amendment to the law on the SIS, and thereby it facilitated the status quo. It is a very dangerous situation, which can seriously jeopardize the internal stability of Slovakia. The director of the secret service sufficiently clearly demonstrated that the SIS is oriented towards the detection of and struggle against the internal enemy. Such an approach gives rise to serious doubts of whether this might be a new phenomenon that more seriously than ever before signals that democracy in Slovakia could be jeopardized.

[Wollner] If Mr. Lexa violated the law, he should be criminally prosecuted. Do you believe this will happen?

[Kovac] We are waiting for the prosecutor general to assess the situation. It is his task to examine how laws are observed. If he arrives at the conclusion that someone violated the law, he must initiate proceedings—even if a state body were to be prosecuted.

[Wollner] Do you personally believe that the prosecutor general will do his duty?

[Kovac] Developments in the very near future will show this.

[Wollner] You mentioned your continuing distrust of Lexa. In the spring of 1993, you refused to appoint him to the post of SIS director and then also to the chair of privatization minister. What are the roots of this mistrust?

[Kovac] That is irrelevant. His work, about which we have learned from the report on the SIS, gives a clear answer to the question of why I mistrust him.

[Wollner] Is it still possible to talk about democracy in Slovakia, when the head of the secret service seeks a political enemy and the prime minister influences police investigations and interferes in powers that are not his?

[Kovac] There certainly is democracy in Slovakia but it has come out that within the framework of democracy, state officials can occasionally be tempted to drag party policy into the state life. This in itself only confirms that the democracy is still fragile, and that some rules of its work are not sufficiently clear and digested. It is a situation that calls for an answer to the problem of what the democratic majority in the parliament can do. All the important measures approved in the National Council have been adopted according to democratic principles. It is only a question of whether in the final analysis they serve to reinforce democracy and the principles of the state of law, or to weaken them. If we speak of criticism, we have precisely this possibility in mind of abusing the parliamentary majority to adopt decisions that otherwise could qualify as undemocratic.

[Wollner] How do you feel about the investigator of your son's abduction filing away the case for lack of evidence?

[Kovac] This issue has two levels. One of them is the Technopol case, and the other is the abduction of Kovac, Jr. to Austria with the objective of getting him into prison on the basis of an international warrant for his arrest for suspicion of being an accessory in the Technopol case. My son, myself, and all those who are familiar with this case are convinced that from the very beginning Kovac, Jr. has been dragged into this case for political reasons. Therefore I am interested in its rapid solution. Munich attorneys are working even in Bratislava to facilitate the interrogation of my son by the Munich office of the prosecutor as soon as possible. Unfortunately, this interrogation is being delayed. If this case is ever closed, I believe it will end favorably for my son, and this will shed a different light on the abduction. The fact that the relevant authorities—police and the office of the prosecutor—have been unable to solve such a politically sensitive matter even in nine months, does not do them credit. The course of the investigation and the filing away of the case do not show the work of the state of law in Slovakia in the best light either. I believe that anyone—who has democracy, principles of state of law, and trust in the Slovak Republic close to his heart—must be interested in a fast conclusion of this case with the culprits of the abduction of Kovac, Jr., being found.

[Wollner] The foreign political orientation of Slovakia remains a mystery to the world. In addition to the well-known facts, like the ever more frequent visits of Russian representatives to Slovakia and vice versa, Vladimir Meciar to Moscow, a report appeared recently that in Moscow the prime minister's advisers offered Slovak neutrality in exchange for exports of goods to Russia.

[Kovac] I do not believe that such an offer was made. The orientation of Slovakia can be seen in numerous processes that are actually taking place. We are gradually fulfilling all the obligations implied by our associate membership in the European Union. I have not observed any criticism from the EU bodies in this regard. Slovakia is also implementing the Partnership for Peace plan. Moreover, not even a single parliamentary party proclaims an orientation towards the East. It is a different matter to declare neutrality, but that would also mean to be in isolation. If such a small country as Slovakia became isolated, that could bring it against its will into some other orientation because it would have to seek guarantees for its security and its economic development. It seems to me exaggerated, however, that the question would be posed as a decision between the West and the East. This question was decided on the part of Slovakia a long time ago. Of course we will not know until H-hour, when those who would be admitting us, whether into NATO or the EU, will assess us.

[Wollner] It is rumored that Slovakia has been eliminated from the group of the countries to be admitted to NATO in the first wave. How do you feel about that?

[Kovac] Both NATO and EU representatives emphasize that this decision has not been made so far. Therefore, Slovakia could not have been eliminated.

[Wollner] The relations between you and Prime Minister Meciar are referred to as a Cold War. When did you last meet Mr. Meciar face to face?

[Kovac] It was on 27 June last year.

[Wollner] The president is persona non grata also for other supreme officials of the state: When you unexpectedly appeared at a preview exhibition of Slovak artist Albin Brunovsky two weeks ago, it caused a lot of commotion. Culture Minister Hudec allegedly disappeared without saying good bye, and Parliament Chairman Gasparovic was telephoned in the car not to come.

[Kovac] Yes, I know about it. Upon arrival I met the head of the Office of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. I asked the organizers of the exhibition whether Mr. Gasparovic would attend. They said that yes, they expected him as well as the culture minister any minute. When they did not arrive in ten minutes, we began without them. Eventually I learned that Minister Hudec was there but he did not come to the seat prepared for him next to me, and sat somewhere in the back.

[Wollner] What do you think about such manners?

[Kovac] These gentlemen apparently believe that cultural conduct is like that.

[Wollner] Vaclav Havel declared upon return from Aachen, Germany, that European politicians are ever more anxious about the situation in Slovakia. The Slovak Foreign Ministry immediately rejected this observation by Vaclav Havel, and described it as an expression of condescension. What do you think about this reaction?

[Kovac] I know from my own experience that President Havel has a very friendly disposition toward Slovakia, and good neighborly relations between the two sovereign states are important to him. I had the opportunity, more than once, to see that he endeavors to present this stand also in international forums. At the regular Conversations From Lany radio program he expressed his personal view. He apparently based it on the experience of his sojourn in Aachen and conversations with politicians whom he met there.

[Wollner] So how would you comment on the reaction of the Slovak Foreign Ministry?

[Kovac] The president basically reiterated the concerns that the EU member-states expressed twice in demarches to the Government of the Slovak Republic.

[Wollner] Do you share the opinion on the situation in Slovakia with the EU member states, as it is reflected in these demarches?

[Kovac] The situation in Slovakia can be characterized by various processes. It would be wrong to see them as dominant issues that cause anxiety. There are also many favorable phenomena that immediately affect the interests of millions of people. Many of them mean the continuation of the transformation—they lead towards the recovery of the economy, development of the technical infrastructure, reduction of unemployment. Of course, there are also domestic political problems, which are a subject of attention of the EU member states. I share the concerns over the fate of Slovak democracy but I keep hoping that the problems are just of a temporary nature, that these are childhood diseases. The sooner we overcome them, the better for Slovakia. I am convinced that we shall overcome them.

Slovakia: Slota Criticizes HZDS Approach to Coalition

AU0506152096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak National Party Chairman Jan Slota by Martin Krno on 3 June; place not given: "Jan Slota: The Cup Is Filled to Overflowing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krno] The meeting of the Slovak National Party [SNS] Political Board ended just a while ago. Has it modified in any way the stances adopted at the 1 June extraordinary session of the expanded SNS Central Council Presidium in Zilina?

[Slota] It endorsed the resolution from Zilina. At the same time I announced that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman wants to meet the SNS club of deputies on the afternoon of 5 June to mutually clarify some matters.

[Krno] To what degree have the personnel changes to the SNS's disadvantage at the extraordinary meeting of the Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] Supervisory Board on 31 May radicalized your stance?

[Slota] I would not establish a direct link between these two things. Some opposition representatives are calling us the biggest privatizers. That is not true. If the issue were raised of how much the sympathizers of individual parties privatized, many people would be surprised! Of course, some members of our party are also privatizing, but it is not even 0.5 percent of the book value of all privatized companies. I would like to protest against deputies' statements that the meeting in Zilina on Saturday was a reaction to Friday's coup [prevrat] in Slovenska Poistovna. I fully agree with what the National Property Fund [FNM] president said on Slovak Radio's "Radiozurnal" program today (Stefan Gavornik said that coalition partners from the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] and the SNS in the FNM leadership have found themselves in the role of extras and outsiders—editor's note). We are convinced that there have been gross breaches of the statutes and powers of the FNM Presidium. The whole affair in Slovenska Poistovna is distasteful and detestable.

[Krno] Wasn't it just the last drop that caused the cup of your dissatisfaction to overflow?

[Slota] Indeed. The cup is filled to the brim. After Friday's raid [prepad] on Poistovna, we all stood back in awe. It was a shock for us.

[Krno] During the vote on the basic treaty with Hungary, or on territorial and administrative arrangement, you made concessions to your coalition partner. On the other hand, your legislative initiative to amend the school law was declared by HZDS representatives unconstitutional, and the fate of the Penal Code amendment [also initiated by the SNS] remains uncertain....

[Slota] I agree with you. The HZDS should approach some decisions more seriously and view us as true coalition partners, not as deputies worthy only of pushing buttons for their proposals.

[Krno] Do you think that the situation could escalate to the point that the functioning of the government might be imperiled?

[Slota] We have expressed certain discontent. However, we are still convinced that if the coalition will collaborate more with the opposition, it should carry on its work. I do not see any benefit for our young state in early elections.

[Krno] Can your initiative to enforce efficient supervision of the FNM, to halt the privatization of financial institutions, and to enlarge FNM bodies and OKO [parliamentary body for supervising the activity of secret services] with opposition representatives be considered a gesture of reconciliation?

[Slota] Yes. When we take an unbiased look at ordinary people who have to fight for their bare survival, we see that they are disgusted by the present situation. All parties should implement a policy that will not burden voters morally and culturally but rather introduce contentment into the community of the Slovak nation, which is very much lacking here.

[Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 4 June on page 2 carries a 300-word report by "is" on an interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota broadcast on the private Radio Twist on 3 June. In the interview Slota reiterated his view that the opposition should be allowed to supervise the activities of the FNM and the secret services "to calm domestic political struggles," and denounced the recent changes in the management of Slovenska Poistovna. In this context Slota reportedly voiced the belief that "Prime Minister Meciar was not informed about the goings-on in the FNM with regard to Slovenska Poistovna and cannot have approved of them."]

Slovakia: HZDS Dissenter Gaulieder Gets Media Attention

AU0406085296

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers have recently published several items on the critical views of Frantisek Gaulieder, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deputy and member of the special supervisory body [OKO] for monitoring the activity of the Slovak

Information Service [SIS], viewing Gaulieder's statements as the "first sign" of dissent within the HZDS parliamentary group. Some reporters recall that previous splits in the HZDS parliamentary group, which resulted in the formation of the Democratic Union [DU], had a similar beginning.

Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 15 May on page 3 carries a 300-word report by "pes" on Gaulieder's reaction to the recently publicized tape recording of an alleged telephone conversation between Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek and SIS Director Ivan Lexa, which the opposition press viewed as proof of the two officials' interference in the investigation of the kidnapping of President Kovac's son. Reacting to Hudek's protest that the conversation was a private one, Gaulieder reportedly told NOVY CAS: "I do not consider the talk between Lexa and Hudek to have been a private telephone conversation. The vulgarisms that could be heard are not worth commenting on. Following the broadcast of the tape, the two officials should seriously ponder their behavior. Unlike Minister Hudek, I also do not think that policemen are idiots. I value their work highly, all the more so as I am a member of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Defense and Security Affairs Committee." Asked whether he would initiate the dismissal of Lexa and Hudek from their posts, Gaulieder replies: "I am not going to comment on that right now."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 18 May on page 2 carries a 500-word report by Zita Sujova on an OKO session held in Bratislava on 17 May [filed as referent item], which, according to the NARODNA OBRODA reporter, Gaulieder left prematurely following "a sharp exchange of opinion" with OKO Chairman (and fellow HZDS deputy) Igor Urban that "could be heard as far as the corridor in front of the OKO secretariat."

Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 20 May on page 3 carries a 300-word report by Balazs Tarjan entitled "Parallels With Dissenters Are Self-Evident." The PRACA reporter observes that "Frantisek Gaulieder was the only HZDS and government coalition deputy who, after publication of the Lexa-Hudek conversation, publicly called on the two officials to consider their behavior." In this context he says: "According to observers' speculations, Gaulieder was one of the candidates for Hudek's post (and would perhaps be able to replace also the SIS director). Journalists therefore inquired whether any pressure had been brought to bear upon him as deputy and member of the [HZDS] parliamentary club to correct his viewpoint. Deputy Gaulieder denied this possibility. 'I belong to a broad spectrum movement and I have the right to present even divergent opinions,' Gaulieder said. Whether or not we believe in the broad spectrum nature of the HZDS, it is interesting that exactly the same vocabulary was used in 1993 by Milan Knazko, immediately thereafter by Lubomir Dolgos, and half a year later by Jozef Moravcik [three former HZDS leaders who broke away from the movement]. Freedom of opinion within the framework of the Movement and its parliamentary group has always been spoken of in conjunction with the expression of a nonconformist or divergent opinion. In the five-year history of the HZDS, this has always ended with the dissenters' departure." Tarjan therefore believes that Gaulieder's statements "could mean the first sign of disruption of the until now rare unity of the HZDS parliamentary group."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 21 May on page 2 carries a 500-word report by Zita Sujova entitled "F. Gaulieder Has Support of the HZDS in Galanta and Knows Nothing About His Expulsion." The report mentions that, according to a report broadcast on private Radio Twist on 20 May, "the HZDS Political Board, which usually meets on Mondays, has on its agenda the expulsion of HZDS member and deputy Frantisek Gaulieder from the movement." Asked by NARODNA OBRODA to respond to this report, Gaulieder reportedly said: "I do not know why I should be expelled. No one from either the HZDS leadership or from the leadership of the HZDS parliamentary club has conveyed to me dissatisfaction with my work." Quite the contrary, Gaulieder says, the HZDS District Assembly held in Galanta on 18 May reelected him member of the Galanta District Presidium. He is therefore "determined" not to give up his parliamentary seat and to stay in the HZDS parliamentary club. Confronted by NARODNA OBRODA with the Radio Twist report, Igor Zvach from the HZDS Public Relations Department reportedly "termed the report on the planned expulsion of Frantisek Gaulieder fabricated." According to Zvach, "the HZDS Political Board did not even meet on Monday [20 May] because HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar had other obligations and nothing of that sort was on the meeting's agenda."

Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 23 May on page 3 and Bratislava SME in Slovak on 23 May on page 5 both publish brief reactions by Frantisek Gaulieder to the report on SIS activity that SIS Director Ivan Lexa presented to the NRSR on 22 May. According to Gaulieder, Lexa's report "disappointed" him because "it was not a report on the activity of the SIS but only a report by Ivan Lexa" and because, contrary to Lexa's claims, "it had not been previously discussed by the NRSR OKO."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 25 May on page 9 carries a 600-word commentary by Julius

Gembicky entitled "Will Jan Slota and Jan Luptak Live To See the Privatization Desert?" The commentary analyzes problems currently facing Prime Minister Meciar. Gembicky notes that "the tension between Frantisek Gaulieder and SIS Director Ivan Lexa is not new" and recalls that, already last year, Gaulieder, as member of OKO, refused to sign Lexa's report on the SIS activity. In this context the commentator says: "Following Vladimir Meciar's negative experience with departures of HZDS deputies in the past, Frantisek Gaulieder's bold views casting doubt on the competence of Ivan Lexa and the authenticity of Lexa's telephone conversation with Ludovit Hudek represent a mortal danger for the prime minister. This is why Frantisek Gaulieder's steps in the parliamentary corridors are accompanied by the omnipresent eyes of his parliamentary colleagues. This is also why backstage rumors have it that, by his departure or excommunication from the HZDS, he could drag along with him seven more deputies."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 3 June, in the "Monitor" column on page 8, reprints a 500-word interview with Frantisek Gaulieder originally published in the weekly NOVE SLOVO BEZ RESPEKTU No. 22. In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Gaulieder criticizes the work of OKO and its failure to monitor SIS activities. He says: "In my opinion, OKO should continuously monitor the SIS, regardless of whether this monitoring is initiated by a member of OKO or whether someone else asks OKO to do this. It is OKO's moral obligation to react to all public expressions related to the SIS and to either confirm or deny doubts or data published about the SIS. It must be clearly evident that OKO really attends to it that the SIS does not abuse its position and works in conformity with the law, but also that others do not misuse the SIS's position. I am thinking of the dissemination of false information about SIS activities. Only in this way can OKO hold the SIS's shield clean. That is, not the SIS should exercise control over OKO, but vice versa." In another reply, Gaulieder expresses the hope that the opposition will soon have its own representative in OKO. He also reiterates that, until now, no one from the HZDS has communicated to him any "reservations" about his work in parliament or in the Movement.

Slovakia: Technopol Investigators Said To Work for SIS

AU0606122196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 1 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Julius Gembicky: "Michal Kovac Jr. Proposed To Supplement the Technopol Case Investigation File"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—On 22 May 1996 Michal Kovac Jr., the Slovak president's son, filed through his attorney Jan Havlat a complaint against the decision of Major Jozef Ciz to shelve the investigation of the case of his kidnapping to Austria. In addition, a few days ago, he asked the investigators to supplement the file on the Technopol case, in which he is being prosecuted by Slovak criminal prosecution bodies on charges of suspected complicity in a $2.3 million fraud, and to carry out some additional acts because the case has come to a dead end. On the basis of their findings to date, the investigators do not possess the legal documents that would warrant the issuance of a resolution proposing that he be taken into custody, which is why Michal Kovac Jr. proposes:

1. To question Jan Smolec, chief editor of the daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, with the aim of verifying his part in the Technopol case, the manner in which he acquired documents on the case from the German prosecutor's office, his contacts with Bohus Zvrskovec, Peter Krylov [key witness against Kovac Jr. in the Technopol case] and the mother of Peter Krylov, as well as his contacts with the Slovak Information Service [SIS]. To question other editors of this daily who wrote on the case with the aim of proving his, and the president's, alleged guilt.

2. To investigate the past of Peter Krylov and his criminal record, the way in which he emigrated from the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], and how he obtained an exit permit for his entire family, despite the fact that—prior to his emigration—he had been sentenced and worked in the Police Corps.

To investigate his collaboration with StB [communist-era secret service], specifically First StB Administration file OEC [personal registration number] 420445 and subfile No. 10 081/516, codename CIZ. To document his contacts with SIS officer Branislav Chilo-Ptak and their common share in frauds, carried out under the name of the firm Introkomerce, against Hydinarsky Podnik [Poultry Farm] Zvolen, SHT Transprivat Stara Lubovna, Slovenska Polnohospodarska Banka [Slovak Agricultural Bank] Spisska Nova Ves, and Frucona Kosice. To investigate Branislav Chilo-Ptak's collaboration with the SIS and his contacts with Jaroslav Svechota.

3. To question, investigate, and document the share of Criminal Police Captain Ivan Kuzma in proving my alleged participation in the Technopol case and to investigate his links with the SIS and contacts with Jaroslav Svechota. To investigate and document his movement and actions on 26 August 1995.

4. To question and document the activity of Jaroslav Svechota with regard to this case. To investigate his contacts with Branislav Chilo-Ptak, Peter Krylov, the mother of Peter Krylov, Dusan Kerny, and Bohus Zvrskovec. To document, in particular, his share in influencing Peter Krylov to cite my name in his deposition of October 1994, on the basis of which an international warrant was issued for my arrest. To document which SIS intelligence officer, concealed under a codename and provided with a diplomatic passport, was sent by him to Munich in July 1995 in order to contact Prosecutor Dauster. What was the assignment of this SIS intelligence officer?

5. To question SIS Director Ivan Lexa about the Technopol case. To document his share in this plot against my person and the president, as well as his interference in, and influence on, the investigation of the case.

6. I request that the same actions be taken with respect to Slovak Minister of Interior Ludovit Hudek and Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

7. To question Dusan Kerny, chief editor of STV [Slovak Television] news, on his activity in the StB, where he is registered under OEC 45925, codename KMET, and on his involvement in the Technopol case, as well as on the circumstances of the STV interview with Peter Krylov. To question STV editors Bronislav Tesarik and Igor Kubis on the same issue.

8. To question Branislav Chilo-Ptak, whose whereabouts are most probably known to Jaroslav Svechota. To investigate and document his complicity in this criminal act.

9. To question Anna Nagyova [director of Prime Minister Meciar's office] on this case. To investigate and document her visit to Munich in October 1994 and her contacts in Bavaria with Bohus Zvrskovec and Peter Krylov.

10. To request legal assistance in order to be able to question German citizen Bohus Zvrskovec on his share in dragging my person, through Peter Krylov, into the case.

11. To investigate and document Bohus Zvrskovec's collaboration with the StB and now with the SIS and his contacts with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

12. To question Engineer Matta on his collaboration with the StB and the SIS.

13. To question Slovak Minister of Economy Jan Ducky with a view to clarifying our conversation in the Bratislava CKM Juniorhotel in October 1994, after the elections, in which he said in my presence that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] was celebrating because they had knocked out the old Kovac. Marian Kocner, too, was present at this meeting.

14. To obtain the standpoint of Munich Prosecutor Dauster on the July 1995 visit by an SIS intelligence officer with a diplomatic passport or, if appropriate, on other visits by persons with diplomatic passports.

15. To document leaks of information from the investigation file to the media, particularly to STV.

In conclusion, Michal Kovac Jr. declares that he had nothing in common with the Technopol case and that, based on well-known media statements by the SIS, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, and Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, it can be deduced that an evident plot against his person is involved, aimed at ousting Slovak President Michal Kovac from his post.

Hungary: Goncz on Russian View of Hungary Joining NATO

BR0506125996 Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz by Alain Frachon and Yves-Michel Riols; place and date not given: "Russia Is Not Considering Vetoing Hungary's NATO Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [LE MONDE] Are Western nations yielding to Russian pressure regarding NATO enlargement by granting it a de facto right of veto?

[Goncz] It seems to me that Russia does not intend to veto Hungary's NATO membership bid and that it would not take steps against Hungary if we became a member of the Atlantic alliance. I consider Boris Yeltsin a friend. We keep our Russian partner informed as to how things are going and we strive to reassure it. A Russian journalist once asked me why Hungary wanted to isolate Russia. I told him that a country with 10 million inhabitants could hardly isolate Russia from the rest of the world...

[LE MONDE] What would be the most important thing for you as a NATO member: a permanent U.S. military presence or the reciprocal assistance clause in case of outside aggression?

[Goncz] Membership in all European structures, including NATO and the EU, would be enough of a guarantee. Today, the situation in Central Europe does not call for the permanent presence of foreign military forces. NATO membership is a sufficient guarantee of political and military security. In fact, we joke that NATO is already present in Hungary since the creation of an Implementation Force base in Taszar [name as published] in the south of the country.

[LE MONDE] Does the future evolution of Russia worry you?

[Goncz] What is taking place in Russia right now is a very confused process, but influencing it from the outside is going to be difficult. Whoever leads this country—his freedom of movement seems rather limited to me. Therefore, I do not think this evolution can be stopped once and for all. I cannot rule out the possibility that (Communist candidate—LE MONDE editor's note) Mr. Zyuganov will win the election, but it does not fundamentally change the situation. I think West European analysts sometimes set too much store by individuals.

[LE MONDE] Is it still possible to doubt that the EU is going to enlarge to include Central Europe?

[Goncz] As a Central European, I consider this as an absolutely irreversible process. After World War I, Western Europe integrated its Scandinavian periphery. After World War II, it absorbed its Mediterranean periphery. Today, with a fair amount of bump and grind, it is assimilating Central European regions, from the Baltic to the Balkans. Europe's competitiveness and its ranking in the world are greatly dependent upon its ability to enlarge.

[LE MONDE] Is a specific timetable for membership important for you, or do you think it will be a gradual process?

[Goncz] You may be surprised by my answer—but what matters most is for the process to be a continuous one. We need to make sure enlargement does not come as a shock, that it does not lead to disappointments. It would be highly symbolic if the year 2000, which will mark the 1,000th anniversary of Hungary's existence as a European kingdom, is also the year when the country becomes a full member of the EU. [passage omitted]

Hungary: NATO Said To Impose Aircraft Purchase

AU0506132196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 5 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Correspondent's report: "Will the Purchase of Combat Aircraft Be Compulsory?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is not Hungary's prerogative to decide whether it wants to purchase combat aircraft and, if so, what type of combat aircraft to purchase. NATO will determine this for all of east Central Europe—a military expert who asked to remain unidentified told us.

The countries of east Central Europe might need a total of 180 to 220 combat aircraft. This is a serious number and, according to Western estimates, the winning firm might make $8 billion from such a deal. "It is worth noticing that an increasing number of offers, including offers from the United States and France, speak of selling combat aircraft in a package, simultaneously to all the countries in this region"—the unnamed official said. Unlike the manufacturers of the Swedish Gripen combat aircraft who are coaxing the Hungarian officials in order to strike a deal, the French firm Dassault that manufactures the Mirage combat aircraft and the Lockheed that manufactures F-16's are coaxing Western politicians and military leaders. And these arms manufacturing lobbies have great influence; so much so that, in a few years, in the course of joining NATO, developing the NATO candidate's air force by means of an aircraft-package could emerge as a condition for NATO membership, irrespective of the cost of implementing such a plan.

Some independent experts do not exclude the possibility that the Hungarian Government has just postponed the aircraft-purchase tenders until 1997 precisely because the cabinet was told that, in time, Hungary will receive an "irresistible" offer. According to the cabinet justification, the reason for the aforementioned postponement is that they want to wait for the beginning of NATO membership negotiations. According to expert opinions, there were simply financial reasons behind the aforementioned decision: Although we would have to repay the costs in 10 to 15 years, we would still have to accept the heavy interest burdens for the credit.

Hungary: Kovacs Ready for Examination of Minorities Policy

LD0106225896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 1 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary is prepared to submit itself to international inspection of its minority affairs, said [Hungarian Foreign Minister] Laszlo Kovacs in Vienna after the foreign ministerial session of the Central European Initiative. The idea was earlier raised by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk and it was repeated by the Slovak foreign affairs state secretary in Vienna. According to Kovacs, it is useful for the minority policies of individual countries to be compared to the European norms, and Hungary has nothing to hide or be ashamed of. The foreign minister added that by this statement he did not mean that Hungarian minority policy was perfect, only that there was the intention to improve it.

Hungary: Army Chief on Emergency Situation, Lack of Funds

LD0606103896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to [Ferenc Vegh], the army's new chief of staff, the Hungarian army is in an emergency situation. Major General Ferenc Vegh, who will be appointed by the president of the republic today, told NEPSZAVA daily that the Hungarian army has no more reserves, therefore it cannot meet its obligations as laid down in the constitution and the Defense Law.

In his view, the political decisionmakers should be forced to decide whether they want to have an effective defense force or an operetta army which is only suitable for representing democracy and sovereignty.

Hungary: Finance Minister Says Lobbies Hinder Reforms

LD0606103296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0700 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy admitted that inflation will be higher than the planned 20 percent and real wages this year will be lower than planned. Addressing a forum, Peter Medgyessy added that he hopes the purchasing power of wages will not fall next year. However, this requires a three percent growth in GDP.

The finance minister believes that sacrifices made for economic stabilization may be wasted because of strengthening lobby interests. He told the NEPSZABADSAG daily that it is primarily the cultural and education lobby that strengthened, but health care and social pressure groups are also becoming increasingly organized. According to the minister, the fact that the fight goes on behind the scenes is also a problem. Everybody is devoted to reforms in principle, disagreement is only about the pace, the time, and the methods of the reform proposed by the government, he said.

According to Medgyessy, problems will only mount up by delaying decisions and this may force the government to take radical measures again.

B-H: U.S. Said Agreed To Postpone Karadzic Arrest

AU0606133196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "The Tightening of the Noose"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Geneva meeting between Presidents Izetbegovic, Milosevic, and Tudjman leads to the conclusion that the United States does not intend to give up on the implementation of the Dayton agreement. A day before the meeting, agencies reported that Milosevic would be bringing to Geneva a paper with Karadzic's signed resignation. This is deemed to be Milosevic's greatest success since the time when 10 months ago, the Bosnian Serb leadership delegated him to represent them in peace negotiations.

But is this enough? It is possible that the pragmatic Milosevic persuaded the Americans that nothing more should be undertaken at the moment, since more radical moves—the arrest of Karadzic and Mladic—could result in an abrupt deterioration of the situation back home. He managed to avoid this risk by using stalling tactics. Only after the West stepped up pressure on him and threatened to reimpose sanctions, Milosevic decided to appoint a new Serb Republic [RS] governor. Had he ever had any intention of arresting war criminals in Bosnia, he would have done it. Milosevic will now be able to say to Biljana Plavsic [RS vice president], whom he at one point called a mental case, that she is the RS governor and that, pursuant to this, she will have to singlehandedly arrest Karadzic and General Mladic. The meeting of the three presidents in Geneva was mostly called for Milosevic's benefit, as his obligations in the Dayton agreement are, objectively, the biggest. For the Bosniaks, the issue of international arbitration on Brcko is a very important issue, although relations with the Croats are also deteriorating. The general feeling is that Tudjman has already made certain concessions, but he is now dissatisfied with the increasingly complex situation in Podunavlje. Milosevic was supposed to discipline the Bosnian Serb leadership and extradite Karadzic, Mladic, and the three former Yugoslav People's Army officers to The Hague tribunal, but he did nothing.

The impression is that, in this instance, the United States turned a blind eye because it believes there is no alternative to Milosevic in Serbia. It probably agreed to postpone the extradition of Karadzic and Mladic until after the September elections in the hope that, when it comes to the Bosnian Serbs, the outcome will create a better atmosphere for such a move. However, the plan is counterproductive. Until Karadzic and Mladic are handcuffed, the frustration of the their victims on the one hand, and the arrogance of Chetnik murderers and looters on the other hand, will continue to grow. If this issue is not viewed as a priority political issue, all war criminals in the area will be definitely promoted to national heroes, and terror and revenge will rule Bosnia.

Still, there are competent voices that claim that the noose is tightening around Karadzic and Mladic. Antonio Cassese, president of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, claims that Karadzic and Mladic will be in The Hague by the end of the year. Let's wait and see.

B-H: IFOR 'Deployed Around' Karadzic's House on 5 Jun

AU0606144196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1121 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 6 Jun (BETA)—The Implementation Force [IFOR] has intensified patrols in and around Pale with the goal of arresting Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic, sources close to the Serb police have confirmed to BETA.

According to these sources, on Wednesday three armored transporters deployed around Karadzic's private house and turned their guns at it.

The situation almost developed into an incident when a group of civilians interposed themselves between the transporters and Karadzic's house. According to the police sources, the transporters soon withdrew.

The Serb authorities in Pale have not lodged an official protest over this incident.

The relations between IFOR and the Serb Republic leadership have been tense since IFOR's attempt to arrest Slavko Aleksic, commander of the Serb forces from Grbavica, two days ago and the cancellation of the news conference by the international forces in the Pale press center.

IFOR canceled the news conference, as it was officially announced, because Karadzic's photograph was hanging in the conference hall.

B-H: Gen Talic Asks IFOR To Help Locate POW's

AU0406105196 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Report by Slavisa Sabljic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lieutenant General Momir Talic, commander of the Serb Republic Army First Krajina Corps, and Implementation Force [IFOR] Commander General Michael Jackson emphasized the need to speed up the process of registering and releasing missing and captured persons at a meeting today in Banja Luka.

[Begin recording] [Sabljic] There is still no word about what happened to some 2,000 Serb soldiers and civilians missing since the last fall's offensive by Croat and Muslim armies against the western parts of the Serb Republic. The same sentiment was felt after today's meeting in Banja Luka, and the speech of ICRC representative Pierre (Crembil) was hypocritical to say the least. Although, under the Dayton Agreement, the humanitarian organization was supposed to complete the task of the unilateral release of prisoners by 19 January, it has still not done so under the pretext that the Serb side has failed to submit certain lists, though it has done so, while failing to mention its own mistakes, which undermine the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Accord. Showing compassion for the families of the missing, Gen. Jackson underlined the need for more understanding on all three former warring sides, while Gen. Talic was quite decisive.

[Talic] IFOR is excluded from having to release prisoners and the ICRC does not have the force to release them, which means that IFOR must be involved in locating and releasing captured soldiers and delivering the bodies of soldiers killed not only during this offensive but also during the four-year war. Consequently, all the media and all authorities, both civilian and military, must absolutely join the parents and implement that part of the Dayton Accord. Otherwise—I claim that in all responsibility—the implementation of the Dayton Accord will be jeopardized in parts envisaged by the Dayton Accord, and the signatories of the agreements will be held accountable and will have to explain why the Dayton Accord has not been fully implemented and why so little importance was given to the release of captured RS Army soldiers and people of other nationalities. [sentence as heard] [end Talic]

If, by any chance, more understanding was shown and if one looked for the culprits on other sides instead of just the Serb side, there would be fewer problems. However, there is still a steadily escalating sense of foreboding among the families, friends, and fellow soldiers of about 2,000 Serb soldiers and civilians whose destiny remains uncertain even after today's meeting. [end recording]

B-H: War Crimes Tribunal Insists on Arrest of Suspects

AU0506130896 Paris AFP in English 1216 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, June 5 (AFP)—The UN tribunal probing war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia on Wednesday urged the international community to "keep its back straight" and press ahead with attempts to oust Serb leaders accused of war crimes.

In a statement, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said that its president Antonio Cassese was increasingly concerned over the failure of repeated attempts to remove the indictees from power and hand them over to the tribunal.

Although the statement did not identify the leaders by name, it referred to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his army chief Ratko Mladic, who have defied international efforts to have them removed from power and handed over to the tribunal.

Their continued presence on the political scene is threatening to scupper Bosnia-wide elections to be held by mid-September.

Press reports have said western officials agreed to an arrangement whereby Karadzic and Mladic would renounce formal duties and stay out of public view in exchange for not being arrested. But the United States and other key players in the peace process have denied this.

NATO, concerned about a possible backlash from the Serbs if Karadzic is arrested, says its peacekeeping force in Bosnia will not hunt him or Mladic down actively, but rather detain them only if NATO forces come across the suspects in the course of routine duties.

However tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier said that Cassese would attend a Bosnia review conference to be held in Florence next week and "will urge the international community to keep its back straight" and assist the tribunal in fulfilling its mandate.

"Establishing it (the tribunal) and, at the same time, preventing it from fulfilling its mandate amounts to the issuance of a license to kill for future tyrants," the statement from Chartier said.

It said strong international action was needed to honor the memory of the war victims.

"It is a moral imperative not to have them buried twice," it said.

Chartier added that in Florence, Cassese would urge the international community to safeguard the integrity of the Dayton peace accord negotiated six months ago and "not to disconnect peace and justice (or) bargain on any of the terms."

"Fair and free elections are said to be the key to a lasting peace in Bosnia and they will not be possible in an environment polluted by alleged war criminals," the tribunal statement said.

"At Dayton, justice was made a pillar of peace and the arrest of the accused is thus vital for both justice and peace," it added. "Neither can depend upon the will of the accused."

B-H: Cassese Says Individuals, Not Nations, Commit Crimes

LD0506164896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1537 GMT 5 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 5 (TANJUG)—President of the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Antonio Cassese said in Belgrade on Wednesday that individuals and not nations had committed crimes in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Speaking to reporters after talks with speaker of the Yugoslav parliament's lower house Radoman Bozovic, Cassese said that they had fully agreed that there could be no collective, but only personal and individual responsibility.

In the four-year civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, atrocities were committed by individuals, not by groups or states, Cassese said and added that the tribunal was charging individuals, regardless of their nationality.

According to Cassese, the tribunal does not aim at accusing entire peoples.

The Hague-based criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was set up under a U.N. Security Council resolution in May 1993.

According to official information released by the tribunal in early May 1996, the tribunal has brought a total of 57 charges for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia—46 against Serbs, eight against Croats and three against Muslims.

B-H: Hague To Call For Sanctions Against Bosnian Serbs

AU0606131096 Paris AFP in English 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 6 (AFP)—UN war crimes tribunal chief Antonio Cassese said for the first time Thursday he will call for the reimposition of sanctions against Bosnian Serbs at an international summit on Bosnia next week.

"I will request that (top civilian peace coordinator Carl) Bildt should trigger sanctions against the Republika Srpska," he told journalists here.

The move would be to punish the Serbs' failure to cooperate with The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), he said.

Cassese, speaking after a meeting with Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, said he would make the call at a two-day summit called to monitor progress on implementing the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia scheduled for Florence next Thursday.

The ICTY president said he would "probably" call for renewed UN sanctions against "Serbia as well."

UN sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and their main sponsors, the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro, were imposed by the United Nations in 1993 and suspended in February this year.

B-H: Cassese, Minister Discuss Extradition of Bosniaks

AU0606140696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Antonio Cassese, president of the The Hague War Crimes Tribunal, today visited Sarajevo where he met top Bosnia-Herzegovina officials to discuss the transference to The Hague of two Bosniaks indicted for war crimes.

Cassese and Federal Justice Minister Mate Tadic [word indistinct] to resolve the problem of transferring the two defendants, 31-year-old Hazim Delic and 23-year-old Esad Landzo, called Zenga, to The Hague. The two have been accused of committing war crimes in the Celebici camp in Konjic in 1992.

B-H: TV Reports on Exhumation of Mass Grave Near Jajce

LD0406222296 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] News just in: the exhumation of a mass grave has begun in Carevo Polje near Jajce. The grave contains bodies of Bosniaks killed most probably in 1992. We have just received video footage from a foreign agency that was present at the beginning of the exhumation.

[begin recording] [Jerko Radic, of the office of the so-called Herzeg-Bosna for the exchange of POW's—caption] We are in Carevo Polje, near Jajce. This is where the mass grave was. We have known about it for over eight months, since the liberation of Jajce. I think that the picture tells it all. Horrible, terrible, frightful. So far we have dug up 36 bodies, but we think that there are many more. I think that we have made a mistake in our calculations because we thought there were 33 bodies, but there will be around 50.

I do not know whether you are familiar [with the fact that], these are predominantly civilians, not only predominantly—they are all civilians. These are Croats and Bosniaks. I would like to stress in particular that we will treat both in the same way. The bodies will be sent to Split for forensic study and identification. We have almost completed collecting the bodies; following the forensic study it will be known how they were killed.

I would like to stress that bodies were tipped into the grave by dumper truck and covered with earth by a bulldozer.

The fact that these were civilians and mainly females, which you can see for yourselves, shows that the Serbs carried out genocide here, that all those who were not Serbs were killed, regardless of their age. [end recording]

B-H: Official Says 63 Bodies Exhumed Near Jajce

AU0506190396 Paris AFP in English
1856 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 5 (AFP)—War crimes investigators exhumed 63 bodies from a mass grave of Croats and Moslems killed by Serbs in central Bosnia, a Bosnian Croat official said Wednesday.

Berislav Pusic, head of the Croat Office for the Exchange of Prisoners and Missing Persons, said 52 of the bodies were civilians and 11 soldiers, the Bosnian Croat news agency HABENA said.

The corpses were exhumed Tuesday from graves at Carevo Polje and Vrbica, near the town of Jajce. His deputy said Tuesday 36 bodies had been recovered from the grave.

Pusic said some of the corpses had been decapitated, while other victims had had their hands tied behind their backs. Some of the bodies showed signs of being burnt.

"In most cases those (particular) victims are Bosniaks (Moslems)," the official said.

Jajce's fall in October 1992 sparked a huge exodus of civilians to central Bosnia, but many of those who failed to flee in time were butchered by the victorious Serbs.

B-H: Investigators Find 6 Bodies in Srebrenica Mass Grave

AU0506164796 Paris AFP in English
1635 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 5 (AFP)—UN war crimes investigators uncovered six bodies in the Srebrenica area on Wednesday at a mass grave site first highlighted by the United States as evidence of Serb massacres in the Moslem enclave. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright last year used U.S. satellite surveillance pictures of the site to back charges that the Serbs had killed thousands of civilians in the former UN-protected area.

According to UN and U.S. estimates, at least 3,000 Moslems were murdered following the enclave's capture by advancing Serb forces last July.

Some of the corpses uncovered Wednesday were seen lying face down, their hands tied behind their backs with shoe laces. All of the bodies were dressed in civilian clothing.

Investigators said more corpses probably lay underneath them.

The mass grave lies in a field at Nova Kasaba south of Srebrenica.

The probe team has so far only uncovered a 2.5 metre (yard) by 4 metre area of the field, but believe the mass grave could be at least seven metres long.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander Ratko Mladic have been indicted by a UN war crimes court in The Hague on genocide charges relating to the fall of Srebrenica.

B-H: Doubt Cast on Fairness of 'Zvornik Seven' Trial

AU0406202596 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian
31 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Doubts About a Fair Trial for the 'Zvornik Seven'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 30 May—At a press conference yesterday, UN officials in Sarajevo expressed doubt that the Serb authorities, if they conduct a trial of the "Zvornik seven," will do so in a fair way.

According to the information of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), lawyer Zoran Dimitri spoke to the "Zvornik seven," and he said that "in the service of truth, they (the Serb authorities) will keep them in prison for 15 years if necessary."

According to the UN spokesman in Sarajevo, Aleksandar Ivanko, the earlier appeal of the "Zvornik seven" was not accepted and, in a few days, all seven of them should undergo psychiatric examination.

Some 20 days ago, these seven Bosniaks were arrested by IFOR [Implementation Force] not far from Zvornik, and the Serb authorities have charged them with the alleged murder of four lumberjacks. According to Ivanko, the IPTF was sent the findings of the autopsies on two people who are believed to have been among the mentioned lumberjacks.

B-H: Bosnian Federation Constituent Assembly Adjourns

LD0506210396 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 5 Jun (BH PRESS)—The third day of work by the 14th session of the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation saw the adoption of 24 of a total of 26 draft amendments to the Constitution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. Thus the Federation's Constitution has been brought into line with the Constitution of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The outstanding issues on which agreement has not been reached—customs policy, the appointment of military and diplomatic-consular attaches, and the status of Sarajevo—should be resolved in 10 days' time by the Constitutional Commission of the Federation's Parliament. Thus, the obligation to harmonize the constitutions, as set out by the Dayton Agreement, will be carried out almost three months behind schedule. [passage omitted]

The Assembly postponed until the next session a decision on the Federation's flag and insignia. [passage omitted]

The constituent assembly adjourned during consideration of an item on the agenda about changes and addenda to the law on the Federation's ministries. The next session of the Assembly is to begin at 1100 on 12 June.

B-H: Serb Civic Council on Discussions With Izetbegovic

LD0106192796 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1347 GMT 1 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 1 Jun (BH PRESS)—The Serb Civic Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina [SGV] held a news conference in Sarajevo today on its preparations for the third assembly of citizens of the Serb nationality, elections in Mostar, reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and problems related to the return of refugees. The assembled journalists were addressed by SGV Chairman Mirko Pejanovic, SGV Vice President Radomir Zivkovic, and SGV Secretary Milorad Kojovic. [passage omitted]

Pejanovic described the recently held meeting between the SGV delegation and Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One of the most important issues discussed at the meeting was the return of refugees. In the SGV's opinion, this is an issue of strategic importance for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and rebuilding of peace and trust between the nations.

"In relation to this, we asked President Izetbegovic for some amendments to law as certain legal conditions are slowing down the return of refugees. We also asked that the general security and protection of safety of all citizens, and citizens of the Serb nationality who had stayed on the reintegrated territory and their property in particular, be stepped up," Pejanovic said.

The SGV delegation asked the president to help create a public political and state view on how to meet the interest of citizens of Sarajevo in returning to the city.

"There is an interest on the part of citizens of the Serb nationality in returning to Sarajevo, after they have seen how cheated they were and to what degree their vital interests were violated," Pejanovic said. He added that the return of refugees to Sarajevo must not threaten the safety of Bosniak refugees already there. They have to be protected and, according to Pejanovic, it has to be done by the state. [passage omitted]

Radomir Zivkovic presented SGV activities in connection with the elections in Mostar. The SGV has requested from EU Administrator Casado that two polling stations be opened in Belgrade and Nevesinje so that 23,000 Mostar Serbs may vote.

B-H: Masked Assailants Attack Local Politician

LD0406210396 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1907 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Jun (BH PRESS)—Masked assailants attacked Zuraim Mehidzic, a member of the Tesanj municipal council and of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats [UBSD], in Tesanj at around 2230 last night, UBSD Deputy Chairman Sejfudin Tokic told deputies at today's session of the constituent assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He went on to say that prior to this incident pressure had been put on UBSD members in Tesanj. According to him, last night's incident was an obvious example of how some people understood the idea of fighting the opposition by all means at one's disposal.

Tokic said that the Tesanj incident had political implications and asked Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to submit a report on it.

Minister Hebib said he has been informed about the incident and that an investigation is under way.

B-H: SDA Official in Tuzla on Silajdzic's Party

AU0506090196 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 p 5

[Report on the interview with Sead Jamakosmanovic, president of the Cantonal Committee of SDA of Tuzla, by F.K.; place and date not given: "We Are Strong—We Do Not Need Any Coalitions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We will enter the elections at all levels on what we have done up to now, and we have done a lot: We have maintained the principle of democracy both in the party and in the state, which in fact is a guideline of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]; our declaration from 1090 [1990] is still valid, which speaks about the rule of people with the help of fair laws where an individual is a free person with the right to equality, regardless of his religion, ethnicity, or other distinctions," so says president of the cantonal committee of the SDA [of Tuzla], Sead Jamakosmanovic.

Further, Jamakosmanovic stresses that the SDA is a party that has worked and will go on working on the raising of the national awareness of Bosniaks, which the voters will know how to appreciate. "We will be particularly active in resisting all those who want to destabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in resisting all those who wish to divide it, or to possess it. We are a majority, but we do not, and will not, conduct a dictatorship of the majority."

Jamakosmanovic particularly stresses that they will enter the new elections with new, young people, whom, as he stresses, people will know how to appreciate. He says that they do not need any coalitions, because they are stronger than they have ever been before, and that on these elections they will achieve better results than they did at the first democratic elections.

At the end of the interview the committee president, Sead Jamakosmanovic said: "Our people do not like people who change their 'dress' fast, which relates to the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, [Haris Silajdzic's party] which does not have the significance attributed to it in the west. However, it is true that that party will contribute to the disintegration of the Bosniak people, because neither Serbs nor Croats will vote for it."

B-H: Muratovic Complains About Zubak's Behavior

AU0506122796 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Dr. Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Almasa Bajric; place and date not given: "'Herzeg-Bosnia' Has Formed Its Own AID"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bajric] With the adoption of several laws at the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal President Kresimir Zubak sent a letter to Miro Lazovic in which, among other things, he states:

"I hereby inform you that the adopted laws will not be enforced on certain parts of the territory of the B-H Federation, nor will they be observed by certain structures of the B-H Federation's authorities," says Zubak.

The Chairman of the Republican Assembly, Miro Lazovic, left the cabinet earlier yesterday for health reasons, and when we talked to him knew nothing about the contents of the letter. Lazovic told DNEVNI AVAZ: As far as laws are concerned, we are probably talking about the draft laws entered into the agenda as items 6 through 11, which delegate Mile Kudic asked to be removed from the agenda. When I see the letter, I will most probably issue a communique.

President Zubak sent letters with the same contents to Prime Ministers Hasan Muratovic and Izudin Kapetanovic. The prime minister of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was explicit:

[Muratovic] The sentence in which he determines what laws and in which territory those specified laws will or will not be applied tells us everything about Zubak's letter.

[Bajric] Can you assume what laws he is talking about?

[Muratovic] I assume that the crucial law here is the Law on AID [Agency for Reserch and Documentation], but I can say that an agency with the same name was formed last week in Herzeg-Bosnia with his (Zubak's) blessing, although the Dayton agreement explicitly says that no regulations and laws can be adopted any more in Herzeg-Bosnia. [passage omitted]

[Bajric] Prime Minister Muratovic points out furthermore that Kresimir Zubak, as the president of the Federation, can give his remarks on the work of the republican organs, but that this time he is not right:

[Muratovic] He is not right for two reasons. First, because there were opinions from all the commissions that are supposed to give their opinion on laws, and second, because he continues to spoil the political climate that has been established by these two governments. He incessantly writes letters, as one could have noticed, and does not express his stand directly through participation in the work of the organs. The Assembly of the Federation is held very rarely, and its session had already been postponed three times, which he certainly knows about. Instead of using the organs of the Assembly, which is remaining in session without a break now that it has so much work to do, he constantly sends letters, and in every letter he threatens that the laws will not be implemented in the Federation.

[Bajric] How do you interpret that?

[Muratovic] I think that it is very unconstructive in this period when the activities of these two governments have yielded very significant things, and made possible for the authorities to start functioning and start applying laws. The letter is very counterproductive, and it is not a good form of communication. Let us not mention that the law experts can prove that the president of the Federation is not right at all. In the same way, one could deny his right to appear as president of the Federation, because it is known that the president of the Federation is elected every year, according to the Constitution.

[Bajric] How will this letter reflect on the totality of political relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Muratovic] I hope it will not have a negative reflection. I hope it will not influence the work of the Croat ministries in the Government of the Federation and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Bajric] President Zubak claims that the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is no longer valid because it has been overwritten by the Dayton Constitution. Is that true?

[Muratovic] It is absolutely untrue, because the agreement from Dayton says that until other laws are passed and the elections are carried out, all the existing laws remain in force. Zubak also states that the existing institutions of the republican authorities cannot pass regulations and laws, the legal basis of which is the Dayton Constitution. Of course they cannot, but therefore it can be done according to the Republic Constitution. Similarly, it was clearly prescribed in Dayton what can be passed based upon the Dayton agreement. Because according to this paragraph of Zubak's letter, both governments could not have been formed as well. Therefore both his conclusions at the end of the letter are absolutely wrong. Of course, one cannot leave it to legal experts to judge about that, but there are enough lawyers sitting in the assembly benches. Finally, he does not invoke any law, but only mentions some kind of "laws."

[Bajric] What is your opinion about the letter on the whole?

[Muratovic] The letter is absolutely unacceptable, particularly when it is sent by an official holding such a high office. Instead of contributing positively to developments, he is trying once again to create a political commotion that will postpone positive processes and enable war profiteers to steer the economic and other movements in the country.

B-H: Muslims, Croats Differ About Future of Mostar

LD0506154096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1420 GMT 5 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 5 (TANJUG)—The mayor of the eastern, Muslim part of the south-Bosnian city of Mostar, Safet Orucevic, said Wednesday that after the elections for local rule it will be a single city, with one administration and one mayor.

This is what Orucevic told local Muslim radio Mostar on the occasion of elections scheduled to be held on June 30.

At the same time, the president of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) for Mostar, Jadranko Topic, told Croatian radio that the elections will be an opportunity for 'people to have fun, because everything is known in advance.'

After the elections, Mostar will be divided into three Muslim and three Croatian municipalities, and at the end the Muslim-Croat Federation will also be divided, Topic said.

Muslim radio Sarajevo said that the freedom of organized and political action was impossible for Muslim parties in the western Croatian part of Mostar.

The same source also said that freedom of movement from the Muslim into the Croatian part of Mostar was still not possible.

After the formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation in March 1994, Mostar was placed under EU administration and remained a divided city.

The European administrator, Spaniard Ricardo Perez Casado, said that an agreement was reached recently to hold elections on June 30. Under the Dayton peace agreement elections were supposed to be held on May 31, but they were postponed due to constant disagreements between Muslims and Croats over election rules.

The Muslim-Croat Federation was formed following one-year fierce clashes between Croats and Muslims for supremacy in territories with a mixed population in southern and central Bosnia.

Muslims and Croats expelled before that about 45,000 Serbs who lived in the surroundings of Mostar.

B-H: Bender Protests Muslim Description of Ethnic Areas

LD0506184096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1735 GMT 5 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 5 (TANJUG)—Senior Bosnian Croat official Ivan Bender on Wednesday [5 June] protested over the practice of Muslim officials to add the adjective 'so-called' to the names of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republika Srpska.

Bender said at a session of the Constituent Assembly of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, held in Sarajevo, that the two republics existed in reality on the ground and that this fact had to be respected, Muslim Sarajevo radio said.

Bender is Presidential Council president of Herzeg-Bosnia, the state that the Bosnian Croats proclaimed after the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The republic functions in practice in spite of the agreement on forming the Muslim-Croat Federation.

B-H: Stolac Croats Oppose 'Mass Visit' by Muslims

LD0406214296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A meeting of chief advisers has been held in Mostar, chaired by Perez Casado, the European Union [EU] administrator in Mostar, to consider preparations for the forthcoming elections. Also, in connection with the announced mass visit of citizens of Muslim nationality to Stolac, the municipal council of this town has sent a letter to the UNHCR. Here is a report on all this by Anton Mrkonjic:

[Mrkonjic] The Serb side has, through its representative Rajko Gatalo [phonetic], officially requested of the EU administration that Mostar citizens of Serb nationality be allowed to vote in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic. The EU administrator and representatives of the Croat and Muslim peoples did not support this request. [passage omitted]

At today's session, the Croat side demanded that the European police explain whether they are capable of ensuring the safety of Bulevar [main street in Mostar], which has seen several serious incidents over the past few days. Mile Puljic, vice president of the Mostar municipal council, said Administrator Casado promised to examine this demand.

In connection with the announced mass visit of citizens of Muslim nationality to Stolac on 5 June, without prior agreement from the legal authorities there, the Stolac municipal council has sent a letter to UNHCR representative Soeren Petersen, in which it demands talks with senior officials of this organization in order to avoid undesirable incidents.

The Stolac municipal council has warned that the Muslim side has refused to take part in setting up an interim municipal council or municipal electoral commission. The council has announced a forum [as heard] which was agreed at a session of the council for cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Mass visits by one side would threaten the pilot project of the return to Stolac of 100 families, which was agreed at the highest level with the help of international mediators. We want to have talks with Mr. Soeren Petersen in order to avoid incidents and implement all parts of the peace agreement in the Stolac area, says the letter from the Stolac municipal council to the UNHCR.

B-H: Mostar Radio-Television To Begin Broadcasting

LD0506170696 Mostar Radio-Televizija Mostar Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Radio-Television Mostar faces its most important phase of development now that it has become one of the founders of the independent television network controlled by the newly formed TVIN-TV International Network. Here is a report by Alija Sedzejevo:

[Sedzejevo] Radio-Television Mostar faces its most important phase of development after becoming one of the founders of the independent radio-television network controlled by the newly formed TVIN network. The inception of this project was signed in Mostar by managers in Radio-Television Tuzla, Zenica-based Zetel, Sarajevo-based Hajat, Sarajevo-based independent TV-99, and Mostar Radio-Television a few days ago. It is to be expected that the installation of a land link network linking all five television stations will begin soon. In practical terms, this would mean that Radio-Television Mostar would be able to broadcast its programs throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The project is to be financed by the international community and $8 million dollars has already been earmarked for the development of broadcasting and the link network through the mediation of the office of Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina [coordinator for civilian operations]. [passage omitted]

Michael Steiner [Bildt's deputy] has sent word to Safet Orucevic, mayor of [east] Mostar, that Radio-

Television Mostar enjoys the full support of the office of the high representative in terms of finding appropriate premises for the new radio-television station as the current premises are not conducive to making programs that the new network will require. The new network is to begin broadcasting in July 1996. Broadcasts will go out by satellite to the whole world.

Apart from enabling communications with the whole Bosnian diaspora from Mostar and the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this project should be a powerful shot in the arm for the media in our country. [passage omitted]

The Mostar municipal authorities will take urgent action to find appropriate premises for the new Radio-Television Mostar and pave the way for making and broadcasting programs that will very soon emerge from their local framework, something which is very much in the interests of Mostar and Bosnia. [passage omitted]

B-H: 'War' Among TV Stations as Elections Approach

AU0406201196 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 p 13

[Article by M.P.: "New Transmitter—Worse Reception"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the Television of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton, the public of Tuzla and its surroundings was informed that the new transmitter in Ilincica had started "working," and that from now on the viewers of this television would have a much better picture reception.

And indeed, when it comes to the reception of the Television of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton, in most parts of Tuzla the picture is considerably better. But on other television channels it is either worse or it cannot be seen at all! Even the program that allegedly had an international license to be emitted on a certain channel cannot be seen any longer, namely Studio FS-3.

Already three months ago, editor Sinan Alic—who is also the director of the FRONT SLOBODE publishing house, under whose auspices Studio FS-3 was born—had announced the beginning of broadcasting on the television channel, which had ceased to exist at the beginning of the war when the municipal authorities formed the public company Radio and Television of Tuzla. For some time, the channel FS-3 emitted only foreign music programs, and occasionally HRT [Croatian Television], but the installing of the new transmitter of the Television of Tuzla-Podrinje Canton simply erased FS-3 from the screen. One must add—to the disappointment of many people in Tuzla.

It is hard to say whether this is a sort of war between television stations, but it is getting more and more evident as the elections approach. Nobody cooperates with anybody; they even cheat on one another, which can also be said about this latest "intrusion" of one television station onto the frequency of another. And is questionable to what degree all that has an "international license."

These days the experimental broadcasting of the cantonal radio program has started. For the time being, on the frequency that was once reserved for SIM radio (Semberija), they in fact only broadcast the program of the cantonal television!?

In other words, if you are tired, just shut your eyes, and on the mentioned radio "listen" to the program of the cantonal television. Do not worry about watching. Others are in charge of—watching you!

B-H: Sarajevo Media Monitoring Center Issues Report

LD0506200996 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1815 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 Jun (BHPRES)—A Sarajevo-based monitoring center has issued its first report on monitoring the media covering the election campaign. The report was commissioned by the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting and the Sarajevo-based Society for the Regeneration and Development of the Media Plan.

The aim of monitoring the media is to offer an independent and credible source of information to the domestic and foreign public, political parties, and state bodies in both entities, as well as to international players, for the purpose of assessing the election campaign and the legitimacy of the results.

The main monitoring center in Sarajevo monitors all available press, and especially news bulletins broadcast by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television, the Bosnian Serb radio stations, programs by neighboring countries' television stations, and independent radio and television stations in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regional centers in Banja Luka, Bihac, Mostar, Zenica, and Tuzla will be in charge of monitoring the local media. Experienced domestic and foreign correspondents and experts will be involved in the media monitoring and analysis.

The monitoring center's report publishes the results of a research conducted by the media plan concerning the media picture in Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing—for the first time—facts about the media in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to this research, there are 145 newspapers, magazines, and periodicals, 91 radio stations, 24 television stations, and 6 news agencies in the two entities.

However, the media system—according to this research—has been divided into three separate sections: the Serb Republic and parts of the Muslim-Croat Federation under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and the Croatian Defense Council. The pluralism of the media depends on the degree of political freedom in each of these parts.

The monitoring center maintains that it works independently from the governments in the two entities and the international organizations in charge of implementing the peace areement.

B-H: Pale Reportedly Tries To 'Stifle' Bijeljina TV

AU0506141196 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 96 p 16

[Article by V. Mitric: "Pale Stifling Semberia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bijeljina-based SiM Television no longer exists, and the studio can only work within the Serb Radio and Television [SRT], because it is owned by the state. The studio in Bijeljina cost around 2 million German marks [DM], while the most recent investment in SRT's technical equipment totaled DM4 million.

This is how, several days ago in the Banja Luka studio, Ilija Guzina, SRT chief editor, replied to the question about the SiM Television. Guzina pointed out that "someone should check what is being done there," referring to the public media house SiM in Bijeljina.

Condemnation

The statement by Guzina has met with huge condemnation on the part of Semberia residents, and particularly on the part of SiM employees, including the local branch of the ruling Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], which has, on several occasions, publicly voiced discontent over the policy pursued by Pale, which, it is felt, has been paying no attention whatsoever to the Semberia region, disregarding the entire burden that it shouldered in the course of the war. The attempt to take over SiM Television is evidence of the piracy [piratstvo] of Pale, which, it is emphasized, would like to hold everything in its iron grip.

Three years ago, at the start of the war, Pale's interest in Bijeljina Radio, which was later renamed SiM Radio, began to grow, and, at that time, it tried to overwhelm it as part of the SRT system. Owing to the resolve of the SiM management and the local authorities, the radio was preserved. Its editorial policy was more than fair toward the official Pale policy, and the station regularly carried the most important news, political, and other kinds of broadcasts from the Pale studio.

Lately, however, the editorial policy of SiM Radio has obviously begun to bother Pale barons. Therefore, according to rumors circulating in Bijeljina, Guzina, burdened by his own vanity and megalomaniac aspirations and assisted by Velibor Ostojic, deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic Government, is trying to stifle SiM Television, which is supposed to begin operating in mid-June.

"Several days ago, we had a meeting of the expanded Executive Board, which was also attended by Ostojic and Guzina. They insisted on us signing a contract on entering the SRT system. We agreed to join the system by carrying important broadcasts, however, we were absolutely against any option that would result in our being stifled by the system," said Pero Simic, director of the Bijeljina-based SiM media house. "We offered them our technical services, but they wanted us to sign the contract the same day, as they planned, at all costs. Of course, the Executive Board unanimously rejected their demand."

Style

Dissatisfied with the decision of the SiM Executive Board, Ostojic reacted in his well-known style: "You are undermining this state. We want to create a joint information system."

He called Simic a traitor, upon which Guzina gave the following explanation: "We know what Simic's editorial policy is like, and what else can we say about it? He let Rajko Kasagic talk, even after his removal, which is outrageous."

"I replied to Ostojic that we do not intend to undermine the state. The television is financed by the municipality. It cost DM10 million, rather than DM2 million as Guzina claims. Instead of pestering us, they would be better off finding out how DM4 million allocated for TV equipment was spent, since we are in possession of some papers showing how the issue was being managed. Besides, I told him, it is only now, after four years, that it occurs to them that they should perhaps create a joint system of information.

"As for Kasagic, I told him that they should not be concerned about his appearance on the radio," Simic said. "He is a Serb, first of all, and a member of the SDS who was at one time appointed prime minister by President Karadzic. After three and a half hours of debate, Ostojic stood up to go, demonstratively. He called me a traitor three times and threatened to arrest me as many times," Simic said.

The studio in Bijeljina is 120 square meters, while the television covers an area of 500 square meters. At the start, when the television was set up, the Pale leaders did not mind a single thing, believing that the Semberija citizens would eventually give up. When the work was completed, and the first signal of SiM was beamed, which is well received even on the right bank of the Drina River, the "commissioners" like Ostojic arrived to do away with the whole thing.

"The people and municipal assembly deputies were extremely dissatisfied with the work of the SRT broadcasting and technical center in Bijeljina. This was the decisive reason why they set up their own television. We have modern equipment, and we will soon start working. The Bijeljina municipal assembly deputies will probably only confirm our reply to Ostojic and Guzina at the next meeting," SiM Television Director Simic concludes.

B-H: SPRS Chairman Criticizes SDS, Karadzic

AU0306172896 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 pp 16-17

[Interview with Dragan Ilic, chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, by Goran Rosic; place and date not given: "By Burning, Planting Explosions, and Provoking, the SDS Wants To Draw Us Into Street Clashes"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mr. Dragutin Ilic, the chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [SPRS], physician by profession, employed by the Health Care Center in Banja Luka, claims to be the founder of that party in the Serb Republic [RS]. He says that the Socialists established their party in the RS on 2 June 1993, although the preparations for its establishment started at the end of autumn 1992, because, at that time, predominantly right-wing parties were active in the RS and "because the Socialists recognized even then that that Radovan Karadzic and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] were leading the Serbian people in the wrong direction."

The SPRS has 40,000 members today (those who have party membership cards) and communal committees have been established in all communes of the RS, except for Visegrad, Cajnic, Rudo, Kalinovik (General Mladic's birth place), Trnovo, Srbinje, and Pelagicevo. Initiative committees are active there and, according to Ilic, the communal committees have not started to function in the eastern part of the RS, because the population is not very numerous there and because of the history of the region, where, as he says, "Chetnik structures prevailed during World War II."

Judging by the circumstances, Ilic will remain the SPRS chairman after the party convention, which should take place in Banja Luka on 1 June, since he is the only candidate.

[Rosic] You have been saying all along that the present leadership—that is, the SDS—has been trying to disable your political activity in every possible way.

[Ilic] The SDS leadership has ordered the disruption of the work of the SPRS. This is done in various ways, from verbal disqualifications to fabrications in the media, which are absolutely controlled by the SDS; from the prohibition of the use of public facilities for our events and the dismissal from work of our members to real bomb attacks against them and their property! Extreme examples include the time our members were beaten in Teslic and Rogatica. [passage omitted]

[Rosic] Have you contacted the government or the responsible ministry with a request that they prevent similar phenomena in the future, for the protection of SPRS leaders?

[Ilic] All our warnings, and we have contacted the interior minister, the prime minister, and President Karadzic in an open letter, did not stop the attacks. On the contrary, they became more intense, especially in the east of the RS and in Herzegovina. This has, however, made the people embittered and stubborn, so that, politically, we have gained a lot.

Since these incidents escalated, one must conclude that they are organized in agreement with the leadership, with President Karadzic. This terror has the goal of making us respond, but we shall not respond in this way. We shall demand that all problems be solved in a legal way, in line with the law. We do not want to be drawn into street clashes with the SDS! We shall not give up our activities, and our program is proceeding according to plan.

[Rosic] Will your party convention be attended by a delegation of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]?

[Ilic] Yes. There will also be delegations of the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro, the Yugoslav United Left, and the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia as well as three left-oriented parties from the RS—the United Left, the Independent Social Democrats, and the New Workers' Party. We expect the SPS delegation to be at the highest level. We still do not know who they will select. We have expressed the wish for President Milosevic to head the delegation. We shall see whether the president will be able to attend the convention, since he has many obligations.

[Rosic] The SPRS chairman will be elected at the convention. Do you expect to retain your leading position in the party?

[Ilic] Upon proposals made by communal committees, which have been submitted to the Main Committee, I am the only candidate. It is necessary that I retain my present position. [passage omitted]

[Rosic] It is still uncertain whether elections will be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Which side is the strongest opponent of the elections.

[Ilic] Regardless of the attempts made by the leaderships in both entities—especially the Muslim leadership, which is followed by the Pale leadership—to postpone and undermine the elections, they will be held on time. By 6 June, all parties have to submit their applications to register for the elections. This means that everything is going as planned, and that the elections will be held in September.

[Rosic] Opposition parties in the RS complain that they have no access to the state-controlled media, and the international community has done nothing for the establishment of new media that would not be controlled by the state.

[Ilic] When one hears and listens to the state-controlled media, one gets the impression there is only one party. Major attention is paid to every minor SDS activity, and one cannot find a single news item about the activities of the SPRS. The main news program of Radio-Television Serbia was removed from the schedule of the Television of the RS because it reported on SPRS activities. RS, Muslim, and the Croat news programs or other information programs are broadcast at that time. The Belgrade main news program is, admittedly, broadcast late in the evening, but everything that the leadership feels the people should hear is shown before that. The Croat and Muslim main news programs are broadcast at the most popular time on purpose, because the people can still hear messages of hatred and intolerance toward the Serbian people. This is done on purpose, in order to make the Serbs homogeneous again and in order to gather them around the SDS, since only the SDS is presenting itself as the protector of the Serbian people. They are trying to retain power on the basis of that homogenization, of the fear of the Serbian people.

[Rosic] The representatives of the leadership in Pale claim that the state-controlled media in Serbia do not broadcast any reports about SDS activities.

[Ilic] I don't know. I have no opportunity to watch Belgrade television.

[Rosic] According to many assessments, the SDS and the SPRS will be the main rivals in the elections.

[Ilic] It is important that we have one educational, legal, monetary, and economic system that functions well. When the international community will formally accept that the Serbs are entitled to decide on how, where, and with whom they want to live will depend on many circumstances. This is less important.

[Rosic] Will the Yugoslav dinar remain the means of payment in the RS if the SPRS comes to power?

[Ilic] Yes.

[Rosic] Whose triumph in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be most favorable for the SPRS?

[Ilic] The victory of any party that does not support hatred, chauvinism, and intolerance is, in our eyes, desirable in the other entity. Just as it is in the interests of the Serbian people to be led by a party that—instead of war and suffering—offers peace and prosperity, it is in the interests of the other two peoples to be led by parties of a similar orientation. So far, we have had no official contacts with any party from the Muslim-Croatian federation, but, according to its program and practical behavior, the closest to us is the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose chairmen are Selim Beslagic and Sejfudin Tokic.

[Rosic] At a cocktail in Banja Luka, which was recently organized by the representatives of the international community, you had unofficial talks with Haris Silajdzic, the leader of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you disclose the contents of that conversation?

[Ilic] I met Silajdzic there, we exchanged several sentences, and I realized that he is "Alija Izetbegovic's alter ego," only better packaged and more acceptable to the West. I expected him to be a more realistic politician regarding the duties he had performed earlier. What he told me during our conversation is unrealistic; I mean his idea of a unitary Bosnia. He claimed that the election rules were not good since they confirm ethnic cleansing and the partition of Bosnia. I told him that he was being unrealistic. He even mentioned that he had established an initiative committee of his party in Banja Luka. I told him: "With whom do you want to establish a party here? The Muslims who live in Banja Luka will certainly vote for other parties." We did not agree on a single point.

[Box, p 16]

The SDS Lies, We Do Not Want To Incorporate the RS Into Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Rosic] It is claimed by the SDS that you want to incorporate the RS into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Ilic] The SDS had no answers to many questions and was afraid to enter into open dialogue with us (I would like to remind you that we have established dialogue with all parties in the RS except for the SDS, although we have tried many times). The SDS could only use fabrications and lies against us. All these lies and fabrications will rebound on it like a boomerang. How could the RS be led into the Muslim-Croatian federation by the people who were on the first front-lines during the whole war and who fought for the freedom of its people, to be free and equal with other nations? And those who are now accusing the SPRS fought all the time with the goal of seizing someone else's houses and property, or they became rich in some other way.

The gentlemen from the SDS made a coalition with the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], which they have never broken. During the years of war, they had contacts, they traded, they even sold weapons between themselves. How could Bihac, Zepa, Gorazde, and other places be completely besieged by the Serbs for such a long time if the Serbs did not supply them with weapons and food?

[Rosic] Do you mean local Serbs or those from the leadership?

[Ilic] The leadership is always responsible, and I do not know who acted on its behalf. Nobody was prosecuted for it or adequately punished, which means that the leadership collaborated with them.

The SDS, the SDA, and the HDZ are afraid of losing all their privileges if they lose power, and they will also be held responsible for many things.

[Box, p 16]

If We Win the Election, the RS Will Have Close Contacts With the FRY

[Rosic] If the SPRS comes to power, what kind of ties will the RS have with the FRY?

[Ilic] The SPRS does not hide that it—respecting the Dayton agreement—wants to have close ties with its home-country. And this means that—apart from violating the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina—it can do everything else. The SPRS will do everything to enable the citizens of the RS to live like Serbian citizens.

It is only natural that the people in the RS want to live with its nation, since in this way they will feel safer and see their prospects for the future.

[Box, p 17]

Karadzic and Mladic Harmed the Serbian People the Most

[Rosic] A "hot" topic recently has been the international community requirement for Radovan Karadzic, the RS president, to withdraw completely from political life and for President Milosevic to extradite him and Mladic to the court in The Hague.

[Ilic] We are not happy with the pressure the international community is exerting on Karadzic to force him to go to the court in The Hague. If Karadzic, as a political leader and the representative of the RS as a state, is guilty of having led a policy that primarily made the Serbian people suffer, then he should be held responsible for it not by the court in The Hague, but by the Serbian people.

Regarding General Mladic, he is a soldier, and we do not know why they are lumped together. If it is true that Gen. Mladic did the things he is charged with, he deserves to be brought to trial, but—again—before a court of his own people.

Croatia: Foreign Ministry Official on Bosnia Elections

AU0606113696 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Hido Biscevic, assistant to the Croatian minister of foreign affairs, by Aleksa Crnjakovic; place and date not given: "With the Election Postponed, Dayton Will Fail"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher met with the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, and Slobodan Milosevic respectively, in Geneva on Sunday. We talked to Hido Biscevic, assistant to the Croatian minister of foreign affairs, about the meeting, the reasons for its being summoned, and its results.

[Crnjakovic] After this meeting in Geneva the public is raising the question of the real reasons for such a frequent international meetings on the implementation of Dayton.

[Biscevic] You are right to remind us of the frequency of meetings that are basically, on various and even the highest levels, concentrated on the maintenance and affirmation of the Dayton peace process. There are several essential reasons for this. First, the contents, and even more the grave final implications of the peace model of Dayton for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus for the whole region, is such an important, delicate, complicated, and mutually conditioned process that it is really necessary to maintain that frequency.

The second reason must be sought in a realistic relation of the political forces and "concepts" that even today, regardless of Dayton, "float" on the international stage. I will not hide the fact that despite public consent, one can notice a certain dissatisfaction with the Dayton solutions. Some of this comes from Bosnia-Herzegovina itself and stems from disillusionment or unrealistic expectations, while some is stimulated by certain European circles because of their geostrategic interests, primarily with the dilemma over the possible survival of the Federation.

Finally, the implementation of the Dayton agreement also has as its background the smoldering Euro-American efforts to coordinate their comprehensive policies in areas other than just Bosnia-Herzegovina and this region. These meetings are also the litmus test for much more important Euro-Atlantic relations and thus views concerning the "destiny" and future positions of individual countries in the emerging new world order.

[Crnjakovic] In that context, what is your opinion of results of the agreements from Geneva?

[Biscevic] You see, Geneva has in fact confirmed that the "second phase" of the implementation of the agreement is about to begin. After the military part has more or less been completed and accomplished on the whole, it is the turn of the civilian-political side now. That means that one should start grappling with the most delicate questions of the future internal organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the establishment of the new institutions of authorities and public institutions, and the determination of not only the political but also the "civic" corelations between the entities. So the elections represent the first step in that job.

As you know, from the very moment of signing the Dayton agreement Croatia has thought that postponing the elections could jeopardize the peace process and deepen the already existing divisions and differences between the nations and entities, strengthen these centrifugal processes, and enable the Serb entity to avoid democratic legitimization and continue to "pull itself out" of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear that in that case any perspective for constituting Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the Dayton peace agreement would disappear, which could influence the functioning of the Federation as well as relations between Croats and Muslims. We have therefore insisted, with our Bosniak partners, on acceptance of the elections despite the imperfect conditions. In fact, to insist on or to expect perfect conditions after four years of war could in fact jeopardize the peace process, and thus also the realistic interests of the Bosniaks.

The Geneva agreement is therefore so exceptionally important regarding the necessity to hold the elections within the time limits envisaged. I expect that the exact date of the elections will soon be made known.

[Crnjakovic] Isn't the return of the refugees of crucial importance for free and fair elections?

[Biscevic] That, of course, is why we reached in Geneva a firm political agreement, including obligatory freedom of passage for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who want to come to the polls, freedom of movement, and so on. It seems essential to me primarily to provide for freedom of movement within the entities. Namely, as everyday practice shows, attempts to cross the demarcation lines between the entities unfortunately still cause disputes and open conflicts.

However, allow me to emphasize that preventing those charged with war crimes from taking part in the elections, and from holding any kind of political office, is equally important for the elections. That is a special responsibility of the international community, because it is impossible to expect fair elections if the clique of Karadzic and Mladic directly or indirectly continues to control the media, the police and security services, and other instruments in the Serb entity.

Croatia: Serbs 'Do Not Deny' Croat Refugees Right To Return

LD0506203796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1952 GMT 5 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, June 5 (TANJUG)—Authorities in the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem do not deny the Croat refugees the right to return home providing that they live together with Serbs, the region's president Goran Hadzic said Wednesday.

After meeting with special envoy of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Soren Jensen Peterson, Hadzic described as inacceptable a position by President of the Association of Croatia's Refugees Mate Simic that Croats would not return to the region as long as Serbs did not leave their houses.

The region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem borders on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. Under an agreement reached between Croatian authorities and Serb officials last November, the region was placed under a one-year U.N. transitional administration.

Commenting on the meeting, Peterson welcomed Hadzic's position on the Croat refugees' right to return to the region.

Peterson said he would exert his influence on Croatian authorities to alter the current law on selective amnesty for Serbs, because he said this was a condition for the Serbs' return to Croatia.

He said the international community was making continual efforts to enable Serbs to exercise their right to return home, and said this had been stressed also by the U.N. Security Council.

He said the first group of Serbs who had fled western parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina had visited their houses on Wednesday. The action was organised by UNHCR, he said.

Serbs in Croatia proclaimed their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Croatia launched an aggression on western, southern and central parts of Serb Krajina in May and August 1995, triggering an exodus of about 250,000 Serbs.

The region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem is the only part of Serb Krajina that has not been occupied by Croatia.

Croatia: Stanimirovic Lists Demands of E. Slavonia Serbs

AU0406110396 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Jun 96

[Report by Draga Grubic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The success of the peace process on the territory of former Yugoslavia depends primarily on the extent further moves of the international community are founded on facts. Hence the question: Is the international community—resolving the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis as well as the conflict between Croatia and the Republic of Serb Krajina, representing the interests of the great powers and neglecting the democratic voice of the people—responsible for everything happening in the hot Balkans? Mistakes made during the Croatian aggression against the Republic of Serb Krajina should not be repeated in the case of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem. This time, the voice and clearly expressed will of the people of the district who want to remain there with their legally elected leadership should be taken into account.

[Grubic] The UN Security Council adopted two resolutions about the basic agreement for the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem signed in Erdut, resolutions No. 1025 and 1037, expounding on the details of the district's reintegration into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia at the expense of the Serb people. Based on the demand of the people and five municipal assemblies of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, the district's executive council viewed a platform to be adopted by the district's assembly on the terms under which the Serbs can remain and survive in the region.

[Vojislav Stanimirovic, chairman of the Executive Council of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem] Considering the war and other events, we will insist that this be a fully demilitarized zone, that there be a 15 or 20 year moratorium on serving in the army for our children, here in the district. Furthermore, we will demand that Croatia pass a law on full amnesty. We will demand a comprehensive education system. We will demand that our district remain in its present borders, as specified by the Erdut Agreement. We will not accept territorial division of our district into two counties as proposed by the Croats. They divided us into two counties assigning Baranja to the county of Osijek-Baranja and the rest of the district to the Vukovar-Srijem county. We would practically melt into the two counties and become a minority there. We will demand that elections be organized by the Council of Europe, not Croatia. Furthermore, we want our own symbols [obelezja]; we want to use our alphabet. Moreover, we will demand to have our own judiciary and administration and the division of the legislative power between the Croatian parliament and our district parliament. In other words, we want our own judiciary up to a certain level, on the level of the district. Furthermore, we will demand local citizenship provisionally... we will accept Croatian citizenship, if we are given local citizenship.

[Grubic] What if you do not get that?

[Stanimirovic] If we do not get that, if we are placed totally under Croatian sovereignty and their power, I believe there will be a great fourth exodus here. I think the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mandate is not about seeing us leave here [as heard] and that it is not in the interest of the international community, nor of the FRY, nor ours. That would only serve the interests of Croatia if we left.

Croatia: E. Slavonia PM Insists on Multiethnicity

LD0206164496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1554 GMT 2 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, June 2 (TANJUG)—Prime Minister of the Serb Region of East Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem Vojislav Stanimirovic said on Sunday that this was and must remain a multiethnic, multinational and multiconfessional territory.

'Baranja is presently the only multiethnic territory in Croatia, with 32 percent of non-Serbs,' and Serbs can remain there only if human rights and personal property rights principles are observed, Stanimirovic told local radio in the central Serbian town of Kragujevac.

Representatives of Croatia and the region's Serbs signed an agreement in November 1995, under which the region is to be placed under U.N. Transitional Administration for one year, with the possibility of extending the period for another year.

Speaking about the demilitarization of the region, which should end by June 20, Stanimirovic said that the majority of Serbs had handed over their weapons and that military units had been disbanded.

He said that Croatia's recently adopted law on partial amnesty of Serbs had alarmed the population, but that he hoped the problem would be overcome with a full realization of the November 1995 agreement.

Croatia: Slavonian Serbs Testify to Croatian Crimes

AU0606133396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0746 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 6 Jun (BETA-AFP)—Vojin Dabic, chairman of the Serb information center in eastern Slavonia, has announced that the Serbs are in a position to prove that the Croatian regime was guilty of many crimes against the Serbs in that region even before the war broke out in 1991.

"Eyewitness accounts and other evidence of crimes against the Serbs in Vukovar and in the whole of eastern Slavonia will nullify the arguments of the Hague tribunal and Croatian propaganda, which accuse the Serbs of having started a rebellion," Vojin Dabic told reporters yesterday.

According to him, the Serbs were only responding in 1991 to the terror organized by "criminals under the protection of the regime of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman."

Dabic said that the Hague tribunal investigators had been informed about the fact that Croatian authorities were guilty of crimes against the Serb population even before the armed clashes.

He stressed that at the end of May a group of international investigators in Vukovar had gathered eyewitness accounts of war crimes against the Serbs.

Dabic said that the Hague tribunal's investigators were expected to arrive soon, and added that with the help of many associates—including one former captain in the Yugoslav People's Army—he had prepared comprehensive documentation that will be handed over to the International War Crimes Tribunal.

FYROM: Bill on NATO Status of Forces Passed

AU0506162196 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Report by Stojan Trencevski—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Commentator] Members of all political parties in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly are holding the 47th session today. The bill on SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] of NATO and the Partnership for Peace member countries was passed. The parliamentarian debate continued according to the agenda, discussing the initiative for a referendum on early parliamentarian elections that are to be held by the end of the year organized by the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party. While the initiative was explained in the assembly, several hundreds of citizens were outside the building demanding early elections. Stojan Trencevski reports on the course of the session:

[Trencevski] After he had informed the members of parliament about the SOFA agreement with NATO and the Partnership for Peace member countries, which regulates the positions of the preventive forces in our country, Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski asked the members of parliament to pass the bill on the ratification of this agreement urgently.

[Handziski] Our individual program was prepared in the shortest possible time, and it was accepted by the two relevant structures of NATO, that is the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Military Committee, in March this year. The usual procedure for the country proposer and NATO representatives is to hold a official ceremony, following which the individual program is implemented in practice. Since Secretary General Solana had a lot of other duties in the period following the adoption of our individual program, we agreed with NATO to start with the implementation of our individual program immediately, without holding the official ceremony. So, since March 1996, we have started to realize our individual program. According to this individual program, our first joint activities will take place in July, in the exercises of NATO and the Partnership for Peace countries to be held in Albania starting from 15 July. Here, the first Macedonian unit—that is, a company—will participate, and it is going to leave for Albania on 13 July 1996.

[Trencevski] Furthermore, Minister Handziski briefly explained the basic importance of the bill that ratifies the agreement and defines the status of the Partnership for Peace forces, and, indicating that this means that the Macedonian armed forces will participate in military exercises in the region, Macedonian Defense Minister said as follows:

[Handziski] These are documents that we cannot change. It is our duty to decide whether we will take on the obligations from these documents or not. This means that the law on the ratification is practically a kind of a political decision taken by the assembly and state that specifies whether we are joining the agreement or not. We have good starting foundations and concise needs. The foundations refer to the fact that this assembly took such a political decision on 23 December 1993 when it decided on membership of NATO. The needs are contained in the fact that we will have joint activities with NATO and Partnership for Peace countries. Their armed forces will take part in activities in Macedonia and ours on their territories, and it is necessary for us to regulate their status by such an international agreement.

[Trencevski] Furthermore, on behalf of their parliamentarian groups, Ismet Ramadani, Ljupco Popovski, Zoran Krstevski, Mirko Tripunovski, Rufi Osmani, and Faik Abdi supported this bill, in favor of which all 86 members of the assembly voted.

Particular interest was demonstrated in the initiative for a referendum on early elections to be held by the end of the year. Before the parliamentarian debate started, the leaders of the VMRO-DPMNE and the Democratic Party, Ljupco Georgievski and Petar Gosev, presented an expanded justification for the initiative. In his elaboration, which lasted for nearly a whole hour, Georgievski said that the referendum is a constitutional duty and a moral debt to, as he said, the 218,000 citizens who signed for the referendum. He also presented the following arguments:

[Georgievski] The drop in production in the Republic of Macedonia during the administration of this government is nearly 50 percent compared to the period before this government started to administer the economy. The average annual drop in the production in the Republic of Macedonia is 10 to 15 times greater. There has been an increased trade deficit since the moment this government began to administer the country. The most characteristic and dreadful data refers to the last three months, in which exports have fallen by 38 percent in only the first three months of 1996. The county's foreign debt is $1.0007 billion, something that will burden this generation and the next two generations to come. Macedonia's debt toward the people who have bank savings is around $1 billion. The per capita GNP is about $690. The official rate of unemployment is 30 percent, although the statistics show that it is over

35 percent and that it is speeding toward 40 percent. [passage omitted]

FYROM: Gligorov Appoints First Ambassador to Belgrade

LD3105182296 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1516 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 31 May (FONET)—Slavko Milosavlevski has been appointed as the first ambassador of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the MAKFAKS news agency reported.

The Macedonian president's office has announced that President Kiro Gligorov today appointed Slavko Milosavlevski the first ambassador to Belgrade. [passage omitted]

FYROM: Macedonia, Slovenia Promote Cooperation

LD0506191996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1854 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, June 5 (TANJUG)—Slovenian and Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Prime Ministers Janez Drnovsek and Brane Crvenkovski signed here on wednesday an agreement on mutual protection and stimulation of investments and protocols on cooperation in education and sports until 1998 and on protection of the environment.

Addressing reporters, Drnovsek and Crvenkovski highly estimated the overall relations between the two former Yugoslav republics and expressed expectation that there will be room for a considerable expansion of bilateral cooperation and 'coordination in joint approach to (the question of) succession to the former Yugoslavia.'

Drnovsek said that the positions of the two sides in view of succession were almost identical and that it marked continuation in efforts to ensure that all successor-countries participate equally in inheriting the former Yugoslavia.

Crvenkovski expressed hope that Macedonian products will be reaching the Slovenian market faster in the future, and said that he expected the old thoroughfares through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia to open soon.

FYROM: Efforts Needed on Road to EU Outlined

AU0506082196 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 1 Jun 96 p 14

[Commentary by Borjan Jovanovski: "European Union-Macedonia: 1:1"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the second part of the match (negotiation on the Agreement for cooperation and trade) the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] team evened up the score with the goal by Jane Miljovski, the captain, at the last minute. The match continues. We have control of the ball.

The regional approach definitely does not precondition the development of European-Macedonian relations with the relations of Macedonia and former Yugoslavia. Instead of this, Macedonia has been located in a space that has been defined as Southeast Europe, which means that the unfortunate ex-Yugoslav basket has been abandoned.

The evolutionary clause defines that Macedonia's aspirations are to sign an Agreement on associated membership, which means the anteroom of the European Union. The European side made some concessions in fixing quotas for the export of our goods to European markets. There is also the financial protocol which allows us a favorable credit of 150 million ecu. And so on and so forth.... In brief, the Macedonian negotiating team has managed to get the maximum that could be obtained from Europe at this moment.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the European negotiating team has left the field defeated. The evolutionary clause, which is to be incorporated in the agreement, gives no guarantee that Macedonia will reach any kind of agreement in future, let alone full membership in the big European family. In this case, it simply means that the road to Europe has been opened. However, we have to travel this road alone. The agreement is not a taxi service that will give us a ride to the desired destination.

The evolutionary clause, as it calls itself, respects our aspirations for signing the Agreement on associated membership in the Union, but it does not neglect the fact that it will depend on the accomplished results. This means that the fine and democratic Constitution will have to be transformed from a piece of paper into a daily reality.

In this sense, this and every other government will have the greatest responsibility. The responsibility needed from all the other structures in the country is no smaller. Instead of understanding it as a possibility for cursing the president of the state, democracy will have to be transformed into a system of thinking. Furthermore, it means that a sensibility for listening to the needs of every minority for maintaining its cultural and language identity will have to be developed. This particularly refers to us because we have a percentage of minorities that is higher than in most of the European countries.

All this has been designated in the formulation of the evolutionary clause in the Agreement, which can for a while be of some small help and a catalyst to the enormous mental process required to build a society that is compatible with those of Europe.

A few words about the regional question. Here, the European negotiators did not give up their principles either, although the Macedonian negotiating team received what it wanted. After the new round of negotiations, the regional approach does not directly place conditions on Macedonia regarding the development of neighborly relations.

However, this in no way means that, for instance, good Finnish-Macedonian relations will be sufficient for a new progress in relations with the 15. In this case, Macedonia is requested, as much as it can, to try to create an atmosphere in which the terms like "our friends—the Albanians, the Romanians, or the Bulgarians" will become a part of the political discourse and of daily manners, the way the member countries of the Union actually communicate with one another.

Generally, this atmosphere cannot be created only through exports or imports of the famous trucks. This communication will have to be opened on all fronts, and its results must certainly be economic interests and first of all cultural communications and rapprochement as the only possibility for knocking down all Balkan stereotypes and prejudices.

Finally, a few words about the chance that the Agreement gives to our production. The tobacco and agricultural products have favorable access to the European markets, which may be of vital interest for our economy. However, the Agreement does not commit the European consignees of the product "made in Macedonia" to receive, for instance, a truck of strawberries that has been loaded with a shovel, no matter how good their quality is. The rules of the game will again have to be strictly adapted to European standards.

If the Macedonian Government and the European commission accept the result that has been reached at the latest round of the negotiations, the Agreement on cooperation with the European Union will be signed in the near future. In the next four years, which is the duration of the Agreement, the competition with Europe will continue. As I said at the beginning, we have control of the ball. However, in order to score a point this time, Miljovski will need the efforts of a team that in this case numbers 2 million players.

FYROM: Editorial Considers Preparation Needed for EU

AU0506090296 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Jun 96 p 13

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "Easily Promised Speed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political team and the man who heads Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] when it makes the big leap and joins the European Union will be remembered and glorified forever in the history of this state. There is no doubt that the government or party that is in power at that time will attribute the whole success to themselves, but there is also no doubt at all that this is not going to happen any time soon: Not in three, nor in five, nor in ten years.

In the past "partisan" five years, as a high ranking Macedonian diplomat called this period, much time and energy was spent reaching the stage in which the naked existence of the state is not directly imperiled or used as a pretext for what we have done or have not done. As the EU has demonstrated to us so clearly, now is the sobering time, the time to shed illusions—regardless of whether they themselves have been fostering them in us or whether we ourselves wanted to believe in them. As a mediator in the Yugoslav crisis and an active mediator in the ongoing Greek-Macedonian dispute, the EU used a promise to view favorably Macedonia's candidacy for EU membership as a "carrot" to gain concessions from the Macedonian side. Moved by the European diplomats' readily given promises, the Macedonian politicians have so far projected the image in public that Europe is just round the corner, and that the situation in this region must be settled before we "enter" Europe, when everything will be much better for us and all the neighbors will live happily ever after in the big European family. With the intensification of the talks in Brussels, it became clear that the road to the EU and full membership will be long and hard. The immediate consensus on the agreement on joining the EU and NATO is not sufficient, because, contrary to the political agreement, economic compatibility and the degree of development represent conditions that cannot be bypassed. Nobody can anticipate beforehand the development of the dispute with Greece, or how much Athens is prepared to support Macedonia in its association with the 15 countries, let alone whether it is going to use the same blackmail that it is applying to Turkey at the moment. Besides, at this moment nobody can anticipate whether the EU members will want to expand at all at the time Macedonia is ready. It will be really ready to join Europe the moment it starts thinking whether it really needs to join the Union.

During last week's talks in Brussels on the cooperation agreement, more realistic and sober tunes were heard from the Macedonian negotiating team. The reasons are, first, the increased caution on the part of the EU regarding its own expansion, and second, the priorities of the expansion itself. In simple words, it means that the Balkans is not the first on the list. It is the counties of eastern Europe to which priority should be given because of their strategic importance for the maintenance of peace and security on the whole continent. This is the reason that the Macedonian side was so allergic to the term "region" and that it wished to be treated outside the Balkan groups. It is clear that—despite the association agreements with Romania and Albania—EU's strategic interest for its own states has not been fully defined.

At the moment, the Macedonian strategy seems to be contained in two components: A little sentiment and servility ("we were good, consider us first"), a little warning ("if you leave us aside, we will continue to be the apple of discord"). Does this work in Brussels? For the time being, it probably does. Europe, however, would be attracted more if we started thinking and acting like Europeans. This is not a preconditions, but if we clean up the streets, towns, and restrooms, and if we are not so upset when somebody exclaims "down with the government" it would be no bad thing.

FYROM: Constitutional Basis for Referendum on Elections

LD0406215196 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 2000 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At its 47th session today, the parliament of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] passed a law ratifying an agreement between the states for the regulation of the status of forces of member countries of the NATO Partnership for Peace.

Following a lengthy debate on the proposal for calling a referendum on early elections, parliament reached the conclusion that there was no constitutional basis for it:

[begin recording] [Unidentified member of parliament] The Commission for the Political System is proposing that the Assembly adopt the following conclusion:

First, the assembly deems that there is no constitutional basis for adopting a decision to call a referendum for early elections for Macedonian Assembly deputies.

The assembly has concluded that the referendum, at the proposal of 150,000 citizens, in accordance with Article 73, Paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, can be called only in connection with the issues within the competence of the assembly, not in connection with calling early elections for Macedonian Assembly deputies.

Second, this conclusion is to be forwarded to the coordination committee of the referendum initiators.

Those in favor of the proposed conclusion raise your hands. Sixty-six deputies have voted for.

Is anybody against?

Eighteen deputies have voted against.

Are there any abstentions?

One abstention.

I conclude that the assembly has adopted the proposed conclusion. [end recording] [passage omitted]

FYROM: Free Debate on Government Performance Urged

AU0506083396 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 1 Jun 96 p 13

[Commentary by Aleksandar Soljakovski: "The Forces of Free Expression"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the next few days, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] will discuss the initiative for the collection of the 150,000 (more precisely over 170,000) signatures for a referendum on early elections.

What is going to happen? By all accounts—nothing! The initiative will be played down, drawn out, constitutionally convicted.... The Assembly will declare that it is not authorized, and the members of the government will declare themselves not competent (which isn't far from the truth, if we want to be malicious).

The author of these lines will be very happy if this does not happen. If he is proved wrong, if the assessment proves to be false, then there will be a really democratic act of the first degree in Macedonia, one that would be respectable for even much more developed democracies, for far longer parliamentary traditions than ours.

It is to be expected that those who welcome the day when democracy was born in the Macedonian Assembly (when the coalition was breaking apart) will proceed in the same style. Democratic, I mean.

Let us talk straight—nobody has any illusion that new elections would bring a drastic improvement. The political forces are fragmented, as is the mood of the voters. Even the initiators of the referendum, who easily (easily and rapidly) collected an enormous number of signatures, are not prepared for new elections. The only thing they can do is to mend the failures after their catastrophic withdrawal from the elections in 1994 and take their place in the Assembly. That is better than nothing!

It is also true that if two parties could not go along so far, there will be at least five in a new government. It is also true that a new government would not be able to bring anything significantly better. It would have to build its whole image on the postulate that "it has to correct the mistakes of the old government." It is also true that for a long time Macedonia will be wallowing in its inability to create sound political forces capable of bringing progress or radically changing what has been neglected over generations.

All this is true, but what is really certain is that this government has not fulfilled expectations and has not managed to get away from the syndrome of stagnation and backwardness. The people are unhappy and an enormous number of them have signed the initiative for a referendum. An enormous number in this small country where fear of politics is a historical experience that is deeply rooted in the public consciousness and even in the folklore.

For the first time, this people has decided to try and say "no" to the government. This is the first time, and this force has to be respected. Why? Because of democracy, because of the need to prevent the forces from the past from awakening, the forces of darkness (do not worry, they are here, around us, watching), and this is something that has not been overcome yet.

This government will have to reexamine itself. Will it do so in a legal, constitutional way? Will it have to be faced with the challenges of democracy within the framework of the system, without proclaiming the strikes "illegal," and the conditions for going on strike "inappropriate," thus proclaiming them "attempts to destroy the establishment," and as having a "political agenda" (what else could there be)?

The coalition that helped win the elections is being discussed in a very unconvincing way. It is normal for the voters to feel manipulated. After all, matters are not improving (now the Liberals are gone). On the contrary! The citizens have signed. Something that is fortunate for democracy has happened—the revolt has been expressed in a way that is as legitimate as tears. Are we going to wait for "the people to happen?" God save us! When the bearers of the slogans in the streets become a weapon against the heads of the adversaries, then nothing much is left of democracy.

Furthermore, it is very important to recognize that the power is in the hands of systems of modern communism. Not only are they not ashamed of this, but on the contrary, they emphasize it. In their documents, they proclaim themselves successors to the former Yugoslav League of Communists and Macedonian League of Communists. This was all done with the aim of preserving the property of the rich communists, and they are not ashamed of their sources. We know the problem with the communists, however, and why the whole democratic world, the whole progressive public, sought to destroy it. To put it simply, the moment it grabs power, communism, like any other totalitarian regime, is not willing to let it go at any cost! Here lies the nub, here lies the syndrome that, like the vampire from the past, leaves no room for democracy.

Legality, a sound approach to these problems, is all right. The people have expressed the will to vote again or in a different manner. They have the right to say "I think in a different way, I will try to promote my ideas in a public, democratic, and legitimate way"—I will endeavor, I will fight, to convince people that they are wrong. I will use all the power and legitimate means (there are plenty of them, thank God) to make the voter think carefully about what is best for him. On the other hand, I will respect the results of his vote. Why? Well, in the name of democracy, freedom, a better future. It so simple and yet so difficult!

FYROM: Territorial Scheme Projects 44 Bilingual Communes

AU3105170296 Skopje MIC in English 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "There are some remarks that the territorial division is politicized and that the greatest politization is done on the line of inter-ethnic relations. The element of inter-ethnic relations was not a part of the concept for one minute. This concept improves the inter-ethnic relations, and the arguments for that are the following: Out of 34 municipalities, 11 are bilingual (Albanian language) which amounts to 32.35 percent. According to the proposal for 11 new municipalities, 44 will be bilingual, which makes 39.64 percent. 36 municipalities will be bilingual—Albanian language (32.45 percent), six will also be in Turkish language, and two in Serbian language," the Minister of Justice Vlado Popovski emphasized in yesterday's introductory speech in the Macedonian [The

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly, discussing the proposal to adopt a Law on territorial division of Macedonia.

Speaking of the concept to draw up the proposal, he pointed out that it includes the principle of separation of the rural from the urban localities, as naturally as possible. This would stop the atrophy of over-populated city entities and the exodus from villages. At the same time, the new territorial division, according to Popovski, will help the cities solve their own infrastructure problems, and the rural regions to be revived economically, for, at the moment, 250,000 acres of arable land remain abandoned in Macedonia.

Dzeladin Murati, who had the first word, tabled a number of remarks from a technical aspect (lack of comparative indicators), and presented a large number of illogical situations: Struga, with 62,000 inhabitants, is divided up into 7 municipalities, and Strumica, with 90,000 inhabitants, has only 3 new local units! He emphasized that this tendency will lead to the quantity losing the quality. Murati also pointed out the administrative procedure of bringing the proposal, the disintegration of the area and the concrete reactions of the population from the Tetovo municipality.

In presenting experiences from Denmark, Slovenia and Croatia, Zoran Sapuric (Liberal Party) emphasized that a new concept from 50 to 60 municipalities should be made, which would be more endurable for the citizens. He stressed that the new municipalities will require a new administrative organ with 2,000 employees and new expenditure of DEM50 million year [German marks]. "Denmark really has 252 municipalities with 5 million inhabitants, but it is also one of the richest countries and we can not compare ourselves with it."

FYROM: Poisoning of Students Given 'Political Dimension'

AU3105170696 Skopje MIC in English 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The People's Democratic Party (NDP—ethnic Albanians) wants the international missions of the United Nations and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to launch an investigation and expert analysis into the poisoning of the Tetovo high school students in the Struga hotel Galeb, as it "does not have any confidence in the Macedonian authorities." This gives the case a political dimension, contrary the public calls to avoid politization of the, for the time being, unexplained poisoning of the students.

NDP which doubts that the true findings of the commission of the Ministry of Health, and eventually, the Interior Ministry, will ever be revealed, has sent a letter to the head of the UNPREDEP mission Henrik Sokalski, requesting that the mission makes a parallel chemical analysis in its own laboratory, or if necessary, to send biological materials for analysis abroad.

Fifty-three students from the secondary medical school "Nikola Stein" from Tetovo were kept for hospital treatment three days ago, immediately after their one-day field-trip to Struga. At the moment, medical officials are waiting for the results of other analyses for which it is necessary to receive some reagents from abroad. Dr. Dragan Filipovic from the Tetovo Medical Center claims that the reasons for poisoning are still not known, but it is definitely certain that spoiled food is not the "culprit." Doctors claim that the poisoned children are out of any critical danger. Dr. Marija Spirovska from the infectious department of the Tetovo Medical Center says that the hospital now holds twenty students who are recovering. Nine students have been transferred to the Infectious Clinic in Skopje for determining the reasons for poisoning, and not because they are more critical cases, as speculated, Dr. Filipovic said. The parents of these nine students have no reason for concern.

However, while the official results are awaited, the parents' discontent is mounting. All kinds of versions are being made up, and the general atmosphere in Tetovo is heating up.

This entire case is very reminiscent of the poisoning of Albanian students in Kosovo in 1990. At the time, it was determined that war gases were used. This time, the symptoms are similar, Bedredin Ibrahimi, secretary of NDP claims.

According to Ibrahimi, the possibility should not be ruled out that this is case of diversion and that those who master-minded this scheme should be sought among those "who don't wish Macedonia anything good," and the motive would be "raising the inter-ethnic tension and destabilization of the country."

For this reason precisely, the NDP will insist that the international organizations, OSCE and UNPREDEP, as neutral instances, prepare a complete official report, and to submit it to the public. Allegedly, the two missions in Skopje have already formed a joint team which has visited the children in Tetovo, taken blood samples and other biological materials for analysis.

This tragic event should not be politicized without any previous objective and relevant analysis. Every prognosis and presumption, would be unappreciated and counter-productive at this moment, says Mersel Bilali from PDP.

He categorically dismisses any speculations which have reached him, that the children are simulating that they are poisoned: "The children are truly ill and the doctors have confirmed that. Claims that they are simulating is pure absurd," Bilali claims Hisen Ramadani, representative in the Macedonian Parliament and politicologist, places the entire case in a broader context: "The international peace is bothering some factors from outside and some extremist nationalist circles in the country. We should not rule out the possibility that the background to this incident is political, for instance, intensification of the relations between the Macedonians and Albanians. In this case, the state should react with mobility and expertize, especially the Interior Ministry, in order to confirm or eliminate any eventual criminal or terrorist components in this case," Ramadani says.

Ramadani urges that the principle of transparency is adhered to to the maximum in this case, and that the public is kept up to date with all results and findings, as a prevention against unfounded presumptions, which are easily spread and which can be detrimental.

Speaking about the poisoning of the Tetovo students on Wednesday, the Minister of Health Ilija Filipce urged that the case is not politicized and promised speedy investigation results. Unfortunately, the speculations are quicker than the results from the analyses, which are expected to come in today.

Poland: Prime Minister Cimoszewicz Interviewed

LD0506220996 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2026 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz by Jerzy Marek Nowakowski; place and date not given; from the "Raison d'Etat" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Nowakowski] Good evening. When we talk about a state's foreign policy, we usually talk about the role of the minister of foreign affairs, we talk about the role of the president, and we talk—and I hope more fully in this program in the near future—about the role of parliament. But we very often forget about the chairman of the Council of Ministers, about the superior, if only nominally so, of the minister of foreign affairs. This is why I am very pleased that Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz is today's program guest. Prime Minister: A question I have been asking myself for some time now is the question of to what extent the foreign affairs minister is the subordinate of the prime minister or the president. Do you feel you are the boss of the foreign affairs minister?

[Cimoszewicz] I understand that your possible doubts do not relate to what this relationship is in the eyes of the law and that your question is really about what these relationships are like in practice: who creates Polish foreign policy and who implements it. [passage omitted]

[Nowakowski] For a good few years there were questions—and there were even special subcommissions in the outgoing parliament—about coordinating foreign policy. There were instances of a senator going off and saying one thing, a deputy going off and saying something different, then a minister saying something else, and another minister saying something different from all three. This is when people abroad start scratching their heads and begin to ask where Poland stands.

[Cimoszewicz] To some extent these differences of view and differing statements are inevitable and natural. There is no reason that deputies should all speak with the same voice in unison with the government or with the president. More often than not, they represent their own views, and they have every right to do this. Problems begin to set in only when the general content of statements and concepts implemented by the supreme bodies of state—in other words, the Sejm as a whole—when the Sejm adopts, for instance, bills that accept or reject government foreign policy directions or when the president, prime minister, or the whole government create the impression that they do not have the same approach or the same view or when there is downright conflict between them. In the past few years, we have had cases of this, but thankfully these were isolated incidents. [passage omitted] Fortunately, we have all this behind us. There are no problems like this today. [passage omitted]

[Nowakowski] Let me recall the case that has received the fairly unfortunate name of the Suwalki corridor [linking Russia to Kaliningrad Region via Belarus and Poland] and various small agreements that together have created the impression—and let us hope it is just an impression—that there is some sort of tendency by our Russian partners, in particular, of building extraterritorial and nonextraterritorial, but in any case not necessarily with our knowledge and agreement, roads across the territory of Poland. [passage omitted] Is there not a danger that ministers will sign a certain number of small agreements that will all be pulled together into one whole on the desk of one of our foreign partners, not necessarily Russia? Could something like this happen?

[Cimoszewicz] One must not lose sight of at least the theoretical risk of such a situation arising. But it appears to me that in practical terms this is very unlikely. [passage omitted] But, if I may, I would like to comment on the example itself that you have quoted. I would resolutely like to stress that this refers to the past and that there was only an impression and not facts. What is important to me is what the official representatives of our partners, Russia in this case, say officially. I had the opportunity to speak during the conference of heads of government of the Baltic states in Visby several weeks ago with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. I also had the opportunity to talk earlier with other members of the Russian Government. Not a single one of them said there should be some sort of special extraterritorial solution employing special conditions.

At a certain point, there was a somewhat amusing situation: After the conference in Visby, we had a farewell dinner given by the governor of Gotland. Before the dinner, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin told me that he had just come back from a news conference at which a Polish journalist had asked a question about the corridor. He told me that he explained to the journalist that Russia wanted a normal corridor. At this point I almost took my head in my hands and said to him: Prime Minister, you are using this concept in some sort of technical sense. But in Poland this has, above all, a historical-political connotation [Gdansk corridor used by the Germans to launch their attack on Poland at the start of World War II]. And this is an unfortunate difference in the way we understand and interpret this matter. Please never mention any corridor if all you mean is straightforward transit that is carried out according to European standards. Poland is, of course, as a transit state interested in the development of transit. But it does not and cannot accept any special rights for anyone as regards transit. Chernomyrdin fully agreed with this. So I think there was much more noise and anxiety than warranted generated in this specific matter. [passage omitted]

[Nowakowski] Now a fairly banal question: What are we going to do about Kaliningrad? Or perhaps I should put it another way: What would be the best and most interesting development of the situation in this region from our point of view?

[Cimoszewicz] Our relations with Kaliningrad are, of course, just a fragment of our relations with Russia. We attach great importance to these relations developing well in all spheres. But we do not hide the fact that we are concentrating our attention on the economic sphere. This is why certain plans, which are now evident, by the Russian authorities as regards Kaliningrad Region expressed, among others, in President Yeltsin's decree of a few weeks ago on creating a special economic sphere there correspond to Polish interests. At present, about 500 Polish enterprises are operating in Kaliningrad Region. And the fact that it will be possible in this region, in its capacity as a special economic zone, to process to some extent our manufactured goods before then exporting them duty-free to Russia creates an excellent opportunity for us to expand our exports.

[Nowakowski] The development of exports and economic contacts with our third neighbor traveling southward—in other words, Belarus—did not look too bad. But right now there is a certain question mark over this Belarus as regards Polish policy. There was the very nasty and unfortunate matter connected with the detention and expulsion of Mr. Marian Krzaklewski [on 14-15 May]. There is a whole number of question marks around the matter of human rights, the observance of human rights, in Belarus. But Belarus appears to be an important partner, so what are we to do with Belarus?

[Cimoszewicz] We wish to have the best possible relations with all of our neighbors. We must, of course, respect the internal choices made by the public of these states, and this includes Belarus. Belarus has the right to choose its own path irrespective of whether we, from our point of view, see this choice as being correct or not. But there is a certain qualification to this: Belarus, in the same way as all states, must respect the currently accepted standards for civic rights and freedoms. And here the stance of Poland is clear and will not change. In the very unfortunate incident connected with the detention of Mr. Krzaklewski, the Polish Government reacted unambiguously and immediately. But I would like to view this incident as being something that will not be repeated in the future and as having no effect on relations between Belarus and us.

In this instance, these common, as I see them, interests have, on the one hand, economic significance—our exports to Belarus and turnover in general over the past period, particularly last year, increased greatly, by more than 70 percent—and, on the other, very great social significance if one takes into account the fact that hundreds of thousands of Poles live in Belarus and that in Poland we have a large Belarusian minority. We are trying to maintain contacts that are as close as possible with our Belarusian partner, but I cannot hide the fact that in particular its internal economic problems, which I think are connected to a large extent with a lack of boldness in undertaking economic reform, might threaten our exchange. The latest decisions, which block the hitherto fairly free use of convertible currencies for trade transactions, threaten to ruin Polish exports to this market. [passage omitted]

[Nowakowski] We have not talked about Russia, we have not talked about NATO, and we have not talked about the structure of the State Protection Office. My last brief question is whether the whole Oleksy affair has or has not damaged our international image.

[Cimoszewicz] It has, in my view, but I should add that fortunately this has been to a limited extent. I think that the way we reacted to this matter—on the one hand submitting all of the procedures to democratic supervision by parliament and, on the other, observing in a very consistent manner the principles of adhering to the law in clearing up this matter—will positively alter this image.

[Nowakowski] Many thanks, Prime Minister, for the interview, and thanks to you, viewers, for your attention.

Poland: Security Office Head on Policies, Missiles

WS0606103096 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
1 Jun 96 pp 17-18

[Interview with Jerzy Milewski, chief of the Polish Office of National Security, by Janina Paradowska; place and date not given: "Civilians Fear the Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Paradowska] Janusz Onyszkiewicz's attempts at forming the State Security Council have failed. What do you think was the cause of the fiasco of the mission?

[Milewski] In my view, it was primarily the differences on the issue within the Freedom Union. It is not insignificant that Janusz Onyszkiewicz [who, having been appointed by President Kwasniewski to form the Council, has recently resigned] became a member of that party just days earlier. He probably enjoyed far greater freedom when he was nonaligned.

[Paradowska] Were there big differences of opinion between President Kwasniewski and Deputy Onyszkiewicz on the constitution of the Council and its activities? One of the alleged reasons that Onyszkiewicz abandoned the mission was the fear that the Council would not be sovereign.

[Milewski] There were no clashing concepts. The Council was to be made up of esteemed experts on state security, recognized as authorities and representing a wide spectrum of political views. However, there was no restriction that the body is to consist exclusively of representatives of parliamentary groups. It was agreed that Council members are to be appointed not on the basis of the offices they hold, but personally by the president. Such a solution guarantees greater freedom for expressing views.

[Paradowska] In your opinion, is the fact that the Council has not yet been formed a failure of the president, with whom many political groups are unwilling to cooperate, or rather of the opposition, which is unable to reach an internal agreement even on the few issues fundamental for state security?

[Milewski] This is, most of all, a loss for state security. Let us not exaggerate, however. The president's initiative was unprecedented as far as the experiences of democratic states are concerned. In the West, it is in fact a rule that advisory bodies to presidents and prime ministers are made up of people of similar political backgrounds. Naturally, the successful formation of a politically diverse body would enhance security and the attainment of our strategic objectives. Our situation still remains different from that of stable democracies. In many areas consensus is formal rather than real.

[Paradowska] Having come from an altogether different political camp, do you feel any political affinity with Aleksander Kwasniewski?

[Milewski] Solidarity was not a political camp. It was a diverse movement of opposition to a totalitarian system and Soviet domination over Poland. I came to work for the Chancellery of President Kwasniewski because I thought he would effectively implement a policy of security and restructuring of the Armed Forces, which I personally adhere to. My relations with the president will be best described if I say that he does what I think should be done in these areas. I find this far more important than the historical fact that I had been a Solidarity activist since August 1980. Communism was successfully overthrown seven years ago. Now we have to build a democracy. Thus, the state should be run by those most fit for the job.

[Paradowska] Do you want to say that performing the same function at Lech Walesa's side wore you down?

[Milewski] Toward the end, my activities at President Walesa's side were utterly futile. I saw him rarely, and the opportunities to talk with him were even less frequent. That is why I went on to work for the Ministry of National Defense [MON] at my own request. However, it soon turned out that my views on the Armed Forces, particularly on civilian control, were entirely different from the former president's. I was dismissed from MON at his orders soon after the [former Defense] Minister Kolodziejczyk was ousted.

[Paradowska] What would the National Security Council be needed for most today? The public generally perceives it as a body that groups politicians from all walks of political life, a pluralistic decoration.

[Milewski] It would serve not as an ornament, but as a forum for working out a consensus on security policy issues. It should not be a field for incessant political wrangling. This does not mean there is no room for fierce polemics. The Council could provide an excellent forum for such discussions.

[Paradowska] Are there any specific, current issues on which the Council could speak out and work out a consensus? It seems that affinity on security issues is particularly strong.

[Milewski] As far as general declarations of our will to join NATO and the EU—yes. When the question arises, however, of what this really means, what we should do to attain both strategic targets as soon as possible, it turns out there are no shared concepts to speak of. The deeper we delve into the details, the more shallow that affinity turns out to be. There are distinct differences of opinion on the role, organization, and equipment of our Armed Forces and on our functioning in international structures. I mean functioning and not passive hiding under NATO's umbrella. The same applies for key aspects of domestic security. These topics have not yet been exhaustively discussed, to say nothing of reaching affinity between the particular parties.

[Paradowska] Did the so-called Oleksy case have any impact on our security?

[Milewski] It undoubtedly had an impact on domestic security, yet I hope that it will not be detrimental to our membership in NATO. This is a temporary problem. We might become members of NATO in 1988 or 1999 and join the EU after 2000. By that time everyone will have forgotten about the case.

[Paradowska] Will they have also forgotten that we have the custom of disclosing secrets other states guard as closely as possible—names of turned agents, confidential diplomatic correspondence?

[Milewski] Such events show how young Polish democracy is, though Western politicians probably do keep in mind that we have been practicing this system for a mere six years.

[Paradowska] As head of the National Security Office, you are very liberal as far as the state's protection of its own secrets is concerned.

[Milewski] I do not deal with such details. My role at the president's side is to deal with strategic issues.

[Paradowska] You do, however, advise the president on security issues. The president himself is largely responsible for the unrestrained openness. He declared the "game was over" and demanded that everything be explained. Many politicians saw this as a threat to the state.

[Milewski] The president came forth with the initiative of vetting, which has to be finally carried out one way or another. Several political groups had previously come forth with similar initiatives.

[Paradowska] Do you support vetting?

[Milewski] I am for reasonably settling the "file affair." I also want my files for the past 34 years revealed because various people keep using them to defame me; I wrote about this in a letter to POLITYKA some time ago. I have known the contents of those files for several years now, and I know that they contain the most significant proof of the fact that I had not worked for the Security Administration (the documentation covers the years in which it existed). I will not discuss the details of the necessary vetting. It should be carried out reasonably so as not to put the state at risk of social unrest and political shock.

[Paradowska] Regarding the overall spheres of external and internal security, you feel most strongly about military affairs. Has anything significantly changed as far as civilian control over the Armed Forces is concerned from the moment you were dismissed as secretary of state at MON, due to pressure exerted by Lech Walesa?

[Milewski] Practically nothing has changed. Formally, however, a huge step forward has been made by passing the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister, which eliminates the duality of power that had existed up to now. The General Staff will be only one of the departments of MON. The problem is that work on the actual implementation of this law is too slow.

[Paradowska] One might occasionally have the impression that the will to expediently degrade the General Staff and get rid of its current head is the chief ambition of several people in the state. You are among them. This is not, however, a key issue for the military or for civilian control over the Armed Forces.

[Milewski] I have to strongly reject that type of thinking. I do not deny that a lot depends on the personal traits of people performing certain functions and that personal issues are important. But they are definitely not the most significant. It is important how you treat the Armed Forces. They cannot be an autonomous institution endowed with the right to decide about its own structure, set its own objectives, and select its own commanders. The Armed Forces must be an instrument for the implementation of defense policy, which is formulated by civilian politicians who are delegated to do so in elections; just like the police, which are treated as an apolitical instrument of domestic policy. If I speak about issues pertaining to cadre policy, it is with the purpose of cleansing the Armed Forces of solutions applied in the past era. Retaining them does not serve the state, let alone the Armed Forces.

[Paradowska] It is a fact, however, that many politicians from very different political camps toyed with the Armed Forces.

[Milewski] Since we are speaking about politicians, one might agree that without Lech Walesa's approval the Drawsko dinner would not have been possible. That event has still not been equivocally condemned or settled. The West sees it as a manifestation of our immaturity in exercising civilian control over the Armed Forces.

[Paradowska] How should it be settled? Should the participants finally resign from their posts?

[Milewski] It should be clearly stated that the event was highly ignoble and negative. Can the lack of such a statement not encourage the reoccurrence of similar events? I do not want to punish the military commanders who were the main stars of the show. What I do want is to remind the Armed Forces that certain rules have to be observed.

[Paradowska] It is up to the politicians to pass opinions. I truly do not understand what stands in the way of calling the Drawsko dinner by its name and drawing consequences now that Lech Walesa left office several months ago.

[Milewski] I believe a large share of our problems is due to the fact that politicians still tend to be rather strongly convinced that defense and military issues are the domain of the military, that people in the military are experts on both developing state defense policies and implementing them. Under the previous system, the Armed Forces were part of the political setup. This is now changing (albeit not without the resistance of some commanders), but politicians are either unwilling or too timid to enter this field. Please note that nearly one and a half years have elapsed since the Sejm debate on defense. A resolution was passed at the time providing for an increase of the military budget to 3 percent of the GDP. The government partially complied by projecting increased expenditures, but too little is being done in practice. There are no guidelines even concerning how much funding can be expected in the next few years. Thus, MON has no possibility of even developing a draft project for modernizing and equipping the Armed Forces for the next 15 years. (It is impossible to make such projections for shorter periods of time). This also shows the immaturity of our democracy.

[Paradowska] Meanwhile, the question of the cost of NATO membership is arising more and more frequently. It turns out it will be very expensive. Hence, the next question: Will we be able to afford it?

[Milewski] When I hear a question asked like that—and it does crop up ever more often—I get really irritated. The question is not formulated properly. Joining NATO will cost us exactly as much as we allocate for the purpose. The expenses will have to be covered by the state budget, but we can hope that our financial contribution will be lower than the financial aid we receive from the alliance for developing and modernizing the military infrastructure.

[Paradowska] That would sound idyllic were it not for the necessity of the very expensive modernization of our Armed Forces.

[Milewski] The costs of restructuring and modernizing our Armed Forces will undoubtedly be high, but we would have to spend that money even if we did not have any intention of joining NATO. We have to modernize equipment and restructure the Armed Forces in consideration of Poland's capacity to defend itself in the case of local conflicts and guaranteeing our Armed Forces with the possibility of cooperating with NATO forces in order to prevent the outbreak of a global crisis. Fortunately, the two are not mutually exclusive.

[Paradowska] A discussion is currently under way—some even call it a scandal—on the purchases of Israeli Raphael missiles. What is your view on the issue? How does the choice of this missile coincide with the cooperation you spoke of?

[Milewski] I think we are making a strategic mistake. We do not have to have ultramodern equipment. We should have arms that are widely used in Europe. We could then count on help in the field of logistics, have access to spare parts. What we do need are U.S. F-16 planes that the air forces of the United States and several other NATO states are largely equipped with, and not the unique Jas-39 aircraft. We need U.S. Hellfire missiles used by a number of NATO armies, and not the Israeli NT-D's, which practically do not yet exist. There are only prototypes developed by Raphael. Even the Israeli Armed Forces are currently using Hellfire missiles on a large scale and will continue to do so for years to come.

[Paradowska] Why, then, are we placing our bets on the Israeli missiles? Doesn't the Office of National Security have anything to say?

[Milewski] I keep hearing the argument that the Israeli missiles are more modern. However, we do not have to fill the void with the most modern equipment. Perhaps decisionmakers still need some more time to realize that we must not commit such strategic mistakes. Modernization of the Armed Forces is not limited to the problem of purchasing antitank missiles and planes.

[Paradowska] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Commission Adds Martial Law, Emergency Provisions

WS0506142596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5-6 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Agata Nowakowska: "The President Wants Less"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the National Assembly Constitutional Commission approved provisions on the Armed Forces and emergency situations.

Meanwhile, the Sejm will have to make a decision on the use of the Polish Army abroad and the permanent stationing of foreign troops in Poland or their relocation across Polish territory by passing separate laws on those issues. (In emergency situations, this can be done by the president at the government's request).

The commission added to the draft constitution the principle of "neutrality of the Armed Forces in political matters" and civil and democratic control over the military. It also determined who and under what circumstances has the right to impose a state of emergency in the country.

Thus, a state of natural calamity can only be declared by the government.

The president, at the request of the government, will declare martial law in the event of an "external danger posed to the state," an invasion, or when it is warranted by international agreements. Earlier, the president's representatives wanted the president to be able to single-handedly decide about imposing martial law. Yesterday, however, they backed out of this idea.

If the Sejm cannot convene during martial law, the president, at the request of the government, will issue directives that have the power of law and need to be approved by the Sejm.

The president, at the request of the government, would declare martial law for a period of 90 days in the event of a "danger posed to the constitutional system, security of the people, or public order." The Sejm can extend the state of emergency only once and just for two months. The president's representatives gave up their previous proposal, whereby it could be declared to defend "domestic security and the life and property of citizens."

Also yesterday, the commission decided that the Sejm must approve a presidential decision to impose martial law or a state of emergency within 48 hours. (Presidential aides withdrew their proposal to extend this period to 14 days).

The president still insists on setting up the State Protection Committee [KOP] with himself as its head. The committee would comprise the prime minister and ministers of defense, foreign affairs, public security, and administration. KOP would "coordinate activities by state bodies in the sphere of combat readiness and state security," as well as submit proposals to the president on using the Polish Army in the event of danger.

The proposed creation of KOP has provoked much controversy. The Freedom Union, for example, believes that this would significantly expand presidential powers. This issue will be put to a vote today.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz has sent to the Constitutional Commission a proposal on the preamble. The prime minister would like the constitution to begin with the introduction from the 3d May Constitution [of 1793].

Poland: Belgium's Poncelet Offers To Sell Surplus F-16's

BR0506153996 Brussels LE SOIR in French 5 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Olivier Alsteens: "Belgian F-16's Soon Flying in Polish Skies?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—The conference center at the Polish Defense Ministry still has something of the old regime about it. The lobby is big and flashy. The ceiling lights diffuse a dim light. Thick carpets cover the floor. It makes a curious contrast with the dynamism in the streets of Warsaw.

Although the military remains suspicious of the press, Polish Defense Minister Dobrzanski answers directly the dozen journalists he met in the company of Belgian Defense Minister Jean-Pol Poncelet.

Cooperation between the Belgian and Polish military is becoming increasingly concrete. "The assessment of our common activities is very positive," stressed Minister Dobrzanski. "There are many possibilities to expand this cooperation."

These include closer links between the Belgian and Polish Navies, with joint maneuvers in the Baltic, but also air maneuvers over Poland. Belgian F-16 fighters will soon be flying between Gdansk and Krakow. Staff operations are also likely to be organized in the near future. But the Polish forces first want to develop changes in operational standards. "We want to achieve compatibility with the NATO and WEU [Western European Union] Armies as quickly as possible," emphasized the Polish minister, stressing the role of the Belgians in such a development.

The discussion between the two ministers also extended to geopolitical developments in the region. Although certain Polish officers make no secret of their concern at the rapprochement between the Republic of Belarus and Russia, others fear that certain NATO candidate members, such as Poland, are currently embarking on a dangerous course that could even call into question probable NATO enlargement.

This very diplomatic language is in fact intended to evoke tensions between Hungary, a NATO candidate, and Romania. The Poles also seem to want to create a special status for countries unable to accede to NATO in the short term, to which Foreign Minister Poncelet replied, in a speech made in Dutch, that he "under no circumstances wanted Poland's eastern border to become a new dividing line between two worlds."

Learning that the Polish Army is considering renewing its equipment, and its fighter planes in particular, Jean-

Pol Poncelet mentioned that Belgium has a surplus of 40 F-16 fighters and that Belgian industrialists have substantial experience in servicing and improving these aircraft....

"F-16 fighters will most probably be flying in Polish skies," stated Dobrzanski. "But I cannot confirm today that Belgian F-16 fighters will be equipping our Air Force. Polish laws oblige us to respect a procedure of call for tenders. If we buy the F-16 fighters, from Belgium or elsewhere, it is also possible that we will arrange for maintenance in Belgium."

The Polish minister again expressed his satisfaction at the excellent contact with his Belgian opposite number who, he stressed, "will be assuming the WEU presidency from 1 July to 31 December next. We look forward to an extension of our cooperation during this period."

Poland: Deputy Interior Minister Alleged To Be 'O''s Plant

WS0506145296 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5-6 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Krzysztof Kaszynski and Jacek Podgorski: "Did Colonel Anklewicz Play 'O' With the Russians?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The source of agent "O" mentioned in the note that served as a basis for leveling espionage charges against [former] Prime Minister Oleksy was an officer of the Office of State Protection [UOP] overseeing an operational stratagem with Soviet Army Intelligence [GRU]. ZYCIE WARSZAWY sources claim it could have been current Deputy Interior Minister Andrzej Anklewicz.

From the very moment the operational stratagem was contrived, the Russian GRU intelligence services were convinced they had a high-ranking and well-informed agent under the code name "O." In truth, however, they were being fed information fabricated by UOP. ZYCIE WARSZAWY sources indicate that the officer overseeing the operation—and "O's" information source—was most probably Andrzej Anklewicz. Grigoriy Yakimishin, the KGB colonel allegedly turned by General Zacharski, sold the Polish intelligence services a note assessing intelligence acquired by the Russian secret services from this very source. [Former Interior] Minister Andrzej Milczanowski used this note to level espionage charges against Prime Minister Oleksy.

The liaison between "O" and the GRU was Russian spy Marek Zielinski. The UOP stratagem led to Marek Zielinski's arrest in September 1993.

Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, asked by ZYCIE WARSZAWY whether the Polish secret services officer taking part in the operation against Zielinski is Deputy Minister Anklewicz, said: "You will never hear the name of any officer involved in special operations from my lips."

Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said on Tuesday morning [4 June] that "O" was an officer in the Polish secret services planted by UOP to carry out operations in an espionage case.

A few hours later, Deputy Janusz Zemke (Democratic Left Alliance) revealed that this was a reference to Marek Zielinski, arrested in September 1993 and sentenced for spying for Russia. Former Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny spoke of a possible double game back in January. Opposition deputies claim this is merely a hypothesis. Perhaps "O" and "Olin" are not one and the same person. The code name "O" was expanded to "Olin" by Grigoriy Yakimishin during talks with Polish intelligence officers working on the so-called Oleksy case.

Anklewicz met Zielinski when he was working in [former Foreign] Minister Kiszczak's office. He was in charge of contacts with parliament. Zielinski was an analyst on a special team of the minister's experts in 1981-89, where Anklewicz was in charge of the information department. The note written by the chief of the Russian station in Warsaw, which was the basis for leveling charges against Prime Minister Oleksy, mentioned that "O" had access to and good relations with subsequent interior ministers (Majewski, Milczanowski, and Macierewicz). Anklewicz cooperated with all three. This would account for the fact that "O" had access to the documents of the Sejm Internal Affairs Commission and the Sejm National Defense Commission.

Prosecutor Slawomir Gorzkiewicz, who supervised the so-called Oleksy case, was the prosecutor in the case against Marek Zielinski. This explains the ease with which the prosecutor discovered the personal data of "O."

Anklewicz told Radio Zet: "I consider the theory a good joke. I cannot say anything more. The interior minister did not absolve me of the responsibility of keeping a secret. Unlike others speaking to the media, I treat this case seriously."

Minister Andrzej Milczanowski said in a radio interview that he rejects the theory that a UOP officer was involved in a stratagem with the Russians.

Poland: Further on Agent 'O,' Operations Against Russians

WS0606100096 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5-6 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Krzysztof Kaszynski and Jacek Podgorski: "The Agent Who Created 'O'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Marek Zielinski, an agent of Soviet Army Intelligence [GRU], passed on information fabricated by the Office of State Protection [UOP] to the Russians. He was arrested at the Continental Restaurant in Warsaw thanks to a UOP officer referred to by the Russians by the code name "O."

Marek Zielinski, the first Russian spy arrested after World War II in Poland, worked for the Russian intelligence services from 1981 to 1993. Until 1989 he was an analyst on a special team of experts to the interior minister. After retiring from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Zielinski ran his own detective agency and became cofounder and chairman of the Employers Association of Firms Protecting People, Property, and Detective Services [Zrzeszenie Pracodawcow Firm Ochrony Osob, Mienia i Uslug Detektywistycznych]. In the early 1990's, Zielinski was targeted by UOP. However, it was decided that he would not be arrested and that the Polish services would launch a stratagem with the Russians. Most probably [current Deputy Interior Minister] Colonel Andrzej Anklewicz was delegated to carry out the operation. The Russians later gave him the code name "O."

Under the watchful eye of UOP, he fed Zielinski material prepared by the Polish services. Thus, "O's" role was providing Zielinski with both fabricated and authentic materials in order to mislead the GRU. At the end of September 1993, the Polish services decided to end the ploy by spectacularly arresting Zielinski as he was handing material to the Russian military attache, Colonel Vladimir Lomakin. Zielinski was arrested in the evening at the Continental Restaurant on Pulawska Street in Warsaw. Lomakin and Zielinski were taken to UOP headquarters on Rakowiecka Street. Both were searched and interrogated. Once Vladimir Lomakin's diplomatic status was confirmed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian attache was released. The next day he received orders to leave Poland for engaging in activities that transgressed his diplomatic duties. The Russians retaliated by ordering Polish Military Attache General Harmoza to leave Moscow.

Former chief of counterintelligence [at the UOP] Konstanty Miodowicz said after Zielinski's arrest that the agent had "supplied (the GRU with) top secret information that was conferred all the way up to the interior minister. Moreover, he was recruited by the KGB and admitted into the GRU after the Eastern bloc had collapsed." Miodowicz also added that, after 1990, Zielinski was to not only supply information, but also to recruit Polish officers.

In January 1990, at a session of the special Sejm commission investigating the legality of operations in the so-called Oleksy case, the then Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny said that some of those materials could have been fabricated by our services and fed to the Russians as part of a ploy. Asked yesterday by ZYCIE WARSZAWY whether the current disclosure of the mission of the UOP officer who later was referred by the Russians as "O" has anything to do with his January statement, Jerzy Konieczny said he "categorically refuses to say anything on the subject."

Opposition politicians, however, disclaim the theory that the agent "O" mentioned in the note was an officer of the Polish secret services who misinformed the Russians. Former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski totally rejects this theory and upholds the claims he raised in his Sejm address last December, in which he accused Oleksy of cooperating with foreign intelligence services.

Poland: White Paper on Oleksy Case To Be Issued Soon

WS0506145696 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Krzysztof Kaszynski and Jacek Podgorski: "Priceless White Paper"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A white paper including materials from the so-called Oleksy case will be issued by the Government Information Center as early as before the vacation period. "We intend to prepare two versions of the paper," Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska confirmed to ZYCIE WARSZAWY. "The full version, including all publishable materials, would be addressed primarily to journalists and politicians. The abridged version would be sold in bookstores and through the Ruch network of kiosks," Jakubowska stated. The government spokeswoman added that the popular version would be devoid of the documents repeating information already included in the paper.

According to ZYCIE WARSZAWY information, the full version of the white paper will include about 1,000 pages of typescript. Honorariums are not envisioned, and the title and price of the publication are not known. "We would like to publish it on a cost recovery basis, with a minimal markup that could be assigned for some noble social purpose," Jakubowska added.

According to Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech, the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office press officer, material for the paper has been selected by two military prosecutors carrying out the investigation, including Colonel Gorzkiewicz, as well as representatives of the Interior Ministry and Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office supervisory bodies.

[Interior] Minister Semiatkowski is thinking about supplementing the white paper with a report by the Interior Ministry inner commission assessing the method of work by the UOP [State Protection Office] officers who prepared the so-called Oleksy case. The report included a critical analysis of the officers' conduct and served as the reason for the dismissal of four intelligence officers from the UOP Board of Directors by Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski, chief of the special services.

Poland: SLD 'Does Not Insist' on May Elections

WS0506135596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5-6 May 96 p 3

[Report by "(RN)" under the "In Poland" rubric: "The SLD Is Not Insisting on May Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerzy Jaskiernia, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] deputy chairman, said that the Alliance does not insist on holding [legislative] elections in May. So, if the PSL [Polish Peasants' Party] reiterates its opposition, the elections will take place as scheduled—that is, between September and November of next year. President Aleksander Kwasniewski 10 days ago supported the SLD's proposal to hold the elections in May so that a new government would not have to deal with the budget prepared by the previous parliament. Sejm Marshal Jozef Zych of the PSL recently said that no force exists that could hasten the elections against the PSL's will.

Poland: Government Rejects PSL Amendment to Law on Land Sales

WS0506124696 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by E. Cz: "An Amendment Would Be Unjustified"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government did not back the draft amendment to the law on selling real estate to foreigners that was submitted by the Polish Peasant Party [PSL].

The government decided that such an amendment to the law, which was changed recently, would be a hasty and unjustified action. The recent change should be verified in practice for a period that would be sufficiently long to assess its functioning. Another amendment, the government argues, would undermine the credibility of the actions taken by the Polish legislative body among both foreign entrepreneurs and Polish citizens. In its draft amendment, the PSL demands, among other things, an introduction of a total ban on selling agricultural land, forests, and waters; it also demands that foreigners be allowed to purchase without permission only up to 0.4 hectares of nonagricultural land in the countryside.

Poland: Joint Commission Backs Powiats

WS3105142896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 31 May 96 p 2

[Report by B.I.W.: "Joint Commission of the Government and the Territorial Self-Government; In Favor of Powiats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The idea of including reestablishment of powiats [small administrative units] in the government program of state administration decentralization was backed by the Joint Commission of the Government and Territorial Self-Government yesterday. It was supported by all of the self-government organizations that were present at the session, including representatives of the National Self-Government Assembly. As for the latter, however, opponents of reestablishing powiats did not attend the meeting; they included Adam Struzik, Senate speaker and a senator of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL].*

During its 17th session, the commission listened to information on the main principles of the government program of state administration decentralization and on the broadening of self-governments' powers. Authors of the program assume that the Council of Ministers will deal with it before the summer vacations, that work on the draft program will be done in summer, and that in the fall it might be approved by the government. [passage omitted]

Romania: Melescanu Describes NACC Meeting in Berlin

AU0506151996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1935 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Doina Seiciuc in Bucharest on 3 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Seiciuc] For the correspondents who awaited him at Otopeni Airport, Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu summarized the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC] meeting held today in Berlin—a meeting that was also attended by North Atlantic alliance partner countries—as well as the meeting of the North Atlantic Council of the NATO countries' foreign ministers that was held yesterday. Mr. Teodor Melescanu mentioned that the meetings focused on two major issues.

[Melescanu] The first issue was discussed mainly in the North Atlantic Council, whose proceedings were held one day before our meeting. As you know, a few decisions were taken on creating a European defense identity within NATO and also certain measures to make NATO's actions more flexible and improve them, along with measures to reduce the military presence and military assets in general.

Regarding the enlargement, it was mainly the subject of the talks held within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, during a meeting that we held last night with Mr. Warren Christopher and during a meeting that the members of the North Atlantic Alliance held with Yevgeniy Primakov, the foreign minister of the Russian Federation.

As a matter of fact, everybody admitted and everybody emphasized that the major means for NATO expansion will continue to be the Partnership for Peace and its enlargement and the deepening of cooperation between the allied states, and the partner states is the surest way to create the necessary conditions for the enlargement of the alliance.

Regarding the Romanian delegation's participation, as I was telling you, I used this opportunity to present the strategy of Romania's NATO integration that was endorsed by the Country's Supreme Defensive Council on 3 June and, at the same time, to emphasize the importance that we attach to the Partnership for Peace, which we really regard as a means for the most rapid integration in NATO and not an alternative to this integration.

I would like to say that, in the talks with the U.S. secretary of state, Mr. Warren Christopher again stressed the determination of the U.S. Administration to continue the process of NATO enlargement, a process that was also supported by the German side. Chancellor Kohl, who opened today's conference proceedings, made a similar remark, stressing—I believe rightfully so—that the meeting is taking place in a symbolic place, namely Berlin, which was in fact the mirror of a Europe that was fighting separation and that is today the image of a united Europe. Therefore, I could say that these developments will continue. Everybody stressed that this is a second stage of the alliance's enlargement, the stage of individualized dialogue with the member countries, and that, probably in December this year, we will go on to the third stage, namely the stage when NATO is going to decide when and how this enlargement will be carried out.

As I have mentioned, I believe that this meeting in Berlin was interesting for everybody and primarily for us, the partner countries, and I believe that it opened up very important prospects, namely the revitalization of the alliance from the inside, something that also represents a very great contribution to finding solutions to the process of this alliance's enlargement.

[Seiciuc] The Romanian foreign minister was also asked to assess the position that Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeniy Primakov expressed in Berlin today, in the sense of a sort of flexibility of Moscow's viewpoint towards NATO enlargement.

[Melescanu] Mr. Primakov's speech today was an address of a general nature. It did not refer directly to Russia's position on NATO expansion. Certainly, he emphasized the fact that the example that everybody is giving, namely the IFOR [Implementation Force] in which partner states, including the armed forces of the Russian Federation, also participate along with member states, does not necessarily represents a model because we are talking about cooperation with a nonenlarged NATO. The situation would not be the same in the case of an enlarged NATO. However, it was certainly a position that I could say was expected, without being a position of very virulent opposition against NATO expansion. In general, the entire meeting unfolded in a very constructive atmosphere, in which the positions of each country were known without the need for them to be reiterated very emphatically.

Romania: UDMR's Marko Views Party's Performance

AU0506202696 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 5 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Bela Marko, chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by "pataky";

place and date not given: "Kolozsvar, the Black Sheep—Bela Marko: The RMDSZ Was Successful at the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the final results have not yet been officially published, the balance of power can be quite well seen at the Romanian local authority elections. We asked Bela Marko, chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] to assess the results.

[Marko] The RMDSZ has done well at the local authority elections. A Hungarian mayor was again elected in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], and the RMDSZ's mayoral candidates have been elected in some towns where we did not win four years ago. We have not yet added up the results, but it seems certain that the RMDSZ has managed to repeat its 1992 election results, and it has even improved them in some places. When making an assessment, it must be emphasized that participation was low and this applies to the whole population. However, it is positive that, in Transylvania, Funar's party [Romanian National Unity Party] has become very weak, the main government party [Party of Social Democracy of Romania] also had poor results, and the opposition parties fared relatively well.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Can the fact that many Hungarians voted for independent candidates in the Szeklers' Land be a criticism of the RMDSZ's activities?

[Marko] This must be the obvious reason, although we made changes in many places and set new candidates. I do not find the success of the independent Hungarian candidates very worrying because the Hungarians are living in a large mass in this area and pluralism has to prevail in some way.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Why, although Funar's party actually failed in the elections, was the party leader reelected as Kolozsvar [Cluj Napoca] mayor with a large majority?

[Marko] This success can be attributed to Funar's nationalist demagogy. The composition of Kolozsvar's population has been completely altered in two decades, a mass of 100,000 people was settled in the city mainly from beyond the Carpathians, and nationalist demagogy has an influence on this kind of mass without roots. Funar is the mayor of this mass of voters and, in the past four years, he has proved that he is trying to adjust Kolozsvar's image to this resettled population.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] What are the chances of the RMDSZ's mayor candidates in Nagyvarad [Oradea] and Szatmarnemeti [Satu Mare] in the second round?

[Marko] The second round will be harder for us. We would have had the chance for success in the first round mainly in Szatmarnemeti but, unfortunately, with the low participation, the Hungarian voters missed this opportunity.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Are the results of the local authority elections indicative in any way of the general parliamentary elections due in the autumn?

[Marko] We must not seek analogies between the local and parliamentary elections, but the former certainly are indicative of the latter. The main government party has given a poor performance throughout the country, and the opposition has done definitely well. This is a clear indication before the parliamentary elections.

Romania: PDAR, PUNR Say Voting 'Satisfactory'

AU0506154896

[FBIS Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 1300 GMT on 5 June carries a five-minute report on the stands taken by various parties on the 2 June local elections. According to the announcer, "Ion Stanciu, vice president of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR], said at a news conference today that his grouping obtained satisfactory results in the 2 June elections. Twenty-four PDAR mayors were elected in the first ballot and 115 qualified for the runoff in 12 counties." Stanciu is also quoted as saying that "the low turnout in the elections is a big problem for the future of democracy in Romania, something that proves the indifference and discontent of the citizens." Stanciu is also said to have criticized "the deficient preparation of the elections by the government."

The announcer says that at a news conference today, Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] Vice President Ioan Gavra stressed that "there were no winners or losers in the 2 June elections." He considered PUNR's results "satisfactory." Regarding the "breakup of the PDSR-PUNR alliance," Ioan Gavra is quoted as saying that "this will not happen soon." Nevertheless, "in the perspective of the forthcoming general elections, the PUNR vice president does not rule out the possibility of joining new alliances, because there are signs that the electorate has confidence in the political alliances."

The announcer says that "another party held a news conference today, namely the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD], whose leadership assesses that three important forces have left their imprint on the Romanian political life, after the latest local elections: the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], the Social Democratic Union [USD], and the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]." The

PNL-CD's Alexandru Popovici is quoted as saying that "the good results obtained by the CDR in the local elections must mobilize this political alliance to win the general elections, something that will happen only if the CDR political offer and candidates qualitatively exceed the political offer and candidates of the ruling parties."

Romania: PD, PAC Leaders View Strategy for Runoffs

AU0606163796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Electoral Bureau [BEC] informed us that, this morning, the situation of the centralized election results for the 36 counties that supplied complete data and the five counties, that is, Bihor, Constanta, Hunedoara, Iasi, and Olt, that supplied partial data, is as follows: Out of 2,467 electoral constituencies, new elections will be organized in 324 constituencies, and runoffs will be held in 1,431 constituencies. In the first round, 595 mayors were elected, representing 24.1 percent of the total number of seats. Likewise, 22,732 councilors have also been elected. Up to this hour, 24 counties have submitted the minutes with the final results of the local elections to the BEC. Results are still expected from 17 counties and from Bucharest Municipality.

The BEC issued a communique signed by its president, Adrian Nitoiu, and by five members of the Bureau, stating that the criticism directed against this body regarding deficiencies noticed in the organization and unfolding of local elections is unfounded. The communique, which was read during a news conference, states that, in accordance with a government decision, the Central Technical Commissions are in charge of the technical and administrative aspects, and the BEC is in charge solely of following the correct implementation of the legal rules regarding elections, seeing to it that the legal provisions are uniformly interpreted, and investigating reports of electoral fraud, an activity that is currently still being carried out intensively, concomitantly with the verification and centralization of data received from the county electoral bureaus.

In the local election runoffs, the Democratic Party [PD] will support the candidates of the opposition. At the PD news conference held today, PD Vice President Adrian Severin stated that he wishes that, in the localities where the Social Democratic Union [USD] has qualified for the runoffs, the other parties in the opposition will respond in the same manner. The PD vice president states that the mutual support granted to the candidates of the opposition will be an important step towards achieving an accord between the political forces of the opposition in view of the parliamentary and presidential elections. In the opinion of the PD vice president, the 2 June elections had negative effects, namely, the reconsolidation of the alliance between the PDSR and the PUNR [National Unity Party of Romania] and the change of the major leading party's attitude to setting the electoral threshold, meaning that it renounced the proposal to increase the threshold to 5 percent and is in favor of keeping it at 3 percent, the level stipulated by the current law on parliamentary elections.

Nicolae Manolescu, president of the Civil Alliance Party [PAC] stated today at his party's weekly news conference that the political formation he leads has not yet established a strategy for the local election runoffs, however, there is no doubt that the opposition candidates will be supported. On the other hand, the PAC leader accused the government of organizing the first round of elections poorly, adding that the town halls also have a share of blame, our correspondent Florin Lepadatu informed us.

The League for the Defense of Human Rights [LADO] has reconsidered its position and has decided to participate with observers in the local election runoff in Bucharest. LADO calls on all the observers in Bucharest who were accredited for 2 June and the observers who participated in the 1992 elections to come urgently to the LADO headquarters for accreditation. The message that the LADO faxed us mentions that the league also calls on all voters in Bucharest Municipality to come to the voting stations on 16 June to decide on the future of the capital city.

Federal

FRY: PM Pledges Cooperation With Hague Tribunal

LD0506172696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1710 GMT 5 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 5 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fully meets its obligations provided by the Dayton agreement in view of cooperation with The Hague tribunal for war crimes, it was heard in Wednesday's talks here between Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and The Hague Tribunal President Antonio Cassese.

So far, over 1,200 crimes against Serbs have been processed and the tribunal has access to those information, the Yugoslav information secretariat said in a statement.

Yugoslavia will in the future cooperate with the international court in keeping with its legal provisions, said the statement.

A government decision to open the tribunal's bureau in Belgrade is expected to make that cooperation more successful.

A number of objections were made on the work of the tribunal because of its failure to treat equally all suspected war criminals both in the process of bringing an indictment and in criminal proceedings, the statement said.

There is no need to adopt a special law on cooperation between Yugoslavia and The Hague tribunal, it was heard.

The Yugoslav legislation has been adjusted to relevant international conventions and deals with the offenses from the competence of The Hague court on the basis of international law, it was heard.

Yugoslavia is strongly committed to bring to justice all possible offenders of the international humanitarian law, which is evident from the fact that competent Yugoslav courts currently deal with requests from The Hague tribunal, it was heard in the talks.

FRY: Readiness To Cooperate With Hague Tribunal Reiterated

LD0506163896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1533 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Parliament's Lower House Speaker Radoman Bozovic and President of The Hague-based International War-Crimes Tribunal Antonio Cassese discussed here Wednesday Yugoslavia's cooperation with the tribunal.

Cassesse said the tribunal insisted on independence and impartiality in its work and on respect for international law, the Yugoslav parliament reported.

Bozovic reiterated Yugoslavia's readiness to cooperate with the tribunal on the basis of national and international legal norms. He said the gaining of full confidence in the tribunal's institutions and the application of the principle of personal responsibility were the basis for Yugoslavia's further steps in the legal and institutional regulation of the mutual cooperation.

Bozovic said the tribunal's independent role, dissociation from politics, work based on respect for facts and individual reponsibility were also prerequisites for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Bozovic and Cassese agreed that any other approach would bring into question the tribunal's authority, give rise to mistrust and spark further disagreements between the national entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Parliament reported.

Bozovic informed Cassese that proceedings for the legal regulation of cooperation with The Hague tribunal had not been instituted in the Yugoslav Parliament but that the cooperation no doubt had the support of legislators.

Bozovic also informed Cassese that criminal proceedings had been instituted by Yugoslav judicial authorities in cases of criminal responsibility for war crimes, including of persons indicted by The Hague tribunal.

FRY: Milutinovic Receives War Crimes Tribunal President

LD0506165196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1426 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Jun (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Affairs Minister Milan Milutinovic today received Antonio Cassese, the president of the International War Crimes Tribunal [in The Hague], the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced.

They examined current issues of cooperation between the FRY and the tribunal.

It was stated that the text of an agreement on the opening of a liaison bureau of the international tribunal in Belgrade has been coordinated between representatives of the FRY Government and representatives of the international tribunal.

It is expected that an agreement between the FRY and the United Nations will be officially signed soon. This will improve the tribunal's opportunities to gather more information and evidence on the crimes perpetrated in the former SFRY.

FRY: War Crimes Tribunal Head Meets Assembly's Bozovic

AU0506173596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1110 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Jun—International War Crimes Tribunal President Antonio Cassese expressed his regret that the Yugoslav Assembly has still not adopted the law on cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.

Following his talks with Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the Federal Assembly Citizens Chamber, Cassese said that Yugoslav authorities would have to adopt the law on cooperation with The Hague Tribunal which would make it possible for the people summoned to The Hague to be arrested and extradited.

The Hague Tribunal president will talk today with Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

"Bozovic promised me to try to cooperate better and I hope that will happen," Cassese said.

It has been learned that during the talks held behind closed doors, Bozovic told Cassese that most deputies, except for members of the radical right, approve of such a law being adopted.

Cassese said that he had not been given a special explanation why the law has still not been submitted to the Assembly. "Bozovic pointed out that it is necessary to create a political and practical atmosphere for that and I agreed with him."

The Hague Tribunal president recalled that laws on cooperation with the tribunal have already been adopted in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We have fully agreed that the duty of The Hague Tribunal is to insist upon individual responsibility and thereby replace collective responsibility. It is only individuals, whatever nationality or ethnic group they may belong to, who can perpetrate crimes, and not groups or states, Cassese said.

He also said that he did not talk with Bozovic about Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic.

FRY: War Crimes Tribunal To Demand Suspects' Extradition

AU0506193796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1110 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 June (BETA)—Antonio Cassese, chairman of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, stated today in Belgrade that he will demand that the Yugoslav authorities arrest and extradite the three officers indicted for war crimes committed in Vukovar, Croatia.

Cassese assessed the fact that the FRY has not still passed the act on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal as a violation of its international obligations.

Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the Council of Citizens of the Yugoslav Assembly, informed me that the act on cooperation with the Tribunal has not yet been put through an assembly procedure, Cassese said in an informal conversation with correspondents after the meeting with Bozovic.

Cassese will hold talks today with Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, and Justice Minister Uros Klikovac. He will then leave for Sarajevo.

If the representatives of the Yugoslav Government inform me that the act on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal is being prepared, I shall demand to see the draft and insist that they tell me when it will be passed, Cassese said.

He stated that he will be discussing with the Yugoslav officials the FRY's cooperation with the Tribunal, and disclosed a detail that the talks will touch upon the "sensitive" issue of Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, as well as the apprehension and extradition of the three former officers of the Yugoslav People's Army indicted for war crimes committed in Vukovar.

"By not having arrested Mladic when he appeared at the funeral of Gen. Djordje Djukic in Belgrade, the Yugoslav authorities have committed a severe violation of their international obligations. Mladic had to be arrested and extradited to the Tribunal," Cassese said.

He added that he will insist on the Yugoslav authorities arresting and extraditing the three other officers—Mile Mrksic, Veselin Sljivancanin, and Miroslav Radic.

Cassese said that Bozovic had informed him that the Supreme Military Court will decide on their fate. "I understood that the local authorities are contemplating the start of legal actions against them, but the Tribunal has a priority," Cassese said.

The chairman of the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague said that, in his conversation with Bozovic, he had stressed the Tribunal's impartiality, and that he would prove it to Minister Milutinovic.

"We are establishing individual criminal responsibility and are definitely discarding any collective responsibility," Cassese pointed out and assessed that, in the conversation with Bozovic, their attitudes have converged on several issues.

Cassese said that, in his conversation with the head of the Croatian diplomatic corps, Mate Granic, and other officials in Zagreb on 24 May, he had insisted on the arrest of Dario Kordic and Ivica Rajic, who are also indicted for war crimes.

Kordic, former chairman of the Croatian Democratic Community in Herzeg-Bosnia, has been indicted for war crimes committed by Croatian forces in central Bosnia in 1992.

"Karadzic and Kordic belong to the same sort. Both of them play the same foul role, one in Pale and the other one in Herzeg-Bosnia," Cassese said, adding that he made it clear to the authorities in Zagreb that they are obliged to arrest and extradite Kordic because "he and Rajic are under their authority and part of their responsibility."

He said that, in Zagreb, he had looked for evidence to be used in legal proceedings against the perpetrators of alleged crimes committed by the Croatian forces in Krajina in the course of Operation Storm last summer, and that the Tribunal would take over those cases if trials in Croatia proved to be inadequate.

Cassese stated that, in Sarajevo, he will insist on the soonest possible extradition of the two Muslims indicted for war crimes against Serbs in the Celebici detention camp.

I shall demand that the Sarajevo authorities hand over evidence to the Tribunal on crimes that "their people" committed, Cassese said, adding that all three sides are cooperating with the Tribunal inasmuch as they provide evidence about crimes committed by other sides, but not by their own side.

If those authorities believe in international justice, they ought to be consistent and hand over all the evidence they possess, Cassese said.

The Tribunal chairman visited Belgrade for the first time on 23 January, when he discussed the FRY's cooperation with the Tribunal with Foreign Minister Milutinovic and Justice Minister Klikovac.

FRY: Lower House, European Parliament Delegates Hold Talks

LD0506183996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1730 GMT 5 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 5 (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Yugoslav Parliament's lower house and President of the European Parliament's Committee for Southeastern Europe Doris Pak on Wednesday [5 June] discussed the situation in Yugoslavia and the region.

It is necessary to fully implement the Dayton agreement and speed up the democratization processes in the Balkans, it was said in the talks.

Yugoslav Committee President Milos Bojovic pointed at the need for a complete lifting of the international sanctions against Yugoslavia and said that Yugoslavia had always favoured peace, democratic processes and comhlete freedom of citizens, regardless of their nationality.

Bojovic also stressed the importance of Yugoslavia's speedy reintegration into international political, financial and trade organizations.

The Yugoslav delegation and European parliamentarians also discussed the causes for the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, position of national minorities and freedom of the press.

FRY: Foreign Policy To Focus on Regional Relations

LD0606122296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1128 GMT 6 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 6 (TANJUG)—Assistant Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic said the normalization of relations with former Yugoslav republics was a foreign policy priority.

In an interview to the Austrian journal MONITOR and the Belgrade journal REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Jovanovic pointed out that Yugoslavia had already in its constitutional declaration adopted on Apr. 27, 1992, expressed full respect of the rights and interests of newly formed states in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and confirmed that it has no territorial aspirations toward any sides.

The regulation of the many outstanding problems formed with the break-up of the former common state is possible only through political talks, the patient building of confidence and understanding, on the principles of good-neighborliness, Jovanovic said.

As normalization of relations is a two-way process, it is clear that it is expected that the other partners, on these bases, also make full contributions, he said.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sees mutual respect, confidence and cooperation of all Balkan countries on the grounds of equality and mutual interest, non-interference in internal affairs, as the foundation principles on which peace, stability and goodneighborliness in the Balkans is built, he said.

Jovanovic assessed the inclusion of the Balkans in European integration processes would be possible only through 'greater mutual cooperation, closeness, strengthening of confidence, overcoming all open issues through talks, and the intensification of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region.'

Jovanovic said Yugoslavia would continue to oppose any partial approach in the treatment of issues of vital interest for security, peace and stability in the Balkans.

The crisis in former Yugoslavia best shows how interference and the influence of outside Balkan factors, revival of old and forming of new spheres of influence in the region, which as a rule lies behind the different axes and transversals, can have tragic effects on the entire region, Jovanovic said.

Asked by monitor reporters how the Yugoslav Government intends to solve the alleged problem of the Kosovo and Metohija Province, Jovanovic said this was an internal affair of Serbia and Yugoslavia which should be resolved through dialogue of official state representatives and representatives of the Albanian national minority.

Jovanovic said the Albanian national minority in Yugoslavia enjoys all rights, which eables ethnic Albanians to preserve their national and cultural identity. They refuse to use these rights, however, in order to show that they are allegedly threatened and fulfil the separatist aspirations, he said.

Jovanovic welcomed the unequivocal stand of the international community that Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the Republic of Serbia.

We expect the community in future even more resolutely to use its influence on ethnic Albanians to accept dialogue and a life together for the stabilization of the situation in Kosovo and elsewhere in the region, Jovanovic said.

The Yugoslav authorities on several occasions proposed dialogue on all open issues, but not secession, to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, but they always flatly refused.

Serbia

Serbia: War Crimes Tribunal Head Insists on Extradition Law

AU0506184496 Paris AFP in English 1837 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 5 (AFP)—The head of the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague asked Belgrade on Wednesday to speed up the adoption of legislation allowing the extradition of war crimes suspects.

Antonio Cassese, the tribunal president, told reporters here that at a meeting with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, he had insisted that the Yugoslav parliament adopt such a law.

"Milutinovic assured me that (his government) was doing its best to help us as much as possible, but I think that this will take some time, and I am sorry about this because Zagreb and Sarajevo have already adopted such a law," Cassese said.

He said that, nonetheless, cooperation from Belgrade was progressively improving, even if the Yugoslav government had not yet agreed to hand over any war crimes suspects.

Cassese said that the tribunal would open an office in Belgrade soon. He said that the current holdup lay not with Belgrade but with the United Nations in New York, which had yet to approve the project.

"It's a bureaucratic problem and Milutinovic told us that we could start (working in Belgrade) as soon as possible, even without the formal opening (of a bureau). This is very good news," he said.

Cassese earlier met Yugoslav parliament speaker Radoman Bozovic. He is due to meet Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and Justice Minister Uros Klikovac before going on to Sarajevo.

In The Hague, the tribunal announced Wednesday that Cassese would next week ask the international community not to accept any bargaining over the arrest of the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who have both been indicted by the tribunal.

Serbia: IFOR Said To Try To Add RS to 'Unified' Bosnia

AU0506163896 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jun 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Arrest of Mladic and Karadzic—Just a Screen for United States and Germany To Unify Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The major uproar set off by reports on the possible arrest of General Ratko Mladic and Serb Republic [RS] President Radovan Karadzic is only a screen for the Implementation Force [IFOR], that is, the United States and Germany, to make certain, concrete preparations on the ground for the RS's addition to a unified and unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is claimed by NEDELJNI TELEGRAF's reliable sources with the General Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic [VSR].

"From the strategic and defense point of view, the VSR is already in a very inferior position in relation to the two armies in the Muslim-Croat federation. A great number of officers of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Muslim army are being trained at U.S. military academies. IFOR, which is already controlling the general staffs of the warring factions, as well as the arms that are still in use, is placing the VSR in a very difficult position. Just take the fact that Malaysia, following the demand of the United States, have allocated 60 million German marks to the Muslim army for the purchase of U.S.-made Abraham II tanks and Apache attack helicopters. The VSR has very outdated equipment and has no means to transform its ranks, which the other two sides are already doing at full steam thanks to huge financial donations from the Islamic world," says our source with the VSR General Staff.

In this context, one should also view IFOR's precisely planned actions on the ground. IFOR has set up its barracks housing a strong military force and modern equipment near every larger settlement in the RS. Therefore, it is no wonder that the commander of the IFOR land forces, Gen. Michael Walker, has relocated his staff precisely in Banja Luka. Along with this strategy, the International Police Task Force, which is not provided for by the Dayton accord, has taken over control of the corridor [at Brcko], and is trying to influence the personnel policy of the RS Interior Ministry, it is claimed by our sources in the Yugoslav Army [as published].

Montenegro

Montenegro: JUL Official 'Not Discounting' Coalition With DPS

AU0606083396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1252 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 5 Jun—Svetozar Simovic, member of the Yugoslav Left's [JUL] Main Council and coordinator for Montenegro said today that he was not discounting the possibility of an electoral coalition with the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] at the next parliamentary elections in Montenegro. "Montenegrin citizens have a traditionally positive stance toward Yugoslavia, so it is not surprising that young people in Montenegro, particularly educated people not affiliated with any party, are very interested in JUL," Simorivc said at the press conference, MONTENA-FAX reports.

JUL is for the equal treatment of all forms of property and does not oppose privatization. JUL is looking to the future, but with respect for tradition and the history of the Serbian and Montenegrin people, Simovic said. He condemned efforts to found national parties, stressing that as a rule, they always evolve into nationalist parties.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Kornblum Opens U.S. Center in Pristina

AU0506201396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1408 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 5 Jun (BETA)—John Kornblum, head U.S. mediator for former Yugoslavia, opened the U.S. Information Center in Kosovo in Pristina today.

Apart from Kornblum, attending the opening of the center were Rudolf Perina, charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, and Anne Sigmund, director of the U.S. Information Agency USIA for East Europe.

On behalf of the Kosovo authorities, the festivity was attended by Kosovo District leader Aleksa Jokic, his deputy Milos Nesovic, and Bosko Drobnjak, provincial secretary for informaton. Also present were Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and representatives of main Albanian political parties and associations.

Opening the Information Center, Kornblum, assistant U.S. secretary of state for Europe and Canada, said that the center's aim is to acquaint people with U.S. society and culture and that the Information Center is another "proof of permanent U.S. interest and concern for the people of the region."

Ibrahim Rugova assessed that the opening of the Center represents a historic day for Kosovo and the peoples living there. He expressed hope that this act will contribute to the peaceful solution of the Kosovo problem, on the basis of political will expressed by the people.

Rugova thanked U.S. President Bill Clinton and all other U.S. politicians who contributed to the founding of the Center in Kosovo.

"I think that this Center will be a house where two sides, Albanian and Serbian, will meet and exchange information. Today our guests were both Albanians and Serbs, including representatives of the authorities, who met each other, something that does not happen often....we will do everything with a view to contributing to dialogue among people," Kornblum said at the news conference held after the opening ceremony.

He added that the United States constantly exerts efforts in establishing dialogue and bringing people closer, but that this is not solely a U.S. problem, but also of the people in Kosovo and the region.

Before opening the center, Kornblum met Rugova, after which he said that he held a very open talk with the Kosovo Albanian leader. He added that he conveyed to Rugova the U.S. President's conviction that human rights will be respected in Kosovo.

Kornblum today also met representatives of Serbian authorities in Kosovo.

During the opening, several thousand people, mainly Albanians, gathered in the vicinity of the U.S. Information Center and cheered Rugova and the just-hoisted U.S. flag.

Due to the opening of the U.S. Information Center, the police have taken increased security measures in Pristina.

The staff of the U.S. Information Center in Kosovo at the moment consists of one American and one local member.

Kosovo: Albanian Leaders View Opening of U.S. Office

AU0506191096 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 5 Jun 96

[Telephone report by Ramadan Mucolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The representatives of political parties and public life, as well as the entire public in Kosova, assessed that the opening of the U.S. Information Office in Prishtina [Pristina] will be a contribution by the United States to a fair and peaceful solution to the Kosova issue.

Edita Tahiri, chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] Commission for Foreign Affairs, told Albanian Radio-Television that the opening of this office is an important moment that shows that Kosova and the Albanian issue have been acknowledged by the U.S. Administration. Tahiri added that this is further encouragement for the peaceful policy of the Albanians led by President Rugova.

Mark Krasniqi, chairman of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova, declared that the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina is a concrete step by the United States to further internationalize the Kosova issue, which should be followed by other countries, the European Union, and even the United Nations.

Dr. Rifat Blaku, deputy chairman of the Parliamentarian Party of Kosova, stressed that the U.S. office in Prishtina is a concrete step of the U.S. presence in Kosova. He expressed the hope that this form of the U.S. presence will be advanced to a high level of international cooperation.

Luljeta Pulaj Beqiri, chairman of one wing of the Social Democratic Party of Kosova, also viewed the newly opened U.S. office in Prishtina as a testament to the U.S. presence in Kosova.

Meanwhile, Gjergj Dedaj, chairman of the Liberal Party of Kosova, praised this as being due to the commitment of the legitimate leadership of Kosova for a just solution to the Kosova issue.

Xhemal Mustafa, information counselor of President Rugova, assessed that the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina is an important moment in the recent history of Kosova and a strong confirmation of the recognition and internationalization of the Kosova issue. The fact that the United States opened its first office in Prishtina testifies that the U.S. preoccupation, assistance, and interests in Kosova have already become identified and are assuming the character of a serious and promising institutionalization. Mr. Mustafa assessed that the U.S. office in Prishtina is important also for the fact that it will encourage western European countries to open offices in Kosova and that there are serious indications of this.

Avni Spahiu, editor in chief of the daily BUJKU and RILINDJA, stressed that the U.S. presence in Kosova is significant because it acknowledges the importance that Kosova has for peace and security in the region.

Ibrahim Osmani, the Voice of America correspondent from Kosova, said that the U.S. mission in Prishtina is the beginning of the international presence in Kosova. He expressed his conviction that, in the future, Prishtina will turn into an important diplomatic center.

On the occasion of the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina, President Rugova received greeting messages from Academician Mark Krasniqi, chairman of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova, and Riza Halimi, chairman of the Presheve [Presovo]-based Party for Democratic Action.

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